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2ABSTRACT 
Previous research on the demography of South Africa has not resolved whether the 
South African fertility decline should be viewed as rapid given the institutional forces 
ranged against the everyday lives of African South Africans, or as slow, given the 
country’s level of socio-economic development and the vigour with which successive 
governments implemented family planning programmes. 
The thesis presents a detailed demographic analysis of the South African fertility 
decline. By 1996, fertility among African women had fallen to 3.5 children per woman, 
not even half the level estimated for 1960. However, projected median birth intervals 
increased from around 30 months in 1970 to greater than 60 months by the late 1990s.  
Using official and historical sources, many of which are in Afrikaans, the thesis 
argues that the institutional context that prevailed under apartheid is responsible for the 
slow decline in African fertility and the increase in birth intervals. Birth intervals 
increased because African women used contraception for neither fertility limitation nor 
birth spacing as they are conventionally understood. This secular trend towards longer 
birth intervals is neither parity- nor cohort-specific. African women used modern 
contraception to postpone childbearing sine die as a result of the impositions of 
apartheid. Hence a third, new, pattern of contraceptive use is identified.  
The continued increase in birth intervals after the end of apartheid is not 
associated with changes in marriage patterns, or social instability caused by internal 
unrest. Birth intervals have increased most for educated, wealthier and urban women.  
Using the South African fertility decline as an example, the thesis argues that the 
institutional context in which a fertility decline occurs plays an important role in 
determining the pace of that decline. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
They said I should 
Learn to speak a little bit of English 
Maybe practise birth control 
Keep away from controversial politics… 
(Johnny Clegg and Savuka, “Third World Child”) 
 
Apartheid, in all its manifestations, impinged on every aspect of the daily lives of 
African South Africans1. Racial segregation, job reservation, restrictions on mobility, 
inferior education and health care provision were just some of the more obvious aspects 
of that system. However, recent histories have argued persuasively that apartheid was 
not a singular, coherent and hegemonic ideology, but an amalgam of policies forged out 
of conflict and compromise within the White ruling classes. Consequently, serious 
internal contradictions existed between different policy arenas. 
Demographic concerns were central to many apartheid policies. Hence, it is not 
surprising that these contradictions impacted both on the formulation of population 
policy and on demographic outcomes more generally. While official population policies 
sought to reduce African fertility (driven by White South Africans’ fear of being 
“swamped”), other policies ensured that Africans were systematically denied access to 
education, health care and urban residence. These factors have been shown to be 
important in determining the pace of fertility decline in a wide variety of settings in both 
the developing and developed world.  
This contradiction, while identified previously in the literature on the demography 
of South Africa under apartheid, has not been investigated fully before. Less is known 
about the historical dynamics of the fertility transition in South Africa than about those 
in many other sub-Saharan African countries. Government concerns about security and 
secrecy meant that little of the research into South African demography conducted 
between 1960 and 1990 by the government and its agencies was published, while the 
quality of census data collected on the African population was generally poor. 
                                                 
1 The use of apartheid-era classifications based on population group or skin colour should in no way be taken as condoning that 
system. However, the unfortunate legacy of apartheid and segregationist policies is such that most demographic outcomes differ in 
crucial ways according – broadly – to racial categorisations. The term “Black” in this thesis is used to denote all population groups 
that were historically disadvantaged by apartheid: Africans, Coloureds (people of mixed race) and Indians/Asians. However, in 
official (i.e. government) literature, the word “Black” usually refers specifically to Africans. 
13
Furthermore, those demographic findings that were made available to the public tended 
to be published only in Afrikaans. 
One consequence of this is that, in their seminal analysis of the South African 
fertility decline, Caldwell and Caldwell (1993) could not decide whether it should be 
viewed as being rapid or slow. According to them, the decline could be thought to have 
occurred relatively rapidly given the institutional forces ranged against African South 
Africans. On the other hand, they expressed surprise at the slow pace of the decline 
given the intensity of the family planning programmes implemented by successive 
governments after 1974, and the level of socio-economic development in South Africa 
relative to other developing countries. Like the Caldwells, the conclusions to Carol 
Kaufman’s doctoral thesis (Kaufman, 1996) tentatively favour the latter view. Both 
suggest that the political context in which African women made reproductive decisions 
may have inhibited a more rapid process of fertility decline. However, neither the 
Caldwells nor Kaufman attempted to analyse in any detail the possible reasons for this.  
 
Thus, one of this thesis’ principal aims is to investigate the extent to which the 
contradictions between population policy and polity mediated the South African fertility 
decline, and therefore are responsible to any degree for that slow pace of fertility 
change. In so doing, our knowledge and understanding of fertility change in South 
Africa over the last half-century is greatly expanded. Starting with the tentative 
conclusions reached by the Caldwells and Kaufman about the pace of the fertility 
decline in South Africa, the overall aim of the thesis is to answer the question: Why has 
fertility in South Africa declined so slowly? 
Three investigations, with different analytical and theoretical approaches, are 
employed to answer that question. The objective of the first is to redress the paucity of 
current and historical demographic evidence relating to the past trajectory of the South 
African fertility decline. Using data from two censuses, Chapter 3 derives more robust 
and verifiable estimates of the level of fertility among African women between 1960 and 
1998 than have been presented before. Similarly, better estimates of current levels of 
fertility in the country are calculated after a thorough and careful review of recent 
census and demographic survey data. These data, and their comparison with the trends 
in fertility in other sub-Saharan African countries, confirm the slow pace of the South 
African fertility decline. 
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Chapter 4 uses the results from the 1998 South Africa DHS and an earlier 
national demographic survey conducted between 1987 and 1989 to derive estimates of 
changes in parity progression and women’s birth intervals. The derivation of median 
birth intervals is unprecedented in the context of South African demography. With the 
sole exception of the results from a set of investigations conducted by the government 
in major metropolitan areas of the country in the late 1960s, investigations into birth 
intervals in South Africa have not been conducted before. A possibly unique pattern of 
childbearing among African South African women has therefore remained unnoticed 
until now. 
The objective of the second investigation, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, is to 
situate the results derived in the two preceding chapters in the broader social and 
political context of apartheid discourse on population matters. In and of themselves, the 
results derived in Chapters 3 and 4 are curious, and largely inexplicable. Chapter 5 
presents a history of the evolution of population policies in South Africa. It accesses 
sources that until recently were not available, as well as documents published only in 
Afrikaans. This chapter argues that the population policies adopted by successive 
apartheid governments reflected a syncretism between internationally dominant 
demographic paradigms and the particular needs of the apartheid polity. Chapter 6 
develops this analysis by examining the institutional consequences of the apartheid 
regime’s policies for African women’s childbearing. It argues that the particular pattern 
of fertility, childbearing and child spacing observed in South Africa is a logical, rational 
and coherent response to the institutional conditions under which African South 
Africans were forced to live their lives.  
The theoretical approach adopted in Chapter 6 is based on the ideas of Geoffrey 
McNicoll. His theorisations on the relationships between societal forces and individual 
demographic outcomes are integrated with Giddensian social theory and applied to the 
specific case of the South African polity over the years since 1948. As such, this aspect 
of the thesis represents a contribution to the growing field of “institutional 
demography” – an approach to the discipline that seeks to extricate the analysis of 
demographic processes from the realm of the individual, and to situate them firmly 
within broader institutional contexts. 
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An anomaly arises from these two investigations. Chapter 4 shows that median birth 
intervals in South Africa increased dramatically between 1970 and 1990, and continued 
to increase after the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. The material presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6, however, argues that the slow pace of fertility decline and the increase 
in birth intervals was the consequence of the social and institutional context of 
childbearing in South Africa under apartheid. Thus, a third set of investigations are 
undertaken with the objective of discriminating between different possible reasons for 
the continued increase in birth intervals in South Africa between the mid-1980s and the 
late 1990s. To achieve this, Chapter 7 takes a more rigorously statistical approach to the 
modelling and analysis of birth intervals in South Africa. A statistical approach to the 
measurement and modelling of changes in birth intervals in South Africa using two data 
sets is proposed and evaluated. Hypotheses relating to the continued increase in birth 
intervals in South Africa after the end of apartheid are formulated, and conclusions are 
drawn from the fitted models. 
The final chapter synthesises the results from the three investigations into an 
account of the South African fertility decline that provides an answer to the research 
question. Conclusions are drawn about the nature of the South African fertility decline. 
The limitations of the thesis and possible future avenues for research on fertility in 
South Africa are discussed. 
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2 FERTILITY AND BIRTH SPACING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FERTILITY: 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review establishes the background to, and the theoretical framework for, the thesis. 
It covers four areas: the pattern of fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa; the (rather 
limited) literature on the South African fertility decline; what is known about the length 
of birth intervals in South Africa and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa; and the 
relationship between institutions and fertility outcomes. This final part of the discussion 
pays particular attention to sociological concerns with structure and agency and 
establishes a theoretical position that informs the rest of the thesis. 
2.1 The fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa  
With the singular exception of South Africa, the fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa 
only began in the 1980s.  
Figure 2.1 Trends in fertility 1960-2000, selected African countries 
 
Source:  US Bureau of the Census (2001) 
Note: The inclusion of White South Africans in the data presented for South Africa reduces the 
reported level of fertility but does not affect the overall trend in South African fertility to any 
undue degree. Fertility among White South Africans has been close to replacement level since 
the mid-1970s, but they have always comprised a small proportion (less than a fifth) of the 
population. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows that fertility elsewhere in Southern and East Africa remained 
resolutely high from 1960 to 1980, while South Africa was experiencing a long and 
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gradual decline in fertility. Since 1980, however, the level of fertility has fallen faster in 
some of those countries than in South Africa. Over the 20 years between 1980 and 
2000, fertility in Kenya fell more rapidly than in South Africa (albeit from a higher base). 
The pace of fertility decline in both Kenya and Zimbabwe has outstripped that of the 
decline in South Africa since 1990. Thus, Figure 2.1 offers prima facie evidence that the 
process of fertility decline in South Africa is, in many respects, different to that 
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, having commenced earlier but progressing more slowly 
than that in many other countries in the region. 
Furthermore, until the decline in fertility in a few African countries (Lesotho, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Kenya in particular) became evident in the late 1980s, the 
literature on fertility in sub-Saharan Africa concentrated predominantly on the social, 
cultural and historical impediments to fertility decline. Much of this work drew on 
anthropological accounts and classifications of social and cultural aspects of kinship 
systems in the region, and of fertility inhibiting practices such as social proscriptions 
relating to the duration of postpartum abstinence and breastfeeding. Hence, according 
to Lesthaeghe,  
the central feature of reproduction in sub-Saharan Africa has 
been its reliance on a pattern of child-spacing operating through 
prolonged breast-feeding, or more accurately, through 
prolonged lactational amenorrhoea in combination with 
postpartum abstinence. (Lesthaeghe, 1984:9) 
In this, and subsequent work, Lesthaeghe identified a number of cultural patterns that 
maintained the reproductive systems observed in anthropological studies. In addition to 
those mentioned above, Lesthaeghe and his co-researchers argued that high levels of 
sterility, the polygynous structure of many African societies, and religious practices and 
proscriptions kept fertility high through their effect on the duration of postpartum 
abstinence (Lesthaeghe and Eelens, 1985).  
Lesthaeghe and others argue that these factors were self-reinforcing insofar as 
lengthy prescribed durations of postpartum abstinence served to maintain particular 
patterns of social organisation, dominance and kinship systems. Building on this work, 
and that of Schoenmaeckers, Shah, Lesthaeghe et al. (1981), they argued that strongly 
ritualised cultural forms and practices prevented and impeded change in childbearing 
practices in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Caldwell, Orubuloye and Caldwell (1992) suggest four props that served to 
maintain high levels of fertility in the region. The first, they argue, was the importance 
of ancestry and descent in many African societies, which acted as a spur to higher 
fertility: “high fertility was morally correct, and that childlessness or rearing few children 
was evil” (Caldwell, Orubuloye and Caldwell, 1992:214). Thus, according to this 
argument, both abortion and contraception were anathema in many African societies. 
Second, they argue that social systems in West and Middle Africa incorporating 
polygyny and child fostering meant that men and women had separate budgets, with 
women being expected to bear the costs of raising and feeding children, while men were 
able to extract value from children in the form of labour. Given the predominance of 
patriarchal societies in the region, the resultant bifurcation of costs associated with 
childbearing also served to exert upward pressure on fertility. Associated with this, the 
third prop was the productive systems that prevailed in sub-Saharan Africa. These 
systems also mitigated towards higher fertility, since systems of land tenure and 
cultivation required large amounts of labour. Finally, they suggest that structural issues 
associated with the African state attenuated and limited the efficacy of government 
population and family planning programmes.  
Non-demographers, too, directed attention to the role played by the state and the 
significance of institutional and cultural factors in advancing or impeding the fertility 
transition in the region. While some demographers have operationalised these factors in 
an attempt to model the institutional and cultural correlates of high fertility in the region 
(see, particularly, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988)), researchers from other disciplines 
have adopted historiographical and economic approaches to understanding the impact 
of these factors. One such example is the work of Morag Bell, which argues that 
political and economic considerations are also important in shaping our understanding 
of fertility regimes in sub-Saharan Africa: 
a complex network of biological, socio-economic and 
institutional factors influence fertility and underlying these is 
culture. The effects of Africa’s political, economic and social 
transformation on fertility is mediated through fundamental 
cultural norms and values relating to parenthood, family size 
and child rearing. It is the way in which these cultural beliefs 
and practices alter over space and time within the broader 
politico-economic context which influence the character of 
fertility patterns. (Bell, 1986:151-2) 
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The work of Lesthaeghe and his collaborators, the Caldwells and others help explain the 
historically high levels of fertility in sub-Saharan African societies. However, as Figure 
2.1 suggests, this research may be of limited applicability to the South African fertility 
decline. Nevertheless, both Bell and Lesthaeghe suggest (albeit in slightly different ways) 
that if the institutional structure of societies is of importance in determining fertility 
levels, then we must look to changes in institutional formations to make sense of the 
process of fertility decline.  
Cohen (1993) uses the results from the Demographic and Health Surveys 
conducted in many African countries in the 1980s to investigate cross-national fertility 
dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. His analysis identifies South Africa as an anomaly in 
the region, not only because of the relatively low fertility reported, but also because 
contraceptive use was much higher than in other sub-Saharan African countries. 
However, he issued a caveat about whether or not South Africa should be viewed as sui 
generis, and not entirely ‘African’, stating that “there will probably be a great deal of 
debate about the extent to which comparisons should be drawn between the South 
African experience and the experiences of other countries in the region” (Cohen, 
1993:24). The resolution of this debate is an important component of the thesis, and is 
addressed in subsequent chapters. The next section examines the literature on the South 
African fertility decline. 
2.2 Literature on South African fertility 
In the same year that Cohen expressed uncertainty about the comparability of South 
African demographic data with that from other sub-Saharan African countries, John and 
Pat Caldwell (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1993) introduced a journal article with the 
observation that “South Africa has remained a little-known area on the demographic 
map of Africa”. There are two principal reasons why South African demography has 
been (and remains) so under-examined.  
First, South African demography was hampered for most of the last century by 
inadequate census, vital registration and survey data relating to the African population. 
According to Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr (1987:3*)1, “the census coverage of the 
African population in the 1904, 1911 and 1921 censuses is regarded as being poor in all 
respects, the 1936 and 1970 censuses as reasonably good, and those of 1946, 1951, 1960 
                                                 
1 Throughout this chapter, an asterisk in the citation indicates that I have translated the quoted text from the original Afrikaans. 
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and 1980 again as less good”. The granting of ‘independence’ to the TBVC states2 
between 1976 and 1981 further exacerbated the difficulties of census data collection in 
the country. In 1980, the three then-independent states conducted their own censuses, 
while five separate censuses were conducted in 1985 and 1990. 
Questions on African fertility (the number of births in the last year and deaths of 
children under the age of 1 in the last year) were introduced in the 1960 census, and 
included again in the 1970 census. A further question on children ever borne was asked 
in the 1980 census. While “usable” age-specific fertility rates were derived from the 1960 
data, the results from the 1970 census “could not have given a true representation of 
reality,” and those from the 1980 census were so bad as to be “completely and utterly 
unusable” (Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr, 1987:4-5*). Thus, while many African 
countries began to collect useful data on fertility in their post-independence censuses, in 
South Africa the calculation of age-specific fertility rates directly from census data was 
impossible for the entire period from 1960 to 1996. 
Though the quality of census data on the African population was poor, the 
apartheid state’s vital registration system for Africans was possibly worse. As late as 
1985, vital statistics for Africans were described as a “black hole” (Botha and Bradshaw, 
1985), with serious gaps in the reporting of both births and deaths. The system of 
balkanised registration, split between the ‘White’ areas of the country, and the so-called 
‘homelands’, meant that probably less than half of Africans’ deaths were recorded 
officially (Dorrington, Bradshaw and Wegner, 1999). In theory, the registration of births 
should have been more complete, since all children require a birth certificate (and hence 
registration of birth) to enrol at school. Even with this requirement, a significant 
proportion of those births that are registered, are registered up to 10 years after they 
occur. According to Statistics South Africa (2001), of the 680 164 births occurring in 
1991 that have been registered (approximately half the estimate of actual births), 42.4 
percent were registered in 1991 or 1992, while fully 15.3 percent were registered in 1999 
or 2000. Births occurring in earlier years show similar patterns of late and under-
reporting. 
South Africa’s international isolation meant that it was excluded from the scope of 
the World Fertility Survey in the 1970s and the first rounds of the Demographic and 
Health Surveys programme. Despite this, large-scale household survey investigations 
                                                 
2 Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. 
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into the fertility of African South Africans were undertaken periodically in the 1970s and 
1980s by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the government’s official 
social science research body. An account of these surveys is given in van Zyl (1994). 
The most important of them were the 1974 investigation into fertility and family 
planning among Africans (Lötter and van Tonder, 1976), the 1982 WFS-type fertility 
survey (van Tonder, 1985), and the survey conducted between 1987 and 1989 using a 
questionnaire similar to that developed for the early rounds of the DHS (Mostert and 
Lötter, 1990). For reasons discussed later, however, the results of these surveys and 
studies were not disseminated widely.  
 
The second reason for the limited research on South African demography is that 
apartheid policies and practices politicised demographic research and its findings more 
than in most other countries. As Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr (three leading 
South African demographers) have noted, the Afrikaans term for demography, prior to 
the widespread adoption of the anglicism demografie, was politiese wiskunde (‘political 
arithmetic’), a term that neatly encapsulates the reflexive relationship that has existed 
between population and polity in the country3. Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr 
acknowledge the importance of this nexus:  
The political arena in South Africa is, to a large extent, 
dominated by the ‘arithmetic’ of the local population structure, 
while political decisions have, over the years, exerted a great 
influence on population trends… In the discussion of 
demographic trends in South Africa, ‘political arithmetic’ in this 
country will of necessity occupy a prominent place. (1988:59)  
It is on this “prominent place” afforded to the discussion of “political arithmetic” 
in the context of the apartheid state and the social, political and economic institutions 
that it engendered that this thesis concentrates. As is argued in detail in Chapter 5, the 
fear of Whites being “swamped” and the perceived need to limit African fertility were 
central to the evolution and rhetoric of apartheid policies. In addition, though, 
demographic data were regarded as being highly politically sensitive, resulting in a 
situation where demographic data collected on behalf of the South African government 
by the HSRC were not made generally available to researchers. The reports based on 
these surveys and studies were frequently published only in Afrikaans, thereby further 
                                                 
3 The term itself is not unique to South Africa, and was in common use in Europe in the eighteenth century. However, the overtly 
politicised connotations of the term are of heightened relevance in South Africa. 
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restricting their accessibility to outsiders. These documents, though sadly usually not the 
underlying data, are now available to the public through the HSRC library. Thus, a 
valuable resource has been opened up to researchers fluent in Afrikaans. 
Further, demography was absent from the teaching programmes of the English-
medium universities. In part, this reflected the ideologically tainted nature of South 
African demography and the paucity of data. The effect was to focus research emerging 
from these institutions not on South African demography per se (although some 
demographic research was done by individuals), but on sociological and anthropological 
contextualisations of demographic processes, as exemplified by the work of Preston-
Whyte (1978, 1988, 1994) and van der Vliet (1991).  
As a result, critical analyses of South African demographic data were rare until the 
early 1990s. One landmark investigation was that into the changing patterns of African 
culture, social and family structure and livelihoods arising from a study in the Eastern 
Cape in the 1950s conducted by Pauw (1963). This was among the first investigations to 
identify the rise of female-headed households in urban South Africa. Pauw’s work is 
also of importance because it was one of the few early investigations into the 
demography and sociology of the South African population to collect and analyse its 
own data. Most other articles and critiques relied extensively on government figures 
quoted in the press, or on statistics published in the South African Institute of Race 
Relations’ Annual Yearbooks. 
Thus, few demographers outside of the HSRC (and even fewer academics in other 
disciplines) wrote on South African fertility until the early 1990s, and those that then 
began to had to make do with unverifiable published statistics. As a consequence, what 
research was published tended to be derivative, insofar as demographers were unable to 
appraise or manipulate data themselves, and hence were forced to focus instead on 
presenting syntheses, summaries and alternative interpretations of what published data 
were available. Examples of this literature include Lucas (1992), Caldwell and Caldwell 
(1993), and Chimere-Dan (1993a, 1993b, 1994). In addition, some of these researchers 
were unfamiliar with the details of the political, social and economic history of South 
Africa, and frequently had to rely on the HSRC for assistance in translating and gaining 
access to government documents. This could, and frequently did, lead to erroneous 
interpretations of, and conclusions about, the level of South African fertility and the 
pace of the South African fertility decline.  
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While a huge literature exists on the politics, practice, economics and social 
implications of apartheid, a literature on the centrality of demographic concerns to the 
formulation of apartheid policies does not. Anthropological and sociological critiques of 
the implications of apartheid population policies, too, remained rare in the years before 
1980. The earliest published research detailing the nature and evolution of population 
policies in South Africa is that of Madi Gray (1980) and Barbara Brown (1987). Both 
identified the need to locate apartheid population policies in the broader context of the 
South African political economy, but neither Gray nor Brown accessed material written 
in Afrikaans or indeed much “official” data at all. To compound matters, these authors 
lacked the requisite demographic expertise to assess the data critically.  
Much of the historical, political and economic literature on apartheid that seeks to 
engage with aspects of South African demography also suffers from this problem. Hilda 
Bernstein’s otherwise powerful insights (Bernstein, 1975) into the burden borne by 
African women under apartheid, for example, are undermined by her inability to apply 
basic demographic techniques to South African census data. She draws exaggerated 
conclusions about the disruptive effect of apartheid policies on women’s lives by 
comparing the proportion of all White women married to that of all African women 
without standardising these by age. Given that population growth among Africans was 
consistently higher than that among Whites (as well as there being higher mortality 
among the former), the African population of South Africa was – and is – much 
younger than the White population. As a consequence, one would expect a smaller 
proportion of African women to be married, since marriage is strongly correlated with 
age. While these limitations do not detract from the substance of Bernstein’s argument, 
they indicate the extent to which basic demographic understandings have been absent 
from the literature on the effects of apartheid4.   
Two other factors contributed to the limited demographic research on South 
Africa. Apartheid policies and racial capitalism led many researchers (both local and 
international) to view South Africa as being not fully ‘African’, with the consequence 
that the country tended to be ignored in discussions of the demography of the sub-
continent. Furthermore, South Africa’s frequent omission from international statistical 
series (such as those published by the United Nations and the World Bank) meant that 
                                                 
4 A notable exception is the work of Charles Simkins, an economist, who derived population projections and investigated the 
demographic consequences of migration in the 1970s and 1980s (see, for example, Simkins (1983)) 
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data for South Africa were difficult to come by outside the country, and hence often 
ignored by non-specialists. These factors, together with the boycott of South Africa by 
foreign academics that commenced in earnest in the 1980s, have ensured that the 
demography of South Africa has remained a terra incognita on the international map for 
much longer than that of any other Southern African country. 
 
The most frequently cited estimates of past African and South African fertility (cited by 
Caldwell and Caldwell (1993) and Chimere-Dan (1993a) among others) are those from 
Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr (1987). Table 2.1 shows the “official” estimates of 
South African fertility from HSRC sources for the period 1945-95. The estimates for the 
period before 1980, however, need to be treated with more circumspection than has 
been afforded them by some, since they appear to have been determined as much by the 
original authors’ preconceptions as by the data collected5. 
The political transition that commenced in February 1990 allowed – for the first 
time in decades – non-governmental agencies to collect new demographic data. The 
1993 Living Standards and Development Study (SALDRU, 1994), organised with the 
assistance of the World Bank, is the first large-scale data set not collected by the South 
African government or its agencies that can be used to investigate demographic trends 
in South Africa. While the LSDS is primarily an economic and poverty study, it did 
collect important demographic data relating to fertility and mortality. In doing so, the 
study provided researchers with independent and alternative data with which to evaluate 
the level and context of South African fertility. Fuller and Liang (1999) used this study 
to explore the relationships between education and other socio-economic variables and 
teenage pregnancy, while Mencarini (1999) applied the same data to estimate the level 
and correlates of fertility in South Africa. Large-scale demographic surveillance projects 
have also been established in the last decade, with the most notable being that 
conducted at the Agincourt field site on the border between the Northern Province and 
Mpumalanga. 
                                                 
5 The authors used the 1936 South Africa Census results to project the African South African population on three different bases, 
with fertility and mortality assumptions as inputs. The first was a projection that led to an age-structure equivalent to that in the 
1970 census; the second a similar projection leading to the population age-structure in the 1980 Census; and the third (the one finally 
used) “a projection that is based on acceptable fertility rates, if none of the aforementioned projections are acceptable in terms of 
their fertility estimates” (Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr, 1987:31*). 
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Table 2.1 “Official” estimates of total fertility in South Africa, 1945-1995 
Period All South African women African women 
1945-50 6.0 6.8 
1950-55 6.1 6.8 
1955-60 6.0 6.7 
1960-65 6.0 6.7 
1965-70 5.8 6.5 
1970-75 5.5 6.3 
1975-80 4.9 5.8 
1980-85 4.6 5.4 - 5.6 
1985-90 4.0 4.6 
1990-95 3.5 4.0 
Source: Mostert, Hofmeyr, Oosthuizen et al. (1998) for All South Africans and Africans 1985-95; 
Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr (1987) for Africans 1945-85. The higher value for Africans in 
1980-85 comes from Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr (1987), the lower from Mostert, 
Hofmeyr, Oosthuizen et al. (1998).  
Note:  Oosthuizen (2000), citing the same sources, gives a figure of 3.6 for Africans in 1990-95. This 
figure is implausible, given that total fertility in the country was still estimated as 3.5 children per 
woman. Hence, his discussion on the “plummeting” decline in African fertility after 1980 
appears to be based on flawed data. 
 
With the political transition in the country, independent demographers were also 
granted access to previously restricted data sets. Kaufman’s doctoral research (Kaufman, 
1996; 1998; 2000) is an important milestone in the analysis of South African 
demography. She was among the first non-South Africans to gain access to the HSRC’s 
data and archives, and used the 1987-9 DHS-type survey to investigate the political 
context of reproductive control in South Africa. In so doing, she integrated 
demographic and political theory to give a subtler and more politically informed account 
of the dynamics and political context of contraceptive usage during the South African 
fertility transition than previously existed. Like the Caldwells, though, she was restricted 
by her inability to read Afrikaans, and had to rely on the assistance of the HSRC’s 
demographers to access and translate much of the historical literature. As a result, 
several important gaps exist in the literature that she was able to access. 
The post-apartheid government’s statistical agency, Statistics South Africa, has 
also become more willing to present and share demographic analyses. This has 
contributed to the debate on the level of fertility in South Africa. Two reports (Udjo, 
1997; 1998) presenting analyses of South African fertility using the 1995 October 
Household Survey (OHS) and the 1996 South Africa Census have been issued and the 
first independent assessments of the current level of fertility in the country using the 
1996 South Africa Census have started to emerge (Dorrington, 1999; Dorrington, 
Nannan and Bradshaw, 1999). A summary of published estimates of total fertility in 
South Africa using data collected since 1993 is shown in Table 2.2. It is evident that 
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even with the additional data now available, estimates of the level of South African 
fertility still vary substantially. 
Table 2.2 Estimates of total fertility in South Africa using data collected since 
1993 
 
Author and year of publication 
 
Population 
 
Data Source 
Year(s) to which 
estimate applies 
 
TFR 
Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) African 1996 census 1985 5.2 
Mencarini (1999) African 1993 LSDS 1984-88 4.8 
Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) African 1996 census 1990 4.7 
Mencarini (1999) African 1993 LSDS 1989-93 3.7 
Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) African 1996 census 1995 3.1 
Dorrington, Nannan and Bradshaw (1999) African 1996 census 1996 3.6 
Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) African 1996 census 1996 3.0 
Department of Health (1999) African 1998 DHS 1996-8 3.1 
     
Udjo (1997) All 1995 OHS* 1980 4.2 
Udjo (1997) All 1995 OHS 1985 3.5 
Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) All 1996 census 1985 4.5 
Udjo (1997) All 1995 OHS 1990 3.3 
Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) All 1996 census 1990 4.2 
Udjo (1997) All 1995 OHS 1995 3.2 
Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) All 1996 census 1995 2.9 
Udjo (1998) All 1996 census 1996 3.3 
Dorrington, Nannan and Bradshaw (1999) All 1996 census 1996 3.2 
Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) All 1996 census 1996 2.8 
Department of Health (1999) All 1998 DHS 1996-8 2.9 
∗ October Household Survey – a fairly small annual survey conducted by Statistics South Africa to 
provide basic econometric and demographic data, and used to derive mid-year population 
estimates. 
2.3 Birth spacing and contraceptive use in sub-Saharan Africa 
In the absence of easily available modern methods of contraception, birth spacing in 
sub-Saharan Africa traditionally has been shaped by long durations of breastfeeding and 
postpartum abstinence (Greene, 1998; Schoenmaeckers, Shah, Lesthaeghe et al., 1981). 
A common theme running through the literature on fertility in the region, however, is 
that cultural change and modernisation, in the absence of changes in contraceptive use, 
shorten the duration of both postpartum abstinence and breastfeeding, “thus increasing 
the risk of short intervals between births” (Greene, 1998). Many authors suggest that 
modern contraceptive methods are being used increasingly for birth spacing in their 
place, rather than for birth limitation (see, for example, Cohen, 1993; Greene, 1998; 
Kirk and Pillet, 1998).  
Data giving the median birth interval for thirteen sub-Saharan countries, 
presented by Greene (1998) and shown in Table 2.3, indicate that there is some 
variation in median birth intervals across the sub-continent, ranging from 28 months in 
Madagascar and Uganda to 39 months in Zimbabwe. Countries in this sample that 
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neighbour South Africa (Zimbabwe and Namibia) have longer intervals and, a priori, one 
might expect birth intervals for African South African women to be of a similar 
magnitude. 
Table 2.3 Median birth intervals (months) for births in the three (or five) 
years prior to the DHS, to non-sterilised married and cohabiting 
women, 13 sub-Saharan African countries 
Country (Year) Median birth interval (months) 
Madagascar (1992) 28 
Uganda (1995) 28 
Kenya (1993) 31 
Malawi (1992) 32 
Rwanda (1992) 32 
Senegal (1992-3) 32 
Tanzania (1991-2) 32 
Côte d’Ivoire (1994) 33 
Namibia (1992) 33 
Zambia (1996) 33 
Benin (1996) 36 
Ghana (1993) 36 
Zimbabwe (1994) 39 
Source: Greene (1998:32) 
 
Birth intervals, and their determinants, have received only cursory attention in the 
literature on South African demography. With the exception of the surveys conducted 
between 1969 and 1970 by the HSRC in four major metropolitan areas (Mostert, 1972; 
Mostert and du Plessis, 1972; Mostert and Engelbrecht, 1972; Mostert and van Eeden, 
1972) that indicated a mean closed birth interval length of around 30 months, no data 
relating to birth intervals in South Africa have been published. 
However, the literature on birth spacing and birth intervals elsewhere in sub-
Saharan Africa is possibly inappropriate to South Africa, and of little help in 
understanding the changes in South African birth intervals over the last 30 years. This 
literature refers mostly to West and Central African societies. South Africa is far more 
urbanised and industrialised and wealthier than any other country in the region, as Table 
2.4 shows. Furthermore, the racialised pattern of political, economic and social 
development in South Africa means that few similarities exist between the South 
African and other economies in the region.  
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Table 2.4 Economic and spatial characteristics of Southern African countries 
Country Population (m) GDP (PPP $ bn) GDP per capita ($) Percent urban 
South Africa 42.9 296.1 6900 50 
Namibia 1.7 7.1 4300 36 
Swaziland 1.0 4.2 4200 30 
Botswana 1.5 5.7 3900 27 
Zimbabwe 11.0 26.5 2400 31 
Lesotho 2.1 4.7 2240 22 
Kenya 28.2 45.1 1600 27 
Mozambique 18.7 18.7 1000 33 
Zambia 9.7 8.5 880 43 
Tanzania 42.4 23.3 550 24 
Source: Population and economic data come from the CIA World Factbook (2000), urbanisation data 
from the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements Report (United Nations, 1996). 
Population and economic data refer to 1999, data on urbanisation to 1994. 
 
Schoenmaeckers, Shah, Lesthaeghe et al. (1981) indicate that, historically, 
postpartum abstinence of a year or more was common among all the larger ethnic 
groups in South Africa: the Zulu, Xhosa, Venda, Tsonga and Basotho. However, the 
comparatively industrialised and urbanised South African economy means that the 
anthropological inquiries pursued by the contributors to Page and Lesthaeghe (1981), 
for example, may not add greatly to our understanding of the dynamics of childbearing 
in South Africa, except for purposes of historical comparison.   
Cultural change and modernisation have been important features of South African 
society for the better part of forty years. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, research into 
the lives of urban Africans (Pauw, 1963) revealed a syncretism of modern and 
traditional beliefs and practices, with both subject to continual reinterpretation. This 
process still continues (van der Vliet, 1991). Even studies conducted in very traditional 
and rural parts of the country point out the degree to which these communities interact 
with, and are affected by, broader social influences (see, for example, Kuckertz (1990)). 
However, beliefs and practices are not the only aspects of culture that have been subject 
to change. Recent ethnographic research in South Africa (James and Kaufman, 1997) 
shows that ethnic identity itself is increasingly fluid and constantly shaped and reshaped 
according to the social situations in which people find themselves. In these 
circumstances, it is unlikely that cultural determinants of postpartum abstinence and 
breastfeeding have remained strong among African South Africans. Evidence from the 
1998 South Africa Demographic and Health Survey supports this view. The mean 
length of postpartum abstinence (across all parities and age groups) between births 
among African women is 8.4 months, which is much shorter than that suggested above 
as an historical average.  
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2.4 Institutional analysis 
Beyond the determination of levels of, and trends in, fertility and birth intervals in South 
Africa, the thesis seeks to demonstrate the value of adopting an explicitly institutional 
framework in order to understand better the dynamics of the South African fertility 
decline. This section sets out the sociological thinking underpinning the institutional 
analysis of changes in fertility, defining what is meant by ‘institution’, and tracing the 
genesis of the application of institutional analysis to the investigation of fertility decline 
in developing countries. The advantages of adopting an institutional approach to the 
analysis of fertility declines are also discussed.  
2.4.1 What are institutions? 
In his theory of structuration, Anthony Giddens (1984, 1990) argues that the role of 
individuals and individual action (“agency”) has been neglected and marginalised in the 
analysis of institutions and social change. The economic and development studies 
literatures, for example, have tended to adopt narrow, structuralist definitions of 
institutions. In the development studies literature, North (1989:1321) defines 
institutions as the “rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour 
that structure repeated human interactions”. Thus, the definition of institutions in these 
disciplines places much greater emphasis on the manner in which structure constrains 
social behaviour than on the potential for individuals to shape and determine that 
structure.  
For Giddens, institutions are not simply “rules”, but the “more enduring features 
of social life” (Giddens, 1984:24). While McNicoll, a demographer, adopts a more rule-
based definition of institutions, he also acknowledges that “an essential feature of 
institutions is that they persist, generating a society’s distinctive patterns of social 
organisation and the texture of social life” (McNicoll, 1994:201). 
Giddens identifies three distinct categories of structure, each with their own 
associated institutional characteristics. The first operates almost entirely at the level of 
the individual – the “structure of signification”, which finds its institutional expression 
in modes of discourse and communication between individuals. The second is the 
“structure of domination”, made manifest by political and economic institutions that 
determine the modes of resource authorisation and allocation respectively. The final 
category, which is that most generally associated with institutions, is the “structure of 
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legitimation”– given content by legal and moral institutions that determine and regulate 
normative behaviour.  
Central to the theory of structuration is what Giddens terms the “reflexivity of 
social action”, the processes whereby individuals actively engage with, and recast, the 
institutions that surround them. Thus, according to Giddens,  
we should not conceive of the structures of domination built 
into social institutions as in some way grinding out ‘docile 
bodies’ who behave like the automata suggested by objectivist 
social science. Power within social systems which enjoy some 
continuity over time and space presumes regularised relations 
of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities in 
contexts of social interaction. But all forms of dependence offer some 
resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of 
their superiors. (Giddens, 1984:16, emphasis added) 
Hence, for Giddens, structure (and institutions) are “always both constraining and 
enabling” (Giddens, 1984:25). In the demographic literature, McNicoll (1994) has 
adopted what amounts to a Giddensian analysis, arguing that 
in the familiar opposition between structure and agency, 
institutions by definition have to do with structure. But they are 
not hard-cast channels that, once set in place, demand 
compliant behaviour. They are constantly being made and 
remade by those coming into contact with them, emerging 
renewed or marginally changed, or falling into disregard and 
disuse. The role of agency is distinct, although limited. 
(McNicoll, 1994:201) 
Thus, from this sociological standpoint, the constantly shifting balance between 
structure and agency is of primary importance in understanding the evolution and effect 
of institutions on social behaviour. Institutional analysis informed by Giddensian social 
theory, then, seeks to avoid imposing an artificial dichotomy between structure and 
agency. The structures of domination and legitimation can be used to effect a 
transformation of social ordering, but simultaneously the structures of signification 
allow individuals and collectivities to recast and reconstruct their social life and thereby 
reconstitute patterns of social organisation. Thus, while structure generally determines 
patterns of social organisation, agency plays an important part in determining changes in 
those patterns. 
Two important insights emerge from this brief discussion of institutions. The first 
is that the institutions of interest are those that regulate interactions between individuals, 
and between individuals and the state, but that these institutions are not restricted to 
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those associated with structures of domination and legitimation. Giddens suggests that 
the structure of signification and its associated institutional order constitute an 
important institutional domain, lying underneath (but not independent of) dominating 
and legitimating structures. The relationship between the structures of signification and 
legitimation, particularly, is analogous to the “informal institutions” of norms and values 
discussed in the economics and development studies literatures. Since they operate at 
two different structural levels, these institutions are durable and more difficult for the 
state to direct or control. As North argues, they possess a “tenacious survival ability 
because they become an integral part of habitual behaviour” (North, 1989:1324). These 
institutions are not only more durable, but also they have a tendency (as Putnam 
(1993:180) argues) to subvert and recast these in their image. The durability and 
subversive capacity of informal institutions arises in part because the family is one of the 
key sites for the reproduction of the norms and learned behaviours that constitute them. 
According to Putzel (1997:946), “one reason why it is so difficult to effect a 
transformation of informal institutions – of norms and values – is because they are 
constantly reproduced within the intimacy of the family”. Thus, in order for external 
forces to precipitate a rapid transformation of these institutions, it is necessary that 
those seeking that change articulate into, and possibly disrupt, family and household 
dynamics. 
 
Second, institutions are not static, and hence institutional analysis needs to pay more 
than cursory attention to history and historiography. Socially-sanctioned norms of 
behaviour, constructs of fairness, the dominant ideology, the economic system, and 
even the very structure of the state, can and will change over time, either in response to 
pressures arising from the structures of signification, or from broader secular changes in 
the external environment. Since institutions are context- and temporally-specific, they, 
and their social consequences, need to be located within their particular history. 
Furthermore, historiographical analysis suggests that institutions tend to be path-
dependent. By this it is meant that, given an initial starting point, what McNicoll (1994) 
terms an “institutional endowment”, societies will tend to follow particular paths of 
development and social organisation. Or, as Putnam argues, “path-dependence can 
produce durable differences in performance between two societies, even when the 
formal institutions, resources, relative prices, and individual preferences in the two are 
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similar” (Putnam, 1993:179). Path-dependence arises from the fact that the forces of 
history exert long-term consequences:  
institutions evolve through history, but they do not reliably 
reach unique and efficient equilibria. History is not always 
efficient, in the sense of weeding out social practices that 
impede progress and encourage collective irrationality. On the 
contrary, individuals responding rationally to the social context 
bequeathed to them by history reinforce social pathologies. 
(Putnam, 1993:179)  
Institutional analysis, therefore, requires an historical dimension. If institutions are 
not static, the processes whereby they form and the paths along which they evolve 
become important. Furthermore, it follows from the above that theories and analyses of 
social processes (including demographic outcomes such as fertility) that fail to engage 
with the context in which those institutions emerge and develop, are fundamentally 
ahistorical. Moreover, the adoption of an historical approach leads to Lonsdale’s 
observation that “for any reasonably significant historical development, monocausal 
explanation is ipso facto wrong” (Lonsdale, 1981:140). Thus, from an historian’s 
perspective, emphasis is placed on detailing the emergence of institutional forms in the 
fullest way possible in order to understand both the present and the past.  
Hence, in the analysis and explanation of fertility decline in a given society from 
an institutional perspective, there can be no attempt at deriving a monocausal 
explanation for that decline. Rather, the analysis should focus, as it will here, on the 
analysis of the development and change in social institutions that shape human 
reproductive decisions. This too, then, ties in with Giddens’ concept of the reflexivity of 
social action, where social practices, and the institutions that define them, are constantly 
challenged and changed.  
Therefore, there are both historiographical and sociological reasons for adopting 
an institutional approach to understanding demographic outcomes. These carry 
implications for demographic theories of the fertility transition. Lonsdale’s argument in 
favour of rich and complex historical explanations (and against those that are simplistic 
and decontextualised) can be applied to all demographic theories of the fertility decline 
that seek to predict fertility decline based on just one or two causes. This desire for 
mono- or bicausal explanations is one of the reasons given by Mason (1997) for the 
current impasse in the derivation of theories of fertility decline, and accounts for the 
inadequacies of all major theories of the fertility transition that have emerged from 
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within the demographic discipline. However, as Szreter (1993) has argued, demographic 
research and theorisation has tended to be driven by policy considerations. In this “real 
world” approach to the social sciences, the adoption of simpler theories has aided policy 
formulation by identifying broad similarities in demographic outcomes across both time 
and space. Hence these more parsimonious demographic theories have the advantage of 
indicating – in very broad terms – the correlates and possible causes of the fertility 
transition in a wide variety of settings.  
Nevertheless, the theories of fertility decline that have been developed – Mason 
identifies six – have been subjected to strong and vigorous critiques from social 
scientists in other disciplines for their failure to accommodate local specificities 
(Greenhalgh (1990, 1995a, 1995b) and Carter (1995) being the most outspoken). Potter, 
writing in 1983, has argued much the same point: “in studies of the determinants of 
fertility, much more attention has traditionally been given to the characteristics of 
individuals, households and families than to the characteristics of the environments in 
which they are found” (Potter, 1983:627). This weakness has led Geoffrey McNicoll, 
probably the foremost demographic theorist on the role of institutions in the fertility 
decline, to observe that in the fields of demography and population studies, “the 
institutional structure that underpins – indeed, that virtually constitutes – human society 
is simply neglected …[a large] part of standard demography [has] no interest in 
institutions” (McNicoll, 1994:200).  
2.4.2 The institutional analysis of fertility decline 
The roots of an institutional approach to the understanding of demographic outcomes, 
and fertility in particular, can be found in the earliest versions of demographic transition 
theory that appeared in the 1940s. In its original incarnation, in the formulations of 
Notestein (1945) and Davis (1945), demographic transition theory saw fertility decline as 
the long-term consequence of modernisation and social and economic development. 
Thus, in that initial formulation, fertility behaviour was seen as culturally and socially 
embedded. Fertility change was seen as a long-term process, requiring change – brought 
on by development – of those institutions that affect fertility.  
In his critical history of demographic transition theory, Szreter (1993) has shown 
how demographic transition theory evolved from this initial statement (which saw the 
direction of causality running from modernisation to fertility change) into a theory 
which was, to all intents and purposes, the exact opposite. This inversion (which Szreter 
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dates back to 1952) was not simply a response to a growing demand for programmatic 
intervention, but also was strongly influenced by the prevailing international political 
climate, where poverty and underdevelopment were seen as being breeding grounds for 
communist or socialist insurrection. Thus, according to Szreter, the growing desire in 
the West, and in the United States especially, for lower fertility in the developing world 
was a reflection of that fear. Failure to appreciate that intellectual currents in the social 
sciences and within the development orthodoxy strongly and profoundly affected 
demographic theorisation limits our understanding of the evolution of a similar 
orthodoxy within demography and population studies. Demographic theories since the 
1950s, therefore, need to be understood within the contexts of a broader political 
agenda and prevailing debates that were occurring in other disciplines. As Szreter shows, 
the dominant theories adopted within the demographic literature reflect those agendas 
and debates. However, while Szreter’s history traces the evolution of an intellectual 
orthodoxy within demography, this orthodoxy was never hegemonic, as van de Kaa 
(1996) has shown. 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of articles on fertility change by theoretical position, 
1946-1994 
Source: Based on data presented in van de Kaa (1996) 
 
Through an investigation of 450 papers published on the process and pattern of 
fertility change in more than one country between 1944 and 1994, van de Kaa (1996) 
shows how different theories of fertility decline have dominated at different points in 
time (Figure 2.2). Initially, the classic demographic transition narrative dominated 
entirely, before falling into disfavour. The rise in general descriptions of fertility decline 
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since the 1970s reflects the growing debate on, and empirical testing and historical 
analyses of, demographic transition theory. Social narratives of fertility decline based on 
family function and family structure (for example, the work of Bulatao (1982) and 
Caldwell (1982)) dominated in the years around 1960 and 1980. Economic explanations 
of fertility decline (epitomised by Becker (1960, 1981), Schultz (1976) and Easterlin 
(1975, 1978, 1980)) were especially common until the mid-1970s but have been less so 
since. Articles on fertility decline using the proximate determinants framework, or 
positing that a decline in mortality is a prerequisite for fertility decline have been 
common since the 1960s. Explanations of fertility decline based on innovation, 
diffusion, cultural and institutional factors have come increasingly to the fore in the last 
two decades, to the point where such articles and explanations now constitute the 
second biggest class of explanations proffered in the demographic literature.   
 
Institutional approaches to the analysis of fertility decline do not constitute a theory on 
their own, since their focus on local institutional dynamics (and their path-dependence) 
precludes prediction of particular patterns in settings outside that under observation. 
Rather, institutional approaches are a syncretism of three different intellectual strands. 
They adopt both the sociological concepts of structure and agency and the 
historiographical imperative to trace the evolution of particular institutions, while not 
rejecting entirely past intellectual traditions within demographic research. Such 
approaches suggest that, within the broader narratives and theorisations of the causes 
and correlates of the fertility transition, understanding the specific institutional 
conditions under which fertility decline occurs in a specific setting provides a better 
account of that fertility decline. Thus, according to Greenhalgh, institutional approaches 
to demography offer  
comprehensive explanations that embrace not only the social 
and economic, but also the political and cultural aspects of 
demographic change. They read the history of demographic 
theorising as saying that there is no single demographic 
transition, caused by forces common to all places and all times. 
Rather, there are many demographic transitions, each driven by 
a combination of forces that are, to some unknown extent, each 
institutionally, culturally, and temporally specific. (Greenhalgh, 
1990:88) 
The great advantage of institutional approaches to the analysis of fertility decline 
is that they allow (and indeed encourage) the integration of macro and micro levels of 
36
analysis by acknowledging the fact that individual behaviour is iteratively reconstituted 
and challenged by institutions (and conversely). In short, our understanding of the 
dynamics of the fertility transition is enhanced with the use of an institutional 
framework, or as McNicoll argues, 
rounded explanation, cross-disciplinary range, awareness of 
theoretical frontiers and historical contingency, and the critical 
stance that an outsider can bring to self-regarding disciplinary 
cultures all can work in favour of demography as serious social 
science as well as (not to be scorned) a neat ordering of events 
on the Lexis plane. (McNicoll, 1992:414) 
Thus, demographers and other social scientists who have adopted an institutional 
framework argue that demographic processes cannot be divorced or understood in 
isolation from broader social, economic and political forces, and have sought to 
reintegrate social theory with demographic research on the fertility decline (see, for 
example, Greenhalgh, 1990; Greenhalgh, 1995b; McNicoll, 1992 and McNicoll, 1980).  
Much demographic analysis seeks to explain fertility change in terms of 
contraceptive use-effectiveness, or changes in the other proximate determinants or birth 
parities. At a micro level, however, these explanations are, in ultimo, descriptive. They do 
not explain why the change in fertility has come about at a societal level, or the 
mechanisms whereby the particular vector has come to be of significance. The implicit 
assumption frequently made in much of that demographic research is that fertility 
decisions are made at an individual or household level, and that the household is a 
discrete, altruistic and utility-maximising entity. Institutional demography, on the other 
hand, while not negating the precepts of maximisation, draws a close parallel between 
the processes of production (in an economic sense) and reproduction (in a demographic 
sense), thereby emphasising the point that utility-maximisation cannot be separated 
from a broader institutional setting. Thus, for example, Lesthaeghe asserts that the 
arrangements in society for the regulation of reproductive processes reflect the “basic 
setup that governs the functioning of the social system as a whole” (Lesthaeghe, 
1989:13).  
2.4.2.1 Variants of institutional analysis 
As the discussion above indicates, institutional approaches to demography believe that 
demographic processes are not only explained by agency, but that structure is also of 
importance. Different approaches emphasise the balance between structure and agency 
to differing degrees. Three slightly different approaches to institutional analysis have 
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been identified in the literature, all of which view fertility, to a greater or lesser extent, as 
the “social construction of a demographic reality” (Greenhalgh, 1995a). 
The first has an explicitly economic foundation, based on transaction theory as 
originally formulated by Coase (1937) and Ben-Porath (1980). Under this approach, 
decisions at the household level (including childbearing) are assumed to be the outcome 
of repeated negotiations or transactions within the household. Thus, according to 
Fapohunda and Todaro, “family structure affects the locus of reproductive decision 
making, the formation of reproductive goals, and actual fertility behaviour” (Fapohunda 
and Todaro, 1988:590). While this approach moves the locus of analysis away from the 
individual and takes some cognisance of institutions affecting fertility, it does not seek 
to interrogate the effect of the state and local communities, and the pressure and 
influence that these exert on the negotiations that occur within the household, or indeed 
on the composition of households. Because this approach does not accommodate 
investigation of institutions beyond the household, it is not used or discussed further 
here. 
The second and third approaches share many similarities but differ, according to 
Greenhalgh (1990), primarily in their starting points. The second is that advocated by 
Greenhalgh herself, an explicitly political-economic framework that directs attention to 
“the embeddedness of community institutions in structures and processes, especially 
political and economic ones, operating at regional, national, and global levels, and to the 
historical roots of those macro-micro linkages” (Greenhalgh, 1990:87). It adopts a top-
down strategy, commencing with an analysis of the global structures of power and 
domination, and how these in turn affect nations, local communities and – finally – 
impinge on individual reproductive behaviour. The third approach, which is adopted 
here, is that developed and applied to demographic analysis by Geoffrey McNicoll. It 
also integrates macro- and micro levels of analysis and is thus essentially similar to the 
second outlined above, except that the route of analysis operates in the opposite 
direction. The method also results in a political-economic analysis of fertility. As a 
consequence, the accounts of fertility decline that result from the adoption of either the 
second or the third approaches are fundamentally similar. The thesis adopts the latter 
because it has been employed successfully in the demographic literature (most notably 
by McNicoll himself) and even if it is not entirely accepted, it is at least familiar to 
demographers. 
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The starting premise for this last approach is that fertility is not simply a biological 
process, determined solely by the rational economic choices of individuals. Instead, 
fertility is viewed as a social phenomenon in which the reproductive choices made by 
individuals are constrained and affected by the political, economic and social institutions 
that exist in a given society at a given time. According to this perspective, human 
reproduction like other forms of social behaviour, is not hermetically sealed against 
broader social trends and forces, but is directly and powerfully affected by them. 
Individuals and couples can (and do) make decisions about their childbearing. However, 
these choices cannot be understood outside the context in which those decisions are 
made6 or, as McNicoll puts it, “fertility transition, whatever else it may be, is an 
institutional phenomenon” (McNicoll, 1994:206).  
This theorisation is not entirely abstruse to understanding the institutional 
determinants of the fertility transition. An early work on the institutional determinants 
of the fertility decline (Potter, 1983) suggested that institutions affected fertility precisely 
through changing the perceived costs and benefits of childbearing; changing internalised 
values relating to marriage, the family and fertility; and through the social and 
administrative pressures that can be brought to bear on reproductive behaviour.  
In other words, institutions mediate individual decisions on childbearing in an 
important and fundamental way. A simple example of this is that of China under the 
“one-child policy”: even if women (or couples) desire more than a single child, political, 
economic and social sanctions are placed on further childbearing. In this example, it is 
easy to see how institutions (and the state, in particular) regulate individual behaviour.  
The subsections that follow investigate the role played by institutions and the state 
in shaping the dynamics of fertility decline in a particular setting. 
2.4.2.2 Institutions and the role of the state in the fertility transition 
The discussion in Section 2.4.1 indicates that institutions are both dynamic and context-
specific. Hence, the set of institutions assumed to impact on fertility outcomes must be 
determined by reference to both the temporal period of investigation and local 
particularities. This necessity notwithstanding, McNicoll suggests a list of institutions 
that, in most situations, have a bearing on fertility by virtue of the fact that they give 
“rise to local patterns of social organisation – particularly the family and local 
                                                 
6 The economic analogy to this is Herbert Simon’s theory of the “bounded rationality” of economic choices (Simon, 1955), of which 
McNicoll’s approach represents a demographic application. 
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community; family and property law and the local dimension of public administration; 
the stratification system and mobility paths it accommodates; and the labour market” 
(McNicoll, 1994:206). By this definition, state ideology, the economic structure of 
society, and the relative weight and interpretation lent by society to concepts of social 
and administrative justice, fairness and equality (amongst others) are also important 
insofar as they affect those “local patterns of social organisation”. Other institutions 
that fit this description include the social construction of gender relations, the legal 
system itself and the fiscal stance of the state. 
 
The role of the state in the course of the fertility decline is of particular importance in 
the analysis of fertility change from an institutional perspective. Whether or not the state 
can direct a process of fertility change, one thing is certain: the state, by the mere fact of 
its very existence, cannot not influence fertility (McNicoll, 1998). The acknowledgement 
that the nature of state-individual relations may bear strongly on individuals’ 
reproductive intentions (and hence on the efficacy of population programmes) brings 
the role of the state into sharper focus.  
Furthermore, the state’s virtual monopoly on the means of violence implies that it 
should not be viewed as a disinterested party in the development and evolution of 
institutions. It, too, is contested, and has a strong incentive to afford the highest priority 
to its own survival. Thus, the state is not hegemonic and is subject to contestation not 
only from individuals, but from groupings in society that try to capture the state to force 
it to do their bidding, or to act specifically in their interests. Accordingly, the state can, 
and frequently does, establish, protect and maintain those institutions that serve its own 
needs through military, coercive or administrative measures, while simultaneously 
attempting to gain greater purchase over informal institutions through its attempts to 
dictate those patterns of behaviour that are deemed to be socially optimal or desirable. 
Thus, even if the state cannot direct informal institutions, it can still exercise a 
substantial indirect influence on them. The extent to which informal institutions are 
durable, and their ability to affect formal institutions, is therefore closely linked to the 
state’s ability and desire to use its power to assert control over them.  
The extent to which the state, and the population programmes that are 
implemented by it, can affect fertility has been the subject of extended research and 
debate. Debates about the effects of family planning programmes on the level of wanted 
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and unwanted fertility have gone back and forth (see, for example that sparked off by 
Pritchett (1994a), and the comments on and replies to the article, Bongaarts (1994); 
Knowles, Akin and Guilkey (1994); Pritchett, (1994b)). Bongaarts (1997) concludes that 
strong family planning programmes – measured by the somewhat elusive concept of 
‘programme effort’ – have led and will continue to lead to substantial declines in 
fertility. In a particularly South African context, Oosthuizen (2000:85) argues that “the 
impact of the South African family planning programme on the demographic transition 
in this country can hardly be underestimated”. As the evidence presented in this thesis 
will argue, there are few – if any – grounds for this assertion.  
The bulk of the literature on the effect of population programmes, unfortunately, 
remains fundamentally atheoretical (and untestable) insofar as they ignore, as McNicoll 
(1998) argues, the impossibility of “addressing the counterfactual of what would have 
happened in the programmes’ absence”. From an institutional perspective, the capability 
of the state to directly influence reproductive behaviour is probably limited. In the first 
instance, as Potter observes, “national policies are confined to programmatic attempts 
to increase the availability of contraceptive services, and to convince people that low 
fertility is in their own, as well as the nation’s, best interest” (Potter, 1983:654). 
Furthermore, mere assessment of “programme effort” also does not take into account 
that these policies may come up against unresponsive (or even hostile) interest groups, 
particularly if the state can not articulate into local communities. Success is likely to be 
greater where the reach of the state is greater. 
McNicoll (1996) elaborates further on the role played by the state in governing the 
process of fertility decline and identifies two routes whereby the state, irrespective of its 
initial institutional endowment, can attempt to gain purchase on the pace of fertility 
transition, although its success in the pursuit of either or both of these is still contingent 
on the initial institutional endowments and characteristics. The first route McNicoll 
terms regularity: the state’s ability to create and maintain order and, in particular, 
orderliness (predictability, or non-arbitrariness) of state-individual and individual-
individual relations. The second is duress, “the use of political or administrative pressure 
or, at the extreme, physical force to attain fertility objectives” (McNicoll, 1996:17). 
In a more recent paper, McNicoll (1998) further develops his analysis of the role 
played by the state in directing fertility in both transitional and post-transitional 
societies. Irrespective of official programmes or desired demographic outcomes, he 
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argues, the state exerts an influence on fertility by virtue of the fact that any polity 
“sustains a demographic regime: the set of routine behaviours surrounding cohabitation, 
marriage, childbearing and “health-seeking,” and their antecedents or supports in 
patterns of socialisation, organisation, and economic activity” (McNicoll, 1998:12). 
Five ways in which the state can affect fertility are proposed: 
1. through the development, funding and management of 
population programmes 
2. through the socio-legal and administrative regime 
maintained by the state 
3. through the state’s determination of equity and equality in 
society 
4. through micro-effects on household economies via public 
expenditure and transfer payments 
5. through its ability to appeal to “symbols of national identity 
and cultural continuity” (McNicoll, 1998:13) 
Chapter 6 argues that all five of these mechanisms can be identified in the actions 
of the apartheid state, even if most of them arose as unintended consequences of other 
government policies. 
Further developing and applying the concept of path-dependency outlined in 
Section 2.4.1, McNicoll (1994) suggests that the combination of institutional 
endowments found in a particular setting determines the pattern of fertility decline 
observed. Some combinations permit rapid fertility decline while others retard the 
process. Five archetypes of institutional endowment are identified, broadly associated 
with different geographic regions, ranging from “traditional capitalist” through to the 
“soft state”, “radical devolution”, “growth with equity” and “lineage dominance”. In 
this typology, he argues, the “radical devolution” (e.g. China) and “growth with equity” 
(East Asia) archetypes have been associated with the most rapid fertility transitions, 
while societies with institutional arrangements characterised by “lineage dominance” 
(e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) have shown the slowest pace of fertility decline.  
Casterline makes a similar point about the effect of path-dependency on the pace 
of the fertility decline: “path-dependency can result in changes that proceed either more 
quickly or more slowly than would be expected” (Casterline, 1999:36). This thesis argues 
that the related concepts of historicity and path-dependence play a central part in 
institutional analyses of the process of fertility change in South Africa.   
42
2.4.3 Conclusion: Institutional analysis  
This section has set out the underlying principles and motivations for adopting an 
institutional approach to the analysis of the fertility decline. It has argued that there is an 
important place for sociological and historiographical techniques and theories in the 
narrative of the process of fertility decline in a single setting, something that has been 
absent from much of the demographic literature. Social and political theory has set out 
mechanisms whereby individual behaviour is mediated by other social forces, while 
historiography emphasises the necessity of charting the evolution of institutions in their 
social context, and the role played by path-dependent outcomes, in helping us 
understand the patterns of fertility decline seen in a given setting. 
The approach adopted is thus not in conflict with classical demographic theory. 
Rather, it builds on those theories, and seeks to explain better the pattern of fertility 
decline. In a review of theories and narratives of the fertility decline over the last fifty 
years, van de Kaa (1996) concluded that 
Overall sufficient material has been accumulated to conclude 
that path-dependency and institutional aspects are mainly 
responsible for the regional flavour which can be detected in 
the demographic transition process. And further, the initial 
transition narrative is too deterministic in nature, too general, 
and so far removed from concrete societal settings that it leaves 
insufficient room to account for differences in institutional 
endowments and the fortuitous elements present even in path-
dependent processes. (van de Kaa, 1996:428) 
Furthermore, the approach outlined above, which takes history and institutions 
into account, suggests that greater attention should be paid to the historical and socio-
political analysis of national fertility declines, and that commensurately less weight 
should be afforded to the standard methods of technical demography in such analyses. 
This is not to argue that there is not a role for these techniques. They have a valuable 
part to play in the determination of demographic trends. Rather, in attempting to 
understand why a particular fertility transition has taken the form it has, institutional 
analysis can offer insights that cannot be gained from those standard demographic 
techniques. Hence, the statistical determination of correlation, association and causality 
in the analysis of demographic outcomes from an institutional perspective is regarded as 
more peripheral, and not as an end in itself. Thus, McNicoll (1992) suggests that  
the methodological ingredients are here for rich explanatory 
accounts of changing demographic regimes, interweaving 
historical contingency, social dynamics, and cultural 
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idiosyncrasy. In constructing such accounts, formal multivariate 
analysis would have a properly subordinated part. Public policy 
roles would find their natural level in explanation: very likely, 
population-specific polices would appear far less important 
than claimed in the heat of the debate, other domains of public 
policy (and sheer fortuity) much more important. (McNicoll, 
1992:411) 
2.5 Conclusion 
This literature review has established the fundamental precepts underlying the thesis. 
First, earlier research shows that the fertility decline in South Africa differs from that in 
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The question has been raised as to whether the 
South African fertility decline is indeed comparable to that in other African countries. 
Second, reasons why the level of and trend in South African fertility is less well-
known than that in most other developing countries have been discussed. A 
combination of international isolation, state suspicion and hostility, and a paucity of 
demographic skills inside the country has hampered demographic research in South 
Africa. The increased availability of both current and historical data sources, as well as 
archival material means that a new opportunity has been created to reassess the 
dynamics of the South African fertility transition without undue reliance on government 
and other official statistics. This reassessment is attempted in Chapter 3, using census 
and survey data to establish both the current level of, and past trends in, fertility in 
South Africa. 
Third, almost no literature exists – and certainly nothing recent – on patterns of 
birth spacing in South Africa. Evidence from elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa is also 
sketchy, but is unlikely to be of assistance in understanding the changes in birth intervals 
that have occurred in South Africa. The 1998 South Africa Demographic and Health 
Survey, together with earlier demographic survey data, however, makes such 
investigations possible. Thus, Chapter 4 investigates the changing patterns of 
childbearing and birth intervals among African South African women since 1970, as well 
as seeking to identify similarities and differences between the patterns of childbearing in 
South Africa and in other sub-Saharan African countries. 
The conceptualisation of institutions as set out by both Giddens and McNicoll 
Giddens is essential to this thesis. The nature of official population polices, the manner 
in which they were implemented by successive apartheid governments, and the 
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responses of the populace to them, forms a central plank in the analysis and explanation 
of the specificities of the South African fertility transition. Chapters 5 and 6 adopt the 
theoretical approach to the institutional analysis of fertility set out above, and apply it to 
the case of the South African fertility transition. In doing so, an account of the 
evolution of official rhetoric and policy on population matters in South Africa is 
developed, which is then used to inform an analysis of the effect of apartheid social 
institutions on fertility change in South Africa.  
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3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN FERTILITY DECLINE: ESTIMATES OF CURRENT 
AND PAST FERTILITY 
This chapter presents estimates of the current and past trend in South African fertility 
derived from recent and historical data. Section 3.1 describes the data sources used and 
the methodologies employed to collect the data. Section 3.2 compares and contrasts the 
data from the two most recent sources, the 1996 South Africa Census and the 1998 
South Africa Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), and identifies differences and 
possible sources of error in the populations described by each data set. Section 3.3 
presents a detailed discussion of the fertility data (and their limitations) contained in the 
1996 census. The corrections and adjustments made to improve the quality of these data 
are set out and discussed before presenting estimates of fertility in South Africa in the 
late 1990s in Section 3.4. Using data from the 1970 and 1996 censuses, retrospective 
estimates of fertility in South Africa, for all South Africans and for African South 
Africans separately, are derived using reverse-survival techniques in Section 3.5. The 
penultimate section examines the cohort-period fertility rates derived from the 1998 
South Africa DHS. Section 3.7 discusses the results from the preceding sections, draws 
some conclusions about the nature of the South African fertility decline since 1960, and 
compares the age pattern of fertility in South Africa with that observed in other sub-
Saharan African countries. 
3.1 Data sources 
The two sources of data used to determine the current level of fertility in South Africa 
are the 10 percent public-use sample from the 1996 South Africa Census, and the 1998 
South Africa Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). In addition, data from the 1970 
South Africa Census are used to determine historical trends in fertility in the country.  
3.1.1 1996 South Africa Census 
The 1996 South Africa Census was the first conducted in South Africa after the demise 
of apartheid, and was carried out on behalf of the South African government by the 
Central Statistical Service (now Statistics South Africa). The official census date was the 
night of 9-10 October 1996, but fieldwork was conducted over a three-week period 
from 10-31 October. A post-enumeration survey (PES) in November 1996, together 
with detailed matching of records between the census and the PES, indicated that the 
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undercount in the census was 10.7 percent (Statistics South Africa, 1998a), and varied by 
province (from 8.7 percent in the Western Cape to 15.6 percent in the Northern Cape). 
According to Statistics South Africa, infants and young adult men were particularly 
prone to under-enumeration, while Africans and Coloureds were less likely than Whites 
and Indians/Asians to have been enumerated. Statistics South Africa suggests that this 
pattern of underenumeration reflects different levels of urbanisation, and difficulties in 
achieving comprehensive coverage in rural areas (Statistics South Africa, 1998a: 20-21).  
Statistics South Africa has made a 10 percent sample of the data available to 
researchers and included a weighting variable, designed to correct for the undercount as 
well as for the fact that the sample provided comprises one tenth of those enumerated. 
The data provided are drawn from a systematic sample of households, stratified by 
Enumeration Areas based on province and District Council. The individual-level data 
file includes all members of selected households, as well as a 10 percent systematic 
sample of people in “special institutions” (old-age homes, prisons, schools etc.) and 
workers’ hostels. Full details of the methods employed to derive the household sample 
are given in the documentation provided with the data (Statistics South Africa, 1998b). 
The raw data were checked and adjusted for double counting, as well as other 
errors, and cleaned and validated before they were released. However, the algorithms 
employed have not been published, making it impossible to assess the extent of 
imputation or modification of the data between the raw and final forms or to arrive at 
an independent judgement of whether any bias could have been introduced by this 
cleaning.  
3.1.2 1998 South Africa DHS 
The 1998 South Africa Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) was co-ordinated by the 
Medical Research Council of South Africa (MRC) on behalf of the South African 
Department of Health. Technical assistance was provided by Macro International Inc.  
The South Africa DHS employed a two-stage sample selected from the 1996 
census demarcations. The census’ Enumeration Areas were used, and sample numbers 
of households were derived in proportion to those in the census. For reasons explained 
in the Preliminary DHS report (Department of Health, 1999), the sample was not 
designed to be self-weighting at a national level. Sample weights are provided with the 
DHS data, and are used to adjust the responses collected to be representative of the 
underlying population.  
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3.1.3 1970 South Africa Census 
The results from the 1970 South Africa Census are used to derive estimates of South 
African fertility for the period 1955 to 1970. The data were provided on CD-Rom by 
Statistics South Africa, and contain a 100 percent sample of Whites, Coloureds and 
Asians/Indians, and a 5 percent sample of Africans. No sample weights for Africans 
were provided, so data for Africans have been multiplied by 20 where necessary.  
The quality of the 1970 census data for Africans is not nearly as good as the 1996 
census. Strong digit-preference exists in the reporting of ages. Whipple’s Index of digit 
preference for ages ending 0 or 5 is 140 for men aged 18 to 52, and 153 for women of 
the same ages. According to a United Nations scale, these values classify the reliability 
of the age data as “rough” (Newell, 1988). In addition, noticeable troughs exist in the 
reported population at age 1 for both sexes, and an even greater undercount of male 
infants in this census is apparent.  
Unfortunately, too, the information asked of African women in the 1970 census 
about their childbearing and recent fertility no longer exist, thereby preventing the 
estimation of African women’s fertility in 1970 and the late 1960s directly from the data. 
Despite these deficiencies, the 1970 census provides the best demographic data for the 
South African population prior to the 1987-9 South Africa “DHS” (described in 
Chapter 4, and used in the analysis of birth intervals in South Africa), and allows the 
derivation of estimates of South African fertility for earlier periods than is possible using 
only the 1996 census and 1998 DHS data. 
3.2 Comparison between the 1998 DHS and 1996 census data 
This section provides an overview of the attributes of the female population of South 
Africa aged 15-49 as documented by the 1996 census and the 1998 DHS. In the first 
instance, the distribution of these women by age, province of residence (de facto and de 
jure1), and attained level of education are compared. Where discrepancies clearly originate 
in one of the data sets, this is pointed out. In general, however, it is hard to ascribe 
differences in the reported distributions to problems with one or the other inquiry. 
The distribution of South African women of reproductive age by their 
background characteristics is shown in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 shows the same distributions 
for African women.  
                                                 
1 De facto residence refers to the province in which women were enumerated or surveyed; de jure refers to women’s “usual” province 
of residence. 
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Table 3.1 Background characteristics of South African women aged 15-49 
 1998 DHS 1996 census 
 All South African women 15-49 All South African women 15-49 
Background 
Characteristic 
Weighted  
% 
Weighted 
N 
Unweighted 
N 
Weighted 
% 
Weighted  
N 
Unweighted 
N 
Age       
15-19 19.2 2249 2373 19.5 2135672 190557
20-24 17.7 2075 2086 18.9 2067653 182607
25-29 15.8 1857 1811 16.3 1790412 158317
30-34 14.1 1654 1616 14.8 1617576 144323
35-39 13.9 1636 1628 12.6 1375399 123101
40-44 11.0 1294 1255 10.1 1105325 99650
45-49 8.3 970 966 7.9 863268 78684
   
Residence   
Urban 60.5 7095 6518 57.7 6321903 565041
Non-urban 39.5 4640 5217 42.3 4633401 412198
   
Province (de facto) 
Western Cape 10.2 1193 919 10.2 1120698 102114
Eastern Cape 13.3 1566 2756 14.6 1600910 142883
Northern Cape 2.2 253 1041 2.0 221107 18758
Free State 6.5 763 936 6.6 721896 65760
KwaZulu-Natal 20.1 2364 1826 21.0 2296584 200083
North West 7.7 909 931 8.1 891976 80913
Gauteng 21.7 2552 1057 19.4 2120387 190981
Mpumalanga 7.0 819 1131 6.8 749418 65977
Northern Province 11.2 1316 1138 11.2 1232330 109770
   
Province (de jure)   
Western Cape 10.3 1210 953 10.0 1093522 99748
Eastern Cape 13.2 1553 2728 14.3 1561831 139716
Northern Cape 2.4 279 1038 2.0 214823 18269
Free State 6.7 787 951 6.5 707481 64506
KwaZulu-Natal 20.0 2345 1813 20.4 2230458 194533
North West 7.6 894 927 8.0 875358 79401
Gauteng 21.6 2534 1063 19.0 2084731 187788
Mpumalanga 7.0 822 1134 6.8 742996 65411
Northern Province 11.0 1294 1119 11.0 1202493 107278
Other country 0.0 4 2 2.2 241613 20589
Missing 0.1 12 7 0.0 0 0
   
Education   
No education 6.8 804 810 11.5 1259929 111956
Primary 24.8 2916 3134 23.6 2587923 230455
Secondary 60.5 7103 6929 55.3 6062741 541518
Higher 7.8 912 862 5.9 649052 58166
Other / Missing 0.0 0 0 3.6 395660 35144
   
Population group   
African 77.9 9147 8993 76.4 8369644 744577
Coloured 10.2 1201 1533 9.2 1011770 90343
White 7.8 916 755 10.8 1179002 105736
Asian 3.5 406 393 2.8 305130 28533
Missing 0.6 66 61 0.8 89759 8050
   
Total 100 11735 11735 100 10955305 977239
Source:  1998 DHS and 1996 census 
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Table 3.2 Background characteristics of African South African women aged 
15-49 
 1998 DHS 1996 census 
 African women 15-49 African women 15-49 
Background 
Characteristic 
Weighted 
% 
Weighted 
N 
Unweighted 
N 
Weighted 
% 
Weighted 
N 
Unweighted 
N 
Age       
15-19 19.7 1802 1910 20.6 1725039 153891
20-24 19.1 1746 1704 19.7 1646314 145236
25-29 16.0 1460 1380 16.5 1379924 121598
30-34 13.7 1257 1211 14.7 1226909 109089
35-39 13.5 1236 1209 12.1 1011310 90070
40-44 10.5 958 911 9.4 789731 70963
45-49 7.5 688 668 7.1 590416 53730
  
Residence  
Urban 53.3 4873 4274 48.1 4022753 357513
Non-urban 46.7 4274 4719 51.9 4346891 387064
  
Province (de facto)  
Western Cape 3.2 294 223 3.0 253916 22982
Eastern Cape 14.6 1338 2410 16.4 1374009 122578
Northern Cape 0.8 73 305 0.9 74946 6427
Free State 7.2 659 808 7.3 613515 56152
KwaZulu-Natal 21.0 1922 1370 22.4 1872755 161876
North West 9.1 828 851 9.7 813826 73770
Gauteng 21.4 1957 819 18.0 1506955 134695
Mpumalanga 8.6 788 1094 8.0 667507 59536
Northern Province 14.1 1288 1113 14.2 1192215 106561
  
Province (de jure)  
Western Cape 3.5 316 261 3.0 247831 22440
Eastern Cape 14.5 1324 2380 16.0 1342567 119953
Northern Cape 1.1 97 312 0.9 72608 6263
Free State 7.4 677 818 7.2 602868 55247
KwaZulu-Natal 20.8 1907 1360 21.7 1815066 157046
North West 8.9 812 841 9.6 799870 72501
Gauteng 21.3 1949 829 17.7 1484229 132676
Mpumalanga 8.6 790 1094 7.9 661431 58995
Northern Province 13.8 1262 1091 13.9 1164313 104209
Other country 0.0 2 1 2.1 178861 15247
Missing 0.1 10 6 0.0 0 0
  
Education  
No education 8.2 747 710 14.1 1177405 104605
Primary 27.7 2537 2606 27.0 2258219 200816
Secondary 58.5 5353 5168 52.6 4402487 392001
Higher 5.6 511 509 3.5 297012 26475
Other / Missing 0.0 0 0 2.8 234521 20680
  
Total 100 9147 8993 100 8369644 744577
Source: 1998 DHS and 1996 census 
 
In aggregate, the DHS describes a population that is more urbanised, marginally 
older, and better educated than the census results suggest. Additionally, the DHS finds 
more women of reproductive age living in Gauteng (and fewer in the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal), and reports a higher proportion of African, Coloured and Asian 
women (and fewer White women) than the census. The differences in reported levels of 
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education between the DHS and the census may not be “real,” but rather a reflection of 
enumerator error or misstatement by respondents in the census.  
The following sections investigate these background characteristics for African 
women in greater detail. 
3.2.1 Age  
The DHS data describe a population that is, on average, 0.4 of a year older than the 
population enumerated in the census, with the distribution of women by age in the 
DHS finding smaller proportions at younger ages, and higher proportions at older ages, 
as shown in Figure 3.1. The distribution of the African population by age also suggests 
that the DHS interviewed too many women aged 35-39 relative to women aged 30-34. 
Figure 3.1 Percent distribution of African women aged 15-49, by age group 
3.2.2 Urban residence 
The DHS describes a more urbanised population than the census. Table 3.3 shows the 
proportion of African women living in urban areas by age group in the DHS and 
census. 
Given that fertility is generally lower in urban areas than rural areas, the national 
estimates of fertility from the DHS will, ceteris paribus, be lower than those derived from 
the census. The age pattern of urban residence in the DHS also reveals a particular error 
in those data. The proportion of women living in urban areas is highest in the 40-44 age 
group, while the proportion of women living in urban areas in the 35-39 age group is 
lower than that reported in either of the adjacent age groups. It is likely that rural 
women aged 40-44 had a tendency to report that they were aged less than 40, thereby 
artificially inflating the rural population in the 35-39 age group, and deflating the rural 
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population among women aged 40-44. This error would also explain the relatively large 
proportion of the population in the DHS survey reported as being aged 35-39, relative 
to the size of the population in the adjacent age groups2. 
Table 3.3 Proportions and numbers of African women aged 15-49 living in 
urban areas by age group 
 1998 DHS 1996 census 
Age group Weighted % Weighted N Unweighted N Weighted % Weighted N Unweighted N 
15-19 45.0 812 767 38.0 654870 58330 
20-24 52.6 917 794 47.1 775140 68222 
25-29 56.1 819 691 53.2 652504 58056 
30-34 57.7 725 633 53.0 731915 64494 
35-39 54.9 679 606 52.3 528889 47115 
40-44 58.0 556 461 50.5 399092 35817 
45-49 53.2 366 322 47.5 280343 25479 
Total 53.3 4873 4274 48.1 4022753 357513 
Source: 1998 DHS and 1996 census 
 
A further implication of this error is that the fertility estimates from the DHS for 
women aged 40-44 are likely to be biased downwards, while those for women aged 35-
39 are likely to be biased upwards. 
3.2.3 Province of residence 
Differences also exist between the DHS and census in the provincial distribution of 
African women of reproductive age. Two measures of residence were captured by each 
inquiry, de jure (i.e. usual place of residence), and de facto (i.e. residence at the time of data 
collection, either on the census night itself, or on the day the household was 
interviewed). There are no substantial differences between the de facto and de jure 
measures of residence in the two data sets, although the DHS found smaller 
discrepancies between the two measures than the census. In part, this can be attributed 
to differential coverage of women whose de jure residence was a country other than 
South Africa. Such individuals accounted for approximately 2.1 percent of African 
women of childbearing age in the census, while the DHS recorded only two women as 
being usually resident in a foreign country. 
The DHS and census data are reasonably similar in the Northern Cape, Free State, 
Northern Province and Northern Cape. However, a fairly big difference exists between 
the samples for Gauteng (the proportion of the population in Gauteng is 3.5 percent 
greater in absolute terms in the DHS than the census) and the Eastern Cape (the DHS 
                                                 
2 One might speculate that this reluctance to admit to being 40 is less of a problem in the census because many women’s ages were 
reported by proxy respondents. 
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found a smaller proportion of the population in this province than the census). 
Noticeable, but smaller, differences in the samples can be discerned in KwaZulu-Natal 
and the North-West (DHS under-represented) and Mpumalanga (DHS over-
represented). 
This pattern, together with the data presented in Table 3.3, suggests that either the 
DHS failed to accurately cover the more rural Eastern Cape and North-West provinces, 
or that census enumerators experienced difficulties in enumerating in Gauteng and the 
census PES failed to correct fully for this. Such differences have implications for the 
analysis of fertility in South Africa, since it is well-established that sizeable differentials 
in fertility by province exist (Dorrington, Nannan and Bradshaw, 1999), partly arising 
from differences in the residential composition of the provincial populations. Figure 3.2 
presents the age distributions of African women in each of the nine provinces.  
Figure 3.2 Percent distribution of African women aged 15-49, according to age 
group and province of usual residence, 1998 DHS and 1996 census  
In the Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Province and the Eastern Cape, the 
excess of women reported to be 35-39 relative to women aged 40-44 is clearly visible. In 
these more rural provinces, age misstatement was a significant problem among older 
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women. The highly irregular age distribution of African women in the Northern Cape is 
a function of the small population (less than 1 percent of all African South Africans) in 
that province.  
The age distribution of African women in Gauteng is very different from that in 
other provinces. This could be indicative of consistently falling fertility in the region 
over the last 25 years, but is more likely to be due to the high rates of labour migration 
into the province once women have completed their education. Furthermore, while 
there was age understatement in the more rural provinces, there seems to have been age 
exaggeration in Gauteng, with women in the DHS aged 30-34 reporting their ages as 35-
39, and those aged 35-39 reporting their ages as being 40-44. 
Even allowing for the relatively small numbers of Africans in the Western Cape 
surveyed for the DHS, the age distribution of Africans in that province, especially at 
ages 25-29, is problematic. 
3.2.4 Education 
Just as notable differences by age and regional composition are found between the DHS 
and the census, so differences exist in the reported levels of education of African 
women of childbearing age. The DHS describes a much better educated population than 
does the census, with fewer women being reported as having no or only primary 
education, and more with secondary or higher education. Except in the youngest age 
groups (where women may have yet to complete their education), these differences 
cannot be ascribed to the 18-month interval between the two surveys. Likewise, 
differences between the two sets of data cannot be ascribed to differences in the form 
of the questions on education: both surveys asked respondents to state the highest level 
of education actually completed. 
These differences persist after allowing for the fact that the age distributions of 
the populations in each data set differ, as shown in Table 3.4. The DHS reports much 
fewer women with no education, and more women with post-secondary education, than 
the census does after stratifying by age.  
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Table 3.4 Percent distribution of African women aged 15-49 by age group and 
completed level of education 
  Completed level of education 
Age group  None Primary Secondary Tertiary 
1998 DHS 0.9 23.0 74.6 1.4 15-19 
1996 census 4.8 29.7 64.7 0.8 
1998 DHS 1.7 15.3 75.2 7.8 20-24 
1996 census 7.4 18.1 72.0 2.5 
1998 DHS 4.8 22.9 63.3 9.0 25-29 
1996 census 11.0 23.2 60.7 5.1 
1998 DHS 9.8 30.9 52.2 7.2 30-34 
1996 census 16.2 30.2 48.0 5.7 
1998 DHS 14.9 33.7 45.8 5.6 35-39 
1996 census 22.2 33.5 38.7 5.5 
1998 DHS 16.6 42.7 37.0 3.7 40-44 
1996 census 29.0 35.2 31.3 4.5 
1998 DHS 23.7 44.5 28.6 3.2 45-49 
1996 census 34.9 35.0 26.7 3.4 
Source: 1998 DHS and 1996 census 
 
3.2.5 Comparability of the 1998 DHS and 1996 census data 
The 1996 census and 1998 DHS data are not directly comparable. First, the aims of the 
1998 South Africa DHS were very different from those of the census. While the census 
aimed to provide a complete enumeration of the South African population (and its main 
demographic characteristics) in October 1996, the purpose of the DHS was to collect 
detailed data on demographic and health variables within the country to assist policy 
making in the health sector (Department of Health, 1999). Second, the DHS was 
conducted approximately 18 months after the census. With declining fertility (and rising 
mortality due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic), this difference may matter. Fertility 
measures from the DHS based on reported fertility in the three years before the 
interview, classified by age of mother at birth, however, refer to the census date.  
Third, the census and the DHS differed markedly in their questionnaires and in 
their data collection procedures. Fieldworkers administering the DHS were better 
trained than the census enumerators. No proxy respondents were used in the DHS, 
whereas in the census, enumerators asked questions of one person about all of the 
household’s members. In addition, DHS fieldstaff were women, which should have 
minimised any reticence on the part of respondents to discuss matters relating to sexual 
behaviour and childbearing. Further, the census asked only summary questions about 
the fertility of women aged 12-49 in the household, while the DHS collected detailed 
birth histories and data on child health and welfare from female respondents aged 
between 15 and 49. 
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Proxy responses in the census may have exacerbated the observed differences 
between the DHS and the census in the socio-economic and other characteristics of 
South African women of childbearing age, for the reason that if the respondent was not 
the woman in question, he/she may not have had full knowledge of the information 
required. Thus, the marital status, educational and fertility variables relating to women 
of childbearing age (as well as their reported ages) in the census may suffer somewhat 
from a certain amount of imputation (or guessing). 
One advantage of the census data, however, is that the large size of the 10 percent 
sample produces reasonable distributions of the South African population, even when 
the data are subjected to a high degree of disaggregation. The much smaller DHS 
sample generally does not permit analysis of fertility (or, indeed, any other demographic 
outcome) by more than a few characteristics at a time. 
3.3 Fertility data in the 1996 census  
The census asked two questions from which South African fertility can be assessed. The 
first question was “How many children, if any, has the woman ever given birth to?” The 
second was “How many children (live births), if any, has she given birth to in the last 
twelve months?” Responses to the first question were not collected for a significant 
proportion of women of childbearing age. Moreover, it appears that many respondents 
did not fully understand the second question, or that their responses were recorded 
inaccurately. Unadjusted, the census data cannot provide robust estimates of fertility and 
a series of corrections are necessary to obtain better estimates from these data. The 
corrections made are presented in the following sections. 
3.3.1 The El-Badry Correction 
The first adjustment made to the census data uses the El-Badry correction to adjust for 
the fact that many of the women of childbearing age who did not respond to the first of 
the two fertility questions are evidently childless. El-Badry (1961) observed that – in the 
majority of cases, and especially at younger ages – women who are enumerated as 
“parity not stated” are, in fact, childless, and that the enumerator has omitted to write 
zero on the form. He proposed a method of adjusting the recorded non-response to 
allow for this by apportioning the reported not stated cases between true not stated 
cases and women of zero parity, using the strongly linear correlation that exists between 
56
the proportion of childless women, and the proportion of women for whom parity was 
not recorded. 
If Z*(i) is the true proportion of women in age group i who are childless, and 
NS(i) is the reported proportion of women in age group i whose parity is not stated, 
then the correlation above can be described mathematically as  
NS(i) = αZ*(i) + β,  (1)  
where α is the “true” proportion of childless women in age group i who were 
incorrectly recorded as parity not stated, and β is the true, constant across all age 
groups, proportion of women whose parity is not stated. Further, since αZ*(i) 
represents the proportion of childless women whose parity was misclassified, the 
reported proportion of childless women, Z(i), can be found from 
Z(i) = (1- α)Z*(i). (2)  
Rearranging (2) to make Z*(i) the subject of the formula, and substituting in (1) 
gives 
NS(i) = γZ(i) + β, where γ = (α/1-α), (3)  
from which an estimate of the true value of Z*(i) can be found by fitting a line to 
the reported points {Z(i), NS(i)} for age groups 15-49, and estimating the parameters γ 
and β to give 
Z*(i) = Z(i)+(NS(i)-β). (4) 
Table 3.5 shows the proportion of women 15-49 whose parity was not stated, and 
the values of α and β, by population group, in the 1996 census. 
Table 3.5 Summary statistics arising from the El-Badry correction, by 
population group 
 
Population group 
% of women with parity 
not stated 
% of childless women reported 
as parity not stated (α) 
True % of women of 
not stated parity (β) 
Africans 15.3 33.9 3.3 
Coloureds 9.7 25.8 1.1 
Asians/Indians 17.1 37.9 0.7 
Whites 10.7 25.8 0.3 
 
The numbers of childless women in the census can then be estimated by summing 
the reported numbers of childless women and the estimated numbers of childless 
women who were erroneously recorded as being of unstated parity. The consequence of 
this adjustment is that estimated lifetime fertility, mean children ever borne, is also 
adjusted downwards (Table 3.6). 
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Table 3.6 Effect of the El-Badry adjustment on mean children ever borne, by 
age and population group 
 Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
Age group Before After Before After Before After Before After 
15-19 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 
20-24 0.91 0.75 0.79 0.68 0.53 0.33 0.35 0.29 
25-29 1.74 1.58 1.52 1.42 1.34 1.20 1.02 0.92 
30-34 2.69 2.55 2.24 2.16 2.06 1.94 1.67 1.58 
35-39 3.48 3.35 2.82 2.75 2.43 2.32 2.05 1.96 
40-44 4.16 4.05 3.27 3.19 2.71 2.61 2.24 2.15 
45-49 4.61 4.50 3.74 3.66 2.92 2.78 2.40 2.31 
 
A further adjustment was made to the current fertility data in the census arising 
from the El-Badry adjustment. Clearly, if a woman has never had children, she will not 
have borne a child in the twelve months before the census. Hence, the reported 
numbers of childless women reporting no births in the twelve months before the census 
were set to be equal to the adjusted numbers of childless women arising from the 
application of the El-Badry correction. The resultant adjusted age-specific fertility rates 
by age and population group are shown in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7 Effect of the El-Badry adjustment on age-specific fertility rates, by 
age and population group  
 Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
Age group Before After Before After Before After Before After 
15-19 0.050 0.036 0.048 0.037 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.009 
20-24 0.104 0.086 0.105 0.092 0.087 0.055 0.063 0.052 
25-29 0.117 0.107 0.121 0.113 0.112 0.101 0.110 0.099 
30-34 0.127 0.120 0.095 0.091 0.086 0.081 0.082 0.078 
35-39 0.113 0.108 0.066 0.064 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.044 
40-44 0.096 0.094 0.050 0.049 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.033 
45-49 0.080 0.078 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.031 
TFR 3.44 3.14 2.60 2.40 2.09 1.80 1.91 1.73 
 
3.3.2 Correction in respect of stillbirths 
The second correction makes allowance for the inclusion of stillbirths in the reported 
number of children ever borne. Comparison of the DHS and census data showing the 
numbers of children ever borne that have died, and children reported as still living (by 
age of mother) reveals higher numbers of dead children at all ages in the census, while 
the reported numbers of children still living are very similar (Figure 3.3). For reasons set 
out below, there are strong grounds for believing that this reflects the erroneous 
inclusion of stillbirths among women’s enumerated children ever borne in the census.  
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Figure 3.3 Mean living and mean dead children for all South African women, 
by age 
 
Although the census question on lifetime fertility3 specifically instructed 
enumerators and respondents to exclude stillbirths, the wording of the question was 
ambiguous, in that the final words in parentheses may have led enumerators to include 
stillbirths among the children that have died. The questionnaire used for the DHS, on 
the other hand, included a specific question on stillbirths, as shown in Figure 3.4.  
Figure 3.4 Extract from the 1998 South Africa DHS questionnaire, showing 
questions on stillbirths 
 
In addition to Question 216, which enquired about the outcome of each 
pregnancy, Question 217 probed more deeply if the woman responded that her child 
had been born dead. Women surveyed in the DHS reported a total of 24 464 
pregnancies and that the foetus was lost before full-term in 1 198 of these, and “born 
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dead” in another 407. Question 217 revealed that only 75 of these children showed any 
sign of life. The other 332 were stillbirths. However, as the mothers reported that these 
332 pregnancies ended in a birth, it seems likely that in the census such stillbirths would 
have been reported as (dead) live births, inflating the actual number of children dying 
before age 5 by about 22 percent.  
An adjustment was made to correct the data for this error. Based on the 
additional questions in the DHS, and the answers to them, it seems likely that the 
reported numbers of children ever borne to women interviewed in the DHS successfully 
exclude stillbirths. Assuming this to be the case, an estimate of the number of stillbirths 
returned as live births in the census can be derived by fitting polynomial curves to the 
proportion of dead children in each set of data. Subtracting the curve fitted to the DHS 
data from that fitted to the census data gives a smoothed estimate of the inclusion of 
stillbirths by mother’s age in the census. Figure 3.3 shows the curves fitted to the 
national population (i.e. all races). The difference between the two curves suggests that, 
on average, about 0.1 stillbirths per woman were reported as live births at older ages in 
the census. 
The scale of this error varies markedly by population group. While clear evidence 
exists of the inclusion of stillbirths among Coloured and African women, the data for 
Whites and Asians/Indians (although the sample sizes of these two groups in the DHS 
were small) reveal no discernible evidence of inclusion of stillbirths in the census vis-à-
vis the DHS. Thus, the adjustment for stillbirths was not applied to these groups.  
After generating the smoothed estimates of the inclusion of stillbirths by 
individual year of age, a correction was made to the reported mean children ever borne 
(CEB) by individual age, by subtracting the smoothed estimate from the reported CEB, 
and aggregating (using the weights in the census) into quinquennial groups. Estimated 
numbers of stillbirths included in the census for Africans and Coloureds (by age of 
mother) are shown in Table 3.8. 
The El-Badry-corrected estimates of children ever borne to African and Coloured 
women were then further corrected for African and Coloured women to compensate 
for the inclusion of these stillbirths. A (lower) revised estimate of the number of women 
at each parity in each age group was derived by subtracting the estimated stillbirths from 
                                                                                                                                          
3 The exact wording of the question (Question 15.1) was “How many children, if any, has the woman ever given birth to? (live 
births). (Please include her children, who are not living with her and those who have died).” 
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each parity and interpolating, assuming a constant inclusion of stillbirths across all 
parities. This adjustment has the effect of further reducing the estimated mean children 
ever borne. 
Table 3.8 Estimated number of stillbirths reported as live births in the 1996 
census, and corrected estimates of mean children ever borne (CEB), 
African and Coloured women 
 Africans Coloureds 
 
Age group 
Number of 
still births 
CEB: 
El-Badry 
CEB: El-Badry
 - stillbirth 
Number of 
still births 
CEB:  
El-Badry 
CEB: El-Badry 
- stillbirth 
15-19 0.003 0.16 0.16 0 0.14 0.14 
20-24 0.017 0.75 0.74 0.010 0.68 0.68 
25-29 0.038 1.58 1.55 0.038 1.42 1.39 
30-34 0.065 2.55 2.50 0.059 2.16 2.11 
35-39 0.098 3.35 3.27 0.071 2.75 2.68 
40-44 0.137 4.05 3.92 0.075 3.19 3.12 
45-49 0.183 4.50 4.33 0.071 3.66 3.60 
Note:  The revised CEB are not exactly equal to the El-Badry CEB less the estimated number of 
stillbirths due to the interpolation procedure used (see text). 
 
3.3.3 Age-specific fertility rates after application of the El-Badry and 
stillbirth adjustments 
The first correction made to the current fertility data arises from the application of the 
El-Badry correction to the numbers of women of zero parity (and hence zero births in 
the last year), and was described earlier. Then, working only with the data where there 
was a numeric response to both fertility questions in the census, the reported numbers 
of women at each parity after application of the El-Badry correction (and correcting for 
the inclusion of stillbirths in the case of African and Coloured women) were distributed 
across reported births in the last year in the same proportions as in the unadjusted data. 
From these, tabulations of births in the last year and children ever borne, by population 
and age group, were derived. 
Table 3.9 Age-specific fertility rates after correction for reporting stillbirths 
as live births, by age and population group  
Age group Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
15-19 0.036 0.037 0.009 0.009 
20-24 0.085 0.091 0.055 0.052 
25-29 0.105 0.111 0.101 0.099 
30-34 0.118 0.090 0.081 0.078 
35-39 0.106 0.063 0.046 0.044 
40-44 0.091 0.048 0.034 0.033 
45-49 0.076 0.034 0.033 0.031 
TFR 3.08 2.37 1.80 1.73 
 
The adjustment in respect of stillbirths has a small effect on the estimated age-
specific fertility rates for African and Coloured women. The estimated age-specific 
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fertility rates for Asians and Whites remain unchanged, since the adjustment in respect 
of stillbirths was not applied, but are shown in Table 3.9 for the sake of completeness. 
3.3.4 Correction for errors resulting from births in the last year being 
recorded as children ever borne 
Further problems exist with the data on current fertility in the census. A significant 
proportion of enumerators or respondents seems not to have appreciated the distinction 
between the two questions, and recorded the same answer (i.e. children ever borne) to 
both. Consequently, large numbers of women report upward of three children born in 
the 12 months preceding the census. These responses are likely to have arisen either 
from misinterpretations of the two fertility questions or through errors in the cleaning 
of the data by Statistics South Africa. This error has severe implications for the 
calculation of age-specific fertility rates and total fertility from the census data unless it is 
compensated for. Older women tend to have had more children, and hence age-specific 
fertility rates calculated without adjusting for this error are particularly exaggerated at the 
older age groups.  
To correct for this, all women of parity two or greater who reported the same 
number of births in the last year as in their lifetime were treated as “not stated” births in 
the last year.  
Table 3.10 Percent reduction in estimated age-specific fertility rates after 
correcting for reporting of children ever borne as births in the last 
year, by age and population group 
Age group Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
15-19 2.3 2.5 0.0 3.1 
20-24 8.8 4.1 3.0 6.6 
25-29 19.7 9.3 6.4 6.6 
30-34 29.9 17.2 23.9 15.9 
35-39 35.2 27.8 35.4 36.1 
40-44 43.9 45.4 47.4 57.1 
45-49 51.1 61.2 61.6 66.5 
 
The effect of this adjustment is significant for all population groups, and especially at 
older ages, as can be seen from Table 3.10. The estimated age-specific fertility rates after 
this adjustment are shown in Table 3.11. 
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Table 3.11 Age-specific fertility rates after correcting for reporting of births in 
the last year as children ever borne, by age and population group 
Age group Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
15-19 0.035 0.036 0.009 0.009 
20-24 0.078 0.087 0.053 0.048 
25-29 0.084 0.100 0.094 0.092 
30-34 0.083 0.074 0.062 0.065 
35-39 0.069 0.045 0.030 0.028 
40-44 0.051 0.026 0.018 0.014 
45-49 0.037 0.013 0.013 0.011 
TFR 2.18 1.91 1.39 1.34 
 
3.3.5 Correction for women of parity one reporting one birth in the last 
year 
Further examination of the data showed that the proportion of women of parity one 
who reported a single birth in the 12 months prior to the census was also implausibly 
high relative to women of other parities who reported a single birth in the same year. 
For women aged 25 and older, a clear linear trend by parity exists in the proportion of 
women having a birth in the 12 months prior to the census (Figure 3.5). This effect is 
most pronounced in the older age groups. 
Figure 3.5 Actual, and estimated, proportions of South African women 
reporting a single birth in the 12 months prior to the census, by 
parity and age group 
 
By extrapolating these trends in the age-group specific data, revised estimates of 
the numbers of women of parity one in each of these age groups who had a birth in the 
12 months before the census were derived. The excess number of births in the last year 
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was assumed to represent women of parity one who had not given birth in the 12 
months before the census. 
3.3.6 Women reporting more than one birth in the year before the census 
It is impossible for women to have more than two maternities in any given 12-month 
period, and the DHS showed very low levels (around 1 percent) of multiple births in the 
12 months before the survey. Accordingly, the census data were adjusted further by pro-
rating all births in excess of one reported in the 12 months before the census to 0 and 1 
births in the period. This further reduces the estimated level of total fertility slightly.   
The estimated age-specific fertility rates resulting from the last two adjustments 
are shown in Table 3.12. 
Table 3.12 Age-specific fertility rates after correcting for misreporting of 
recent births by older women of parity one, and after prorating 
births in the last year of more than one, by age and population 
group 
Age group Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
15-19 0.035 0.036 0.009 0.009 
20-24 0.077 0.087 0.053 0.048 
25-29 0.077 0.098 0.094 0.091 
30-34 0.067 0.067 0.046 0.059 
35-39 0.052 0.041 0.023 0.020 
40-44 0.031 0.018 0.012 0.010 
45-49 0.016 0.009 0.005 0.007 
TFR 1.77 1.78 1.21 1.23 
 
For all population groups, once the data are adjusted to allow for women who 
report impossibly large numbers of births in the last year and childless women who are 
coded as parity not stated, the estimated levels of total fertility are implausibly low, as 
the adjustments made have the effect of eliminating about half the births that were 
reported as having occurred in the 12 months before the census. It is therefore clear 
that once one adjusts for problems with the coding and misinterpretation of the 
question, not all births that actually occurred in the 12 months before the census were 
reported.  
Thus, other reporting errors affect these data. Accordingly, two further 
adjustments were made to the data to produce reasonable estimates of South African 
fertility. First, a Relational Gompertz model was used to correct the shape of the fertility 
distribution for African and Coloured women (Section 3.3.7). Reasonable estimates of 
recent fertility in South Africa were then derived using a variant of Brass’ P/F method, 
64
which estimates the current level of fertility from the lifetime fertility of women at the 
average age of childbearing (Feeney, 1998; United Nations, 1993). 
3.3.7 Fitting of Relational Gompertz models to the 1996 census data 
Relational Gompertz models provide a useful way of evaluating the extent of age 
reporting errors and underreporting of births in census and survey data, and for 
correcting distortions in the shape of the fertility distribution arising from these errors. 
The technique, developed by Zaba (1981), is a variant of the P/F method insofar as it 
uses reported lifetime fertility (i.e. parities) to adjust for biases in the reported current 
level of fertility (the age-specific fertility rates). However, the model relies on the 
applicability of a standard fertility distribution, which is inappropriate for use with the 
White and Indian/Asian populations. Hence the technique was not applied to these 
sub-populations. Additionally, while the technique can correct for distortions in both 
the level and the shape of the fertility distribution, the correction of the fertility level 
requires the assumption that there has been no time trend in fertility. As this assumption 
is unreasonable in the context of the South African fertility decline, the model was used 
simply to correct the shape of the fertility distribution for African and Coloured women.  
Age-specific fertility rates based on the adjusted census data (Table 3.12), and the 
estimated mean children ever borne by age group (adjusted using the El-Badry 
technique, and corrected for the inclusion of stillbirths, shown in Table 3.8) were used 
as inputs into the model. It was fitted using the F-points only (since the intention was 
only to correct the shape of the fertility distribution) using data on the 15-19 through 
35-39 age groups, as comparison of the data with the standard distribution revealed 
significant age reporting errors for women in their forties. The estimated age-specific 
fertility rates are shown in Table 3.13, for all population groups, although those for 
Whites and Indians/Asians remain unchanged from Table 3.12, and are shown again 
only for completeness’ sake. 
Table 3.13 Age-specific fertility rates after application of the Relational 
Gompertz model, by age and population group 
Age group Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
15-19 0.036 0.037 0.009 0.009 
20-24 0.076 0.093 0.053 0.048 
25-29 0.078 0.089 0.094 0.091 
30-34 0.067 0.066 0.046 0.059 
35-39 0.051 0.042 0.023 0.020 
40-44 0.027 0.017 0.012 0.010 
45-49 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.007 
TFR 1.70 1.73 1.21 1.23 
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3.3.8 Analysis of the effects of the adjustments applied to the census data 
Table 3.14 shows the percent contribution that each adjustment discussed so far makes 
to the reduction in estimated fertility by population group. It is immediately apparent 
that, for all population groups, the two single biggest contributors to the reduction in 
the estimated total fertility are the adjustments arising in respect of women’s lifetime 
fertility being enumerated as current fertility, and the El-Badry correction. For all 
groups, these two effects account for between 68 and 83 percent of the reduction in the 
level of total fertility from the unadjusted census data to the estimates presented in 
Table 3.13. The restriction of the analysis to only one birth in the 12 months preceding 
the census is particularly important for Africans. 
Table 3.14 Percent contribution to the reduction in estimated fertility of each 
of the adjustments to the census fertility data, by population group 
Correction Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
Unadjusted total fertility 3.44 2.60 2.09 1.91 
El-Badry correction  16.8 22.9 33.5 26.0 
Stillbirths correction 3.6 4.0 N/A N/A 
Correction for births in the last year 
equal to children ever borne 
51.8 51.9 45.7 57.2 
Correction in respect of parity 1 women 5.3 6.8 12.2 12.5 
Restriction to 1 birth in the last year 18.2 8.8 8.5 4.2 
Gompertz model 4.2 5.7 N/A N/A 
Adjusted total fertility  1.70 1.73 1.21 1.23 
Note: N/A: Correction not applied 
 
3.3.9 Adjustment of the level of fertility using Feeney’s approach 
While the shape of the adjusted fertility distributions for each population group is 
reasonable, the level of fertility implicit in the fertility rates presented in Table 3.13 is 
clearly not. One final adjustment was made to the data to correct the level of fertility 
using a variant of the Brass P/F ratio method suggested by Feeney (1998).  
The Brass P/F ratio method uses reported average parities, P(i) – derived from 
Table 3.8 – and the period fertility rate (Table 3.13) to calculate the P/F ratio, where F 
is the estimated parity equivalent (i.e. the parity that, according to a model schedule, is 
associated with the reported period fertility rate, after adjustment for the six month 
difference between age of mother at survey and age of mother at birth). Values of the 
P/F ratio by population and age group are shown in Table 3.15. 
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Table 3.15 P/F ratios, by age and population group 
Age group Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
15-19 2.06 1.71 2.99 2.65 
20-24 1.87 1.50 1.94 1.83 
25-29 1.96 1.51 1.97 1.62 
30-34 2.17 1.62 2.09 1.68 
35-39 2.27 1.72 2.15 1.78 
40-44 2.40 1.85 2.25 1.86 
45-49 2.56 2.09 2.31 1.90 
 
The P/F ratios measure the difference between the reported parities, and the 
estimated parity equivalents based on reported current fertility, and it is not readily clear 
how to apply them when fertility is declining. However, Feeney (1998) has argued that 
under conditions of declining fertility, the optimal estimate of current fertility is 
obtained by multiplying the fertility schedule by the P/F ratio applicable at the mean age 
of childbearing. The latter is obtained by interpolation between the relevant values of 
Table 3.15. The scaling factors shown in Table 3.16 apply. 
Table 3.16 Mean of the fertility schedule and Feeney’s scaling factor, by 
population group 
 Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
Mean age of fertility schedule 28.8 27.6 28.6 28.9 
Feeney’s scaling factor 2.05 1.53 2.02 1.65 
 
Multiplying the (shifted) fertility schedules by the factors shown in Table 3.16 
gives rise to the age-specific fertility rates for each population group and total fertility 
applicable at the census date (Table 3.17). 
Table 3.17 Adjusted estimates of age-specific fertility rates in South Africa from 
the 1996 census, by population group 
Age group Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
15-19 0.086 0.068 0.024 0.019 
20-24 0.159 0.144 0.120 0.089 
25-29 0.159 0.133 0.185 0.151 
30-34 0.135 0.097 0.085 0.088 
35-39 0.102 0.060 0.045 0.031 
40-44 0.050 0.023 0.023 0.016 
45-49 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.010 
TFR 3.49 2.64 2.45 2.02 
 
The need for the adjustments described in the preceding sections suggest that the 
current fertility data in the census are of particularly poor quality, largely as a result of 
enumerator error. It is imperative that any analysis of the 1996 South Africa Census 
fertility data adjusts for the deficiencies outlined. Failure to do so results in seriously 
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distorted estimates of current South African fertility. By contrast, the equivalent DHS 
data are of relatively good quality. 
3.4 Lifetime and current fertility in South Africa in the late 1990s 
This section compares the levels of lifetime and current fertility estimated from the 
adjusted census data and the 1998 South Africa Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS). Section 3.4.1 presents data on mean children ever borne by population group, 
while Section 3.4.2 presents estimates of fertility by population group, and from these 
estimates of national fertility are derived.  
3.4.1 Estimates of lifetime fertility by population group 
Table 3.18 shows the estimated mean children ever born to women, by population 
group and age group, using the (adjusted) 1996 census and the 1998 DHS data. 
Table 3.18 Mean children ever borne, by age and population group, 1998 DHS 
and 1996 census 
 Africans Coloureds 
 
Age group 
Unadjusted 
census 
Adjusted 
census 
 
DHS 
Unadjusted 
census 
Adjusted 
census 
 
DHS 
15-19 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.16 
20-24 0.91 0.74 0.83 0.79 0.68 0.80 
25-29 1.74 1.55 1.65 1.52 1.39 1.33 
30-34 2.69 2.50 2.63 2.24 2.11 2.12 
35-39 3.48 3.27 3.46 2.82 2.68 2.66 
40-44 4.16 3.92 3.81 3.27 3.12 3.07 
45-49 4.61 4.33 4.46 3.74 3.60 3.42 
   
 Asians/Indians Whites 
 
Age group 
Unadjusted 
census 
Adjusted 
census 
 
DHS 
Unadjusted 
census 
Adjusted 
census 
 
DHS 
15-19 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 
20-24 0.53 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.29 0.19 
25-29 1.34 1.20 1.26 1.02 0.92 1.37 
30-34 2.06 1.94 2.24 1.67 1.58 1.82 
35-39 2.43 2.32 2.79 2.05 1.96 2.11 
40-44 2.71 2.61 2.55 2.24 2.15 2.33 
45-49 2.92 2.78 2.84 2.40 2.31 2.59 
 
These data are shown in Figure 3.6. After application of the adjustments 
described above, the estimates for African and Coloured women from the census and 
the DHS correspond extremely well. The estimates of African women’s lifetime fertility 
flatten out between ages 35 and 44 in the DHS. This further supports the idea suggested 
earlier that rural African women in the 40-44 age group tended to understate their ages 
in the DHS. For White and Asian/Indian women, the data sources agree less well. This 
is partially a function of the small samples of women in these two groups in the DHS.  
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Figure 3.6 Mean children ever borne, by age and population group, 1998 DHS 
and 1996 census 
 
3.4.2 Age-specific fertility rates by population group 
The estimated age-specific fertility rates arising from the census and the DHS are shown 
in Table 3.19. Fertility rates are calculated from the 1998 DHS using women’s reported 
numbers of births in the three years before the survey, and calculating each woman’s 
contribution to the total exposure to risk (in months) by age-group over the three years. 
The rates are directly comparable insofar as they refer to the same date. As a result of 
the Brass-Feeney correction made to the census data, the census rates reflect the level of 
fertility at the census date (i.e. October 1996). The rates calculated from the DHS data 
are based on births to women in the three years before the survey, and refer on average 
to a date 18 months before the DHS interviews. Thus, since almost 70 percent of the 
DHS interviews were conducted between February and April 1998, these rates also refer 
to October 1996.  
The effect of the adjustments made to the census data is not apparent if one looks 
only at the estimated level of fertility. As a result of the corrections made to the census 
data, the age distributions of fertility in the adjusted and unadjusted census estimates are 
radically different.  
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Table 3.19 Age-specific fertility rates by population group 
 Africans Coloureds 
 
Age group 
Unadjusted 
census 
Adjusted 
census 
 
DHS 
Unadjusted 
census 
Adjusted 
census 
 
DHS 
15-19 0.050 0.086 0.081 0.048 0.068 0.081 
20-24 0.104 0.159 0.139 0.105 0.144 0.162 
25-29 0.117 0.159 0.142 0.121 0.133 0.128 
30-34 0.127 0.135 0.119 0.095 0.097 0.083 
35-39 0.113 0.102 0.088 0.066 0.060 0.042 
40-44 0.096 0.050 0.038 0.050 0.023 0.010 
45-49 0.080 0.007 0.013 0.035 0.002 0.001 
TFR 3.44 3.49 3.11 2.60 2.64 2.53 
   
 Asians/Indians Whites 
 
Age group 
Unadjusted 
census 
Adjusted 
census 
 
DHS 
Unadjusted 
census 
Adjusted 
census 
 
DHS 
15-19 0.013 0.024 0.026 0.013 0.019 0.020 
20-24 0.087 0.120 0.138 0.063 0.089 0.087 
25-29 0.112 0.185 0.095 0.110 0.151 0.185 
30-34 0.086 0.085 0.066 0.082 0.088 0.069 
35-39 0.048 0.045 0.036 0.046 0.031 0.016 
40-44 0.035 0.023 0.000 0.035 0.016 0.000 
45-49 0.035 0.008 0.000 0.033 0.010 0.000 
TFR 2.09 2.45 1.80 1.91 2.02 1.88 
 
The adjusted level of fertility estimated from the census data is higher than that 
indicated by the DHS, particularly for African women. However, the estimates of 
Asian/Indian (and, to a lesser extent, White) fertility from the DHS are based on a 
sample too small to be reliable. (The preliminary report issued by the Department of 
Health (1999), did not even publish an estimated total fertility rate for Asian/Indian 
women for this reason.) 
The standardised fertility distributions (i.e. assuming a TFR of 1) differ markedly 
by population group, with those for African and Coloured women being relatively flat, 
and those for Asians/Indians and Whites being far more concentrated around the mode 
(Figure 3.7). The standardised distributions of fertility for African women are almost 
identical in the DHS and the adjusted census results. Minor differences exist for the 40-
44 age group, as one would expect if, as suspected, the misstatement of age by rural 
women in this age group occurred in the DHS. The flatness of the fertility distribution 
at younger ages (and the high rate of fertility among adolescents) for African women is 
similar to a pattern identified in rural Northern Province by Garenne, Tollman and 
Kahn (2000), which they discovered to be the result of two components of similar 
magnitude: high levels of premarital fertility among women aged 15 to 25, and marital 
fertility among women aged 15 to 49.  
The shape of the fertility distribution for Coloured women differs quite 
substantially between the two data sets. DHS fieldworkers experienced difficulty in 
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adequately surveying the population of the Western Cape, where the majority of the 
Coloured population lives, and this would account for the difference. The fertility 
schedules for Indian/Asian women differ between the DHS and the census. Although 
the mode of the DHS fertility distribution seems to be too low, this probably reflects 
the small sample size. The fertility schedule for White women has the same shape in 
both DHS and census; although the higher peak in the 25-29 age group in the DHS 
simply reflects the fact that no White women over the age of 40 reported births in the 
three years before the survey. 
Figure 3.7 Percent distribution of fertility according to age by population 
group  
 
3.4.3 National age-specific fertility rates 
Two approaches could be adopted for the calculation of national South African age-
specific fertility rates from the census data. The first is to use the national data (i.e. not 
disaggregated by population group) from the census, and apply adjustments to it of the 
form set out in Section 3.3. The second approach is to weight the age- and population 
group-specific estimated fertility rates presented above to give an estimated national 
schedule of fertility rates. The second method is preferable to the first. There is strong 
heterogeneity in the fertility schedules by population group presented in Table 3.19, in 
terms of both their level and their shape. Moreover, not all the adjustments made to the 
African women
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
DHS Adjusted Census
Coloured women
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
DHS Adjusted Census
Indian/Asian women
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
DHS Adjusted Census
White women
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
DHS Adjusted Census
71
data on African women are applicable to the data on minority population groups (for 
example, the correction in respect of stillbirths and the Relational Gompertz model for 
Whites and Indians/Asians).  
3.4.3.1 Weights used to calculate national age-specific fertility rates 
Thus, suitable weights are required to estimate the national age-specific fertility rates. 
Since the intention is to first calculate age-specific rates, and thence the total fertility 
rate, the weights chosen for use with the census estimates are the distributions of 
women, by population and age group, excluding those women whose population group 
was not stated (Table 3.20). 
Table 3.20 Weights used in the estimation of national age-specific fertility 
rates from the 1996 census 
Age group Africans Coloureds Indians/Asians Whites 
15-19 0.815 0.083 0.023 0.078 
20-24 0.803 0.086 0.026 0.086 
25-29 0.777 0.094 0.027 0.102 
30-34 0.765 0.100 0.028 0.107 
35-39 0.741 0.100 0.030 0.128 
40-44 0.720 0.099 0.034 0.147 
45-49 0.689 0.101 0.037 0.173 
Note: Weights may not sum to 1 by age owing to rounding. 
 
No such problem arises with the DHS data. First, no adjustments of the 
magnitude required for the census data were needed. Second, the method of calculating 
the age-specific fertility rates from the DHS data was based on the precise calculation of 
exposure-to-risk, and hence, the calculation of national rates direct from the data 
produces the same results if the population-group specific fertility rates from the DHS 
had been weighted by their contribution to the exposure to risk (Table 3.21). 
Table 3.21 Weights used in the estimation of national age-specific fertility 
rates from the 1998 DHS 
Age group Africans Coloureds Asians/Indians Whites 
15-19 0.819 0.094 0.028 0.059 
20-24 0.838 0.090 0.028 0.044 
25-29 0.777 0.115 0.031 0.078 
30-34 0.770 0.111 0.043 0.076 
35-39 0.751 0.114 0.035 0.100 
40-44 0.738 0.101 0.044 0.116 
45-49 0.703 0.113 0.051 0.133 
 
The final estimates of the national age-specific fertility rates are shown below.  
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Table 3.22 National age-specific fertility estimates, 1998 DHS and 1996 census  
Age group 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 TFR 
Census 0.078 0.151 0.156 0.125 0.087 0.042 0.007 3.23 
DHS 0.076 0.139 0.142 0.109 0.074 0.029 0.009 2.89 
 
The revised census estimates show higher fertility than the DHS in all cohorts 
other than the oldest, and markedly higher fertility in the 40-44 age group. Again, this 
provides evidence that older women’s age reporting in the DHS was flawed and subject 
to misreporting. Based on the earlier discussions of the quality of the data in each 
survey, and the limited data in the DHS relating to minority population groups, it is 
probable that the DHS is not capable of providing wholly reliable estimates of national 
fertility, and even less so of the level of fertility in the minority population groups.  
3.4.4 Provincial fertility estimates from the revised census and DHS data 
Apartheid policies on urbanisation, and the creation of the so-called ‘homelands’ have 
created wide provincial disparities in health, education and socio-economic markers, as 
well as the racial composition of each province. These differentials translate into widely 
disparate levels of fertility across the country. Provincial estimates of fertility using the 
adjusted census data and the DHS are shown in Table 3.23 below. Unlike the national 
estimates, the provincial estimates are not calculated from a weighted average of 
estimated fertility for each population group in the province, as the number of 
observations in the DHS data (required to make the correction in respect of inclusion of 
stillbirths) precludes analysis by population group and province simultaneously. 
While in all provinces the level of fertility shown by the adjusted census data is 
lower than that shown by the DHS, there is a good correspondence between total 
fertility estimated from the census and the DHS, except in the Eastern Cape, Free State, 
North-West and Mpumalanga. The rankings of provinces by their total fertility, 
according to the two inquiries, are in reasonably good agreement. 
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Table 3.23 Estimates of age-specific fertility by province of usual residence, 
1996 census and 1998 DHS  
 Western Cape Eastern Cape Northern Cape 
Age group Census DHS Census DHS Census DHS 
15-19 0.055 0.067 0.079 0.079 0.071 0.076 
20-24 0.131 0.120 0.170 0.146 0.155 0.156 
25-29 0.122 0.121 0.178 0.175 0.143 0.148 
30-34 0.088 0.092 0.154 0.141 0.105 0.092 
35-39 0.053 0.051 0.116 0.107 0.064 0.044 
40-44 0.019 0.007 0.056 0.037 0.024 0.015 
45-49 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.005 
TFR 2.35 2.29 3.80 3.47 2.82 2.68 
       
 Free State KwaZulu-Natal North-West 
Age group Census DHS Census DHS Census DHS 
15-19 0.060 0.055 0.078 0.092 0.076 0.060 
20-24 0.147 0.103 0.157 0.148 0.151 0.137 
25-29 0.142 0.116 0.157 0.158 0.145 0.091 
30-34 0.107 0.094 0.130 0.109 0.114 0.108 
35-39 0.067 0.043 0.094 0.098 0.078 0.076 
40-44 0.025 0.027 0.043 0.042 0.033 0.016 
45-49 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.019 0.004 0.000 
TFR 2.75 2.19 3.32 3.33 3.00 2.44 
       
 Gauteng Mpumalanga Northern Province 
Age group Census DHS Census DHS Census DHS 
15-19 0.059 0.052 0.093 0.100 0.101 0.090 
20-24 0.131 0.125 0.170 0.129 0.181 0.179 
25-29 0.126 0.136 0.161 0.124 0.180 0.187 
30-34 0.096 0.084 0.128 0.136 0.154 0.142 
35-39 0.062 0.047 0.089 0.097 0.118 0.089 
40-44 0.024 0.024 0.039 0.015 0.059 0.059 
45-49 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.009 0.029 
TFR 2.50 2.34 3.42 3.09 4.01 3.88 
 
3.5 Retrospective estimates of fertility using reverse-survival 
methods 
Using the data from the 1996 and 1970 South Africa Censuses, reverse-survival 
techniques can be applied to the data for all South African women, and for African 
South African women separately, to better understand the trends in South African 
fertility over the last fifty years and place the results derived above in an historical 
context.  
3.5.1 All South African women 
With appropriate assumptions (the most important of which is the requirement that no 
differential under-enumeration has occurred in particular age groups in the data being 
analysed), reverse-survival techniques can provide valuable insights into fertility trends 
for periods up to 15 years before a census or survey (Bogue, 1993). The method is 
intuitively simple: if the level of mortality by age for the 15 years prior to the survey or 
census can be estimated accurately, it is possible to estimate the number of births that 
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must have occurred in earlier years to give rise to the current population. Using 
estimates of South African mortality derived by Timæus, Dorrington, Bradshaw and 
Nannan (forthcoming), total fertility rates for the period from 1981 to 1996 can be 
derived from the 1996 census data. A similar exercise was performed using the data 
from the 1970 South Africa Census, using the Princeton Regional Model Life Tables 
(Coale, Demeny and Vaughan, 1983) to estimate mortality4. Using a schedule of the 
fertility distribution in quinquennial groups to apportion the births by age of mother, 
estimates of the age-specific fertility rates for each of the 15 years preceding the survey, 
and hence estimates of total fertility, can be derived. The fertility distributions needed to 
do this for the period 1981 to 1996 were interpolated from the estimated fertility in 
1996 (Table 3.22), and data for 1978 (South Africa, 1983:115). 
The reverse-survival estimates of fertility calculated using the 1970 census data are 
more approximate, not only in their use of model life tables, but also because no 
published data on the distribution of fertility by age exist for this period. Estimates of 
the racial composition of South Africa for the period 1955-1970 were derived by 
interpolating between those published estimates that are available for 1960 and 1970 
(South Africa, 1983:12). Sadie’s (1973) estimates of fertility by population group and 
period were then combined using these weights and interpolation between them was 
used to derive annual national fertility schedules. Annual fertility schedules for Africans 
were interpolated directly between Sadie’s estimates. Schedules for the first and last 
periods of each reverse-survival projection, for South Africans and African South 
Africans separately, are shown in Table 3.24. 
                                                 
4 The reverse-survival estimates of fertility for this period was calculated on three different bases using the West Regional Life 
Tables: A fast mortality decline scenario used Level 11 for 1955-60, Level 13 for 1960-65 and Level 15 for 1965-70. A medium 
mortality decline scenario (shown in the graphs) used Levels 12, 13 and 15 for the same time periods, while a slow mortality decline 
scenario used Levels 13,14 and 15. The general level of mortality was chosen so that the resulting tables showed values of e0 and 5q0 
roughly in line with estimates for the population at the time. 
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Table 3.24 Distributions by age of fertility used in the reverse-survival 
projections 
 1956 1970 1982 1996 
Age group All Africans All Africans All Africans All Africans 
15-19 0.053 0.045 0.061 0.056 0.074 0.078 0.102 0.123 
20-24 0.213 0.190 0.228 0.212 0.234 0.218 0.227 0.227 
25-29 0.233 0.220 0.251 0.241 0.261 0.240 0.244 0.228 
30-34 0.195 0.198 0.203 0.207 0.199 0.200 0.199 0.193 
35-39 0.156 0.167 0.143 0.153 0.133 0.148 0.140 0.146 
40-44 0.096 0.111 0.075 0.084 0.069 0.080 0.072 0.072 
45-49 0.054 0.069 0.040 0.048 0.030 0.037 0.015 0.010 
Source: Derived from Sadie (1973), South Africa (1983), and Table 3.19 (Africans) and Table 3.22 (All) 
 
The estimates derived from the application of the reverse-survival technique are 
shown in Figure 3.8, together with estimates published by Mostert, Hofmeyr, 
Oosthuizen et al. (1998) and Sibanda and Zuberi (1999). The former are those presented 
in Table 2.1, while the latter are historic estimates of South African fertility derived from 
the 1996 census data, also using reverse-survival techniques. These estimates, however, 
are based on complex (and inadequately documented) algorithmic procedures that 
attempt to link data on children to their mothers. 
The absence of reliable census data for South Africa between 1970 and 1996 
creates a gap in our knowledge relating to the period 1970-1981. However, linear 
interpolation between the two series5 allows some tentative conclusions to be drawn and 
enhances our understanding of the trend in South African fertility over the fifty years 
since 1948.  
Figure 3.8 Trends in total fertility, all South African women, 1948-1996 
                                                 
5 To avoid errors associated with misreporting of infants’ age and under-enumeration at the youngest ages, interpolated results using 
the values for 1966 and 1983 have been calculated. 
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Source: Own calculation; Mostert, Hofmeyr, Oosthuizen et al . (1998); Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) 
 
The deficiencies of the data and the limitations of the methodologies applied 
notwithstanding, Figure 3.8 indicates that – especially for more recent time periods – the 
resulting estimates of past South African fertility are generally consistent with those of 
other demographers, and provides some support for the use of the reverse-survival 
approach. The estimates derived for the 1950s and 1960s are indeed rough 
approximations as the variability in fertility estimates from one year to the next 
indicates. The very low levels of fertility estimated for 1968 and 1969 reflect the 
underenumeration of children under the age of 2 in the 1970 census, while the pattern 
in the later years of the 1950s shows strong digit preference.  
From the above, we can conclude that the pace of decline of fertility in South 
Africa has been slow and gradual since the 1960s. There are no obvious changes in the 
trend associated with the implementation of the government’s family planning 
programmes in either 1974 or 1984. The next section examines the history of the 
fertility decline among African South African women. 
3.5.2 African women  
Applying the same reverse-survival techniques to the African population produces the 
results shown in Figure 3.9. Given the racial composition of the South African 
population, it is not surprising that the trends shown in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 are 
very similar.  
Figure 3.9 Trends in total fertility, African South African women, 1948-1996 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Reverse survival Interpolated Sibanda and Zuberi Mostert et al
77
Source:  Own calculation; Mostert, Hofmeyr, Oosthuizen et al . (1998); Sibanda and Zuberi (1999) 
 
The two back projections (and the interpolation between them) show clearly that 
the decline in African women’s fertility began (at the latest) in the early 1960s. Fertility 
only fell slowly over the following decade. Since the early 1990s, fertility has declined at 
a faster pace again with little discernible effect of the national family planning 
programmes on the pace of the fertility decline. While the pattern shown by the 
estimates based on reverse-survival techniques is broadly similar to those shown by 
other estimates, some features are worthy of additional comment.  
First, the estimates are lower than those produced by Sibanda and Zuberi, 
especially for the period 1982 to 1994. This difference is most probably attributable to 
their inadvertent linking of children to their grandmothers (not their mothers), and 
hence inflating estimates of fertility among older women. This can be demonstrated 
through a comparison of the (standardised to 1) age-specific fertility rates presented 
above for Africans, and those presented by Sibanda and Zuberi. Table 3.25 shows that 
Sibanda and Zuberi found lower fertility at younger ages than those estimated above, 
and significantly higher fertility after age 40.  
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Table 3.25 Comparison of standardised age-specific fertility rates for Africans 
in 1996 derived from the adjusted census data, and those derived 
by Sibanda and Zuberi 
Age group Adjusted census data Sibanda and Zuberi 
15-19 24.6 16.7 
20-24 45.6 36.1 
25-29 45.6 42.5 
30-34 38.7 43.8 
35-39 29.2 33.1 
40-44 14.3 18.7 
45-49 2.0 9.0 
Source: Table 3.19 (adjusted census estimates), Sibanda and Zuberi (1999). 
 
Second, both reverse-survival techniques produce estimates of recent fertility that 
are substantially lower than those indicated by the estimation from current fertility data. 
This suggests that despite the corrections made in the post-enumeration survey, there 
was a significant undercount of young children in the 1996 census.  
3.5.3 Undercount of infants and children under 5 in the 1996 census 
Dorrington (1999) has suggested that, as in other South African censuses, a systematic 
undercount of infants and children less than 5 years of age occurred in the 1996 census. 
Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr (1987), in a reconstruction of the African South 
African population, estimated that children under the age of five had been 
underenumerated in earlier censuses to the extent shown in Table 3.26. 
Table 3.26 Percent undercount of African South African children (0-4) by sex, 
various years  
 Census Year 
Sex 1936 1970 1980 
Males 15.8 26.9 38.0 
Females 9.2 23.8 37.2 
Source: Mostert, van Tonder and Hofmeyr (1987) 
 
The undercount of children under the age of 5 in the 1996 South Africa Census 
was probably not as high as in the 1980 census. However, dividing the estimate of total 
fertility in 1996 from the current fertility data in the census by that from the reverse-
survival procedure suggests that the undercount of infants (aged less than one) in the 
1996 census was 22.9 percent. For African infants, the equivalent estimate is 26.6 
percent.  
3.6 Cohort-period fertility 
Cohort-period fertility rates measure the fertility of a cohort of women (usually grouped 
into quinquennial age groups) in a defined period (usually grouped in five year periods 
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before the survey). Using cohort-period fertility rates to analyse birth history data from 
surveys such as the DHS is preferable to using conventional age-period rates because 
the calculations are simple; one can readily sum the rates to obtain measures that 
represent the experience of real cohorts of women; and because they allow direct 
calculation of P/F ratios. Cohort-period rates and P/F ratios, calculated following the 
procedure set out in Goldman and Hobcraft (1982), are presented in Table 3.27.  
Panel A shows the number of women in each age group at the time of the survey, 
and the reported number of births to women in each age group, grouped by time before 
the survey. Thus, for example, after weighting, between 1989 and 1993 1056.6 births 
occurred to the 1435.8 women who were aged 25-29 at the time of the survey. 
Panel B presents the annual cohort-period fertility rates, derived by dividing the 
number of births to each cohort of women in a given time period before the survey by 
the number of women in that age group at the time of the survey, and dividing the 
result again by 5 to give the annual rate. Reading across the rows in Panel C (from right 
to left) indicates how fertility has changed over time for women of the same age, while 
Panel E provides equivalent data cumulated by age. The results confirm those of the 
reverse-survival analysis. While fertility has been falling for many years, the pace of 
fertility decline has accelerated in the ten years before the DHS (i.e. since 1988). 
Reading up a diagonal in Panel D from left to right shows the cumulative fertility 
of a cohort at five-yearly intervals (i.e. of that cohort at younger ages). Reading across 
the rows shows the cumulative fertility of different cohorts of women by the same age. 
The data on the diagonal associated with the cohort of women aged 40-44 are 
inconsistent with the data for adjacent cohorts, since the cumulative fertility of this 
cohort at younger ages is lower than the cumulative fertility of the 35-39 cohort at the 
same ages. This could result from displacement of births from more distant to more 
recent periods for women in that cohort (i.e. Potter (1977) effects). The investigations 
discussed earlier, however, suggest that it is the age reporting of women in that cohort 
that is at fault, not imperfect recall of past fertility by women in one specific cohort.  
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Table 3.27 Cohort-period fertility rates and P/F ratios, African women 
   Years prior to survey 
   0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 
 Age group of cohort at survey      
A  No. WOMEN NUMBER OF BIRTHS    
 15-19 1771.746 266.001 3.184   
 20-24 1716.206 1055.096 356.955 9.679   
 25-29 1435.828 991.502 1056.621 314.643 16.494  
 30-34 1235.566 783.452 1053.272 1086.243 334.444 9.873 
 35-39 1215.648 621.143 981.586 1227.718 1052.915 328.473 16.015
 40-44 941.870 291.786 621.853 801.306 887.200 796.458 195.943
 45-49 676.136 86.741 284.848 540.161 602.667 768.016 595.601
         
B COHORT PERIOD FERTILITY RATES     
 15-19  0.030 0.000   
 20-24  0.123 0.042 0.001   
 25-29  0.138 0.147 0.044 0.002  
 30-34  0.127 0.170 0.176 0.054 0.002 
 35-39  0.102 0.161 0.202 0.173 0.054 0.003
 40-44  0.062 0.132 0.170 0.188 0.169 0.042
 45-49  0.026 0.084 0.160 0.178 0.227 0.176
         
 Age group of cohort at end of period     
C COHORT PERIOD FERTILITY RATES     
 15-19  0.030 0.042 0.044 0.054 0.054 0.042
 20-24  0.123 0.147 0.176 0.173 0.169 0.176
 25-29  0.138 0.170 0.202 0.188 0.227 
 30-34  0.127 0.161 0.170 0.178  
 35-39  0.102 0.132 0.160   
 40-44  0.062 0.084   
 45-49  0.026   
         
D CUMULATIVE FERTILITY OF COHORTS AT END OF PERIOD (P)  
 15-19  0.150 0.208 0.219 0.271 0.270 0.208
 20-24  0.823 0.955 1.150 1.136 1.054 1.094
 25-29  1.646 2.002 2.146 1.996 2.230 
 30-34  2.636 2.954 2.846 3.121  
 35-39  3.465 3.507 3.920   
 40-44  3.816 4.341   
 45-49  4.470   
         
E CUMULATIVE FERTILITY WITHIN PERIODS (F)   
 15-19  0.150 0.208 0.219 0.271 0.270 0.208
 20-24  0.765 0.944 1.098 1.137 1.116 1.089
 25-29  1.455 1.796 2.108 2.079 2.252 
 30-34  2.090 2.604 2.959 2.970  
 35-39  2.601 3.264 3.758   
 40-44  2.910 3.685   
 45-49  3.039   
         
F P / F RATIOS      
 20-24  1.076 1.012 1.047 1.000 0.944 1.005
 25-29  1.131 1.115 1.018 0.960 0.990 
 30-34  1.262 1.134 0.962 1.051  
 35-39  1.332 1.074 1.043   
 40-44  1.311 1.178   
 45-49  1.471   
 
Data errors are identifiable if the ratios in a given cohort deviate markedly from 
the trend in surrounding cohorts. The 40-44 cohort has low rates in every period. The 
absence of similar errors in the 35-39 or 45-49 cohort lends further weight to the 
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conclusion that the 1998 DHS data for this age-group are distorted by rural women 
aged 40-44 reporting their age as 35-39.  
Finally, Panel F presents P/F ratios derived by dividing the age- and period-
specific rates in Panel D, by those in Panel E. The ratios compare lifetime fertility with 
current fertility and are a check on the quality of the data. Were the data to be perfect 
and fertility unchanging, the ratios would be very close to unity at all ages in all periods. 
However, increasing ratios point to declining fertility, and as such, deviations from unity 
allow the identification of the approximate time period in which fertility started 
declining (Centre for Population Studies, n.d.). The strongly upward trend in P/F ratios 
in the most recent time periods (0-9 years before the survey) again provides evidence of 
an acceleration in the decline in South African fertility, as these trends are not as readily 
discernible in earlier periods. 
A further check on the comparability of the census and DHS data can be made by 
comparing the cumulative fertility of African women up to age 34. The census reverse-
survival estimates of these women’s fertility, and the appropriate cohort-period fertility 
rates from the DHS are shown in Figure 3.10. 
Figure 3.10 Cumulative fertility of African women 15-34, 1982-1998 
The remarkable agreement between the two earlier estimates from the DHS and 
the census-based series inspires confidence about the quality of the age distribution of 
African women in the census, the appropriateness of Timæus et al’s mortality estimates 
used in the reverse-survival calculations, as well as the quality of the enumeration of 
African children aged between 5 and 15. The more recent fertility estimates from the 
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census seem a little low. This is further evidence that some underenumeration of young 
children and infants in the census occurred. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to provide estimates of the current level of fertility in South Africa, 
and among African South Africans particularly, using recently collected data. The quality 
of these data in the country has been investigated in greater detail than ever before. The 
rigour with which the quality of the 1996 South Africa Census data has been assessed, 
and the close correspondence of the adjusted standardised estimates of fertility with the 
results from the 1998 DHS suggest that these results are, indeed, robust.  
After substantial correction and modification, the data from the 1996 census 
provide more plausible estimates of current levels of fertility in the country and suggest 
that the fertility level among African South Africans in 1996 was approximately 3.5 
children per woman. The level of fertility estimated from the 1998 DHS is somewhat 
lower. The adjustments made to the 1996 census data have the effect of first reducing 
the estimated level of fertility by approximately half while altering the shape of the 
fertility distribution fundamentally. The final adjustment (application of a P/F method) 
has the effect of restoring the level of estimated fertility to that calculated from the 
unadjusted data, although the age distribution is still completely different.  
The principal reason for making these adjustments arises from the fact that the 
fertility estimates published by Statistics South Africa based on the 1996 census neither 
accommodated nor compensated for most of the data errors identified in this chapter. 
The 1996 census data is clearly of poor quality, but the estimates presented here are 
more plausible in terms of their shape (not showing as high levels of older age fertility), 
while reflecting levels consistent with those derived from other sources. In pursuing 
these investigations, it is believed that the best estimates of the current level of fertility 
in Sa based on the 1996 census have been derived. 
The estimates of past levels of fertility in South Africa are not as good as those of 
current levels. Estimates of South African fertility in the distant past are compromised 
by the poor quality of the 1970 census data. Nevertheless, these (along with those 
produced by Sibanda and Zuberi) provide independent estimates (i.e. not derived by 
government demographers) of the past trend in South African fertility.  
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In any event, a decline in the fertility of African South Africans is apparent from 
the early 1960s. Thus, South Africa entered the fertility transition several decades ahead 
of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, most of which began to show a decline in 
fertility only in the 1980s. At the same time, fertility among African South Africans has 
fallen slowly – from approximately 6 children per woman in 1970, to around 3.5 a 
quarter of a century later. As shown in Chapter 2, some other countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa have shown a faster pace of decline once their fertility declines began. The 
reverse-survival estimates of past trends in African fertility in the country further 
suggest that the widely praised family planning programmes implemented by apartheid 
governments in 1974 and 1984 had no immediate effect on the pace of the fertility 
decline among African South Africans. This is not to suggest that the programmes were 
entirely ineffective: as the evidence presented in the following chapters will demonstrate, 
African women in South Africa made use of the family planning services offered, but 
not to effect a sudden or rapid change in their fertility. However, the unavailability of 
further demographic data to assess the trend in South African fertility over the 1970s 
does not permit a more conclusive identification of the trend in fertility around the time 
of the implementation of those programmes.  
 
The relatively slow pace of the decline of fertility in South Africa is further highlighted 
by Bongaarts and Watkins’ review of the correlation between development and fertility 
decline (Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996). They estimate that the fertility levels in the 
developing world declined by 36 percent between 1960-65 and 1985-90. Fertility in Asia 
and Latin America fell by 42 and 43 percent respectively. Although fertility decline in 
sub-Saharan Africa was “almost non-existent”, according to the official estimates cited 
in Table 2.1, fertility in South Africa fell by 31 percent, slightly less than the 
international average. Despite the intense desire of successive apartheid governments 
for a rapid and sustained decline in African fertility and the vigorous family planning 
campaigns undertaken, fertility decline in South Africa was slow by international 
standards. 
The final finding emerging from this chapter relates to the nature of the South 
African fertility decline. The age-specific fertility rates presented in Table 3.19 suggest 
that family size limitation is uncommon in South Africa. As Cohen (1993) has argued in 
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relation to other African countries, the high levels of fertility among older women are 
incompatible with a desire for parity-specific fertility limitation:  
Unlike Western populations, childbearing [in Africa] continues 
throughout a woman’s reproductive years with no obvious 
“stopping” behaviour. The peak of childbearing occurs between 
20 and 29 and falls slowly, indicating little parity-specific 
limitation. In societies that practice fertility limitation, fertility 
rates depart from a natural fertility schedule as women age, 
because women use efficient methods of contraception to 
prevent pregnancy once they have achieved their desired family 
size. There is little evidence of a stopping pattern in any of the 
fertility schedules for sub-Saharan Africa, despite the reported 
practice of terminal abstinence in some societies. (Cohen, 
1993:30) 
The data he uses to justify this assertion can be compared with those for African 
South Africans derived from the adjusted 1996 census results. Cohen provides estimates 
of age-specific fertility rates from DHS surveys conducted between 1984 and 1993 in 22 
sub-Saharan African countries. Excluding the data from the unofficial 1987-9 South 
Africa DHS and from Burundi (a clear outlier), and standardising the fertility schedules 
so that the total fertility rate is equal to one in each case, produces the data presented in 
Figure 3.11. 
The similarities in the fertility schedules are remarkable. Only at the extreme ages 
of childbearing does the fertility schedule for African South Africans differ noticeably 
from that of women in other African countries. As Cohen noted in relation to these 
other African countries, Figure 3.11 indicates that the mode of childbearing in South 
Africa also occurs between ages 20 and 29 (in fact, the schedule is constant between 
these ages). Between ages 30 and 44, there is no discernible difference between the 
standardised fertility schedules for South Africa and for those 21 other countries. 
These results offer an ambiguous answer to the question of whether South Africa 
should be regarded as sui generis in the context of the African fertility transition. In terms 
of the trend in the level of fertility, South Africa is, according to the data presented in 
Figure 2.1, qualitatively different from other African countries. However, in terms of the 
age distribution of fertility, South Africa exhibits fundamental similarities not only with 
the countries that border it, but also with sub-Saharan African countries generally.  
Figure 3.11 Standardised fertility schedules for 21 sub-Saharan African 
countries and South Africa (1996) 
85
Note: The solid bold line represents the data for South Africa (1996). The broken bold line shows the 
unweighted average of the fertility schedules for 21 other African countries. Data for the other 
African countries are derived from Cohen (1993), excluding Burundi and South Africa 1987-9. 
Data for South Africa (1996) are derived from Table 3.19. 
 
Several important questions have been raised in the process of deriving robust estimates 
of the current level of South African fertility. First, why did the South African fertility 
transition begin when it did? Second, why has the transition progressed so slowly? 
Third, what is the nature of the similarity between the processes of fertility transition in 
South Africa and in other sub-Saharan African countries? Answers to the first two 
questions are proposed in Chapters 5 and 6. These chapters situate the results derived 
here in the broader historiographical and institutional framework outlined in Section 2.4. 
A complete answer to the third question is impossible in this thesis, but further clues as 
to the nature and causes of the pattern of fertility decline in South Africa (and 
similarities and differences compared with other African countries) can be gained from 
investigations into parity progression and birth intervals. These are presented in the next 
chapter. 
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4 PARITY PROGRESSION AND BIRTH INTERVALS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
This chapter investigates in greater detail the dynamics of the South African fertility 
decline set out in the preceding chapter. That chapter examined the current level of, and 
past trends in, African fertility in South Africa. This chapter presents analyses of the 
trends in childbearing and child spacing in South Africa. Two distinct approaches are 
adopted. The first examines the proportion of women who progress from one parity to 
the next (i.e. parity progression ratios and associated measures). The second approach 
investigates the length of time elapsed between one maternity and the next (i.e. the 
length of birth intervals). 
4.1 Data requirements for the estimation of parity progression and 
birth intervals 
The data requirements for most methods of investigating parity progression are fairly 
onerous. For the more advanced methods, detailed maternity history data giving the 
date of each birth to each woman in the survey are required. Consequently, the data 
collected in censuses are generally inadequate to the task. However, while this tends to 
limit the application of these techniques to data collected in demographic surveys such 
as that conducted in 1998, our understanding of the dynamics of parity progression and 
birth intervals in South Africa is enhanced with the use of data from the 1987-9 South 
Africa Demographic and Health Survey.  
The international academic boycott of South Africa that was in place at the time 
meant that this survey does not form part of the international programme of surveys 
conducted with the assistance of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and Macro International Inc. However, the South African 
Human Sciences Research Council’s survey used a questionnaire very similar to that 
used in the first round of DHS surveys. Almost 22 000 women of reproductive age, 
across all race groups, and across the entire country, including – importantly – the so-
called “independent” and other homelands were interviewed.  
The methodology underlying the survey and the quality of the data collected have 
been investigated in detail by Carol Kaufman (1997). In her assessment,  
in spite of methodological shortcomings and hazardous 
fieldwork conditions, careful analysis and presentation of results 
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based on these data can provide useful and important 
information regarding the demographic processes of South 
Africans in the late 1980s … Responsible use of these data will 
provide important insights into the history of fertility processes, 
health conditions, and mortality in South Africa … (Kaufman, 
1997:22) 
For the purposes to which the data are applied here, the crucial limitation of the 
data from this survey is that the criteria for inclusion in the survey specified that women 
must either have been married, or have borne a child. Consequently, many, if not most, 
childless women were excluded from the survey, rendering impossible the investigation 
of entry into motherhood from these data. Notwithstanding this limitation, the data 
permit the analysis of trends in parity progression and childbearing among parous 
women over time, and it is on these trends that this chapter concentrates. 
4.2 Measures of parity progression 
This section presents three measures of parity progression. The first, the parity 
progression ratio, is presented in Section 4.2.1. This is not only the simplest measure of 
parity progression, but also it is the only measure that can be computed from data where 
no full maternity history has been collected, as is the case with census data. By contrast, 
the two other indices (Projected Parity Progression Ratios and Brass and Juárez’ variant 
of the Censored Parity Progression Ratio method) derived in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
require detailed maternity histories. 
4.2.1 Parity Progression Ratios (PPRs) 
Parity Progression Ratios measure the proportion of women in a given cohort and of a 
given parity that has progressed to a specific parity. As such, the measure is generally 
only applied to women at the end of their childbearing years, as ratios for younger 
cohorts will be more strongly affected by changes in the timing of births, and will – in 
any event – represent incomplete maternity histories. Accordingly, the analysis below is 
restricted only to the oldest cohort of women for whom full data are available (i.e. 
women aged 45-49) in both the 1996 South Africa Census and the 1998 South Africa 
DHS. 
Using the notation in Preston, Heuveline and Guillot (2001:104-5), Wi is defined 
as the number of women of parity i. The number of women of parity i or higher is 
denoted by Pi (= ∑∞
=ia
aW ).  
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The parity progression ratio is then given by PPR(i,i+1) =  Pi+1 / Pi.  
A cumulative measure, the proportion of women in a cohort who have i children, 
is calculated by PPR(0,i) = Pi/P0. Summing this latter quantity over all parities, i, gives the 
average number of births to women in that cohort. Brass, Juárez and Scott (1997) 
describe the advantages of the parity progression ratio method thus:  
parity progression ratios for a cohort of women are simply a 
reorganisation of the distribution of completed family sizes at 
the end of the reproductive period. Unlike the traditional total 
fertility rates, these indices are not affected by the timing of 
births in the family build-up and hence by the transient effects 
of alterations in mating patterns. … [t]he estimation of precise 
measures is dependent on accurate reporting of total births but 
not on their location in time… (Brass, Juárez and Scott, 
1997:83) 
Parity progression ratios can be calculated from the 1996 census as well as both 
the 1987-9 and 1998 DHS data. The absence of any parity data precludes the calculation 
of parity progression ratios from the 1970 census data. The criteria for inclusion in the 
1987-9 DHS mean that it is not possible to calculate accurate ratios for the progression 
from zero to first birth or, consequently, cumulative parity progression ratios. The 
calculation of PPRs from the 1998 DHS is straightforward, while the ratios derived 
from the 1996 census data are based on tabulations by parity and age after the 
application of the El-Badry adjustment, and after correcting for the inclusion of still-
births.  
Table 4.1 Parity progression ratios (PPR(i,i+1)) and cumulated parity 
progression ratios (PPR(0,i)) for African women aged 45-49, 1996 
census, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
 1996 census 1998 DHS 1987-9 DHS 
Parity (i) PPR(i,i+1) PPR(0,i) PPR(i,i+1) PPR(0,I) PPR(i,i+1) 
0 0.922  0.959  (0.987) 
1 0.924 0.922 0.906 0.959 0.941 
2 0.872 0.852 0.855 0.869 0.896 
3 0.820 0.743 0.813 0.743 0.845 
4 0.767 0.609 0.766 0.605 0.781 
5 0.729 0.467 0.697 0.463 0.710 
6 0.687 0.341 0.626 0.323 0.661 
7 0.642 0.234 0.608 0.202 0.651 
8 0.588 0.150 0.609 0.123 0.601 
9 0.545 0.088 0.672 0.075 0.471 
10 0.478 0.048 0.501 0.050 0.558 
11 0.525 0.021 0.430 0.025 0.357 
12 0.483 0.011 0.825 0.011 0.213 
13 0.509 0.005 0.338 0.009 0.505 
14 0.551 0.003  0.003  
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Table 4.1 presents the PPRs and cumulated parity progression ratios for women 
aged 45-49 in the 1996 census and the 1998 DHS. The final column gives the parity 
progression ratios calculated from the 1987-9 DHS. 
Other than a slight difference at the lowest parities, in part a function of the 
magnitude of the El-Badry correction applied to the 1996 census data, the ratios from 
these data and the 1998 South Africa DHS correspond extremely well. In addition, these 
data show that the lifetime fertility of this cohort of African women in the late 1990s 
was somewhere between 4.33 children per woman (according to the 1996 census) and 
4.46 children per woman (as shown by the DHS data).  
Of greater significance though, is the strongly linear trend in the PPRs in both 
data sets, a pattern further confirmed by the data from the 1987-9 DHS (Figure 4.1). 
The fact that the ratios do not show any obvious ‘steps’ leads to the tentative conclusion 
that there is no socially sanctioned ‘optimum number’ of children among African South 
Africans. If there was, one would expect that the ratios would indicate that the vast 
majority of women would progress to that parity, and thereafter show a declining 
proportion of women progressing to higher parities. The pattern indicated by the ratios, 
on the other hand, suggests a process of increasing fertility control with higher parity, 
even in the 1987-9 DHS. Some women terminate their childbearing at relatively low 
parities. The probability of progressing to a further birth diminishes with each child 
born, and an ever-diminishing proportion of women progress to each subsequent parity. 
Figure 4.1 Parity progression ratios (PPR(i,i+1)) for African women aged 45-49, 
1996 census, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
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Furthermore, the absence of evidence relating to the operation of a socially 
sanctioned norm in the cohorts of women aged 45-49 in these three data sets suggests 
that such norms are unlikely to have existed in earlier cohorts.  
PPRs for cohorts of younger women can be used to derive estimates of future 
parity progression ratios (discussed in the following section). In addition, these ratios are 
important in determining the reliability of calculated projected median birth intervals 
(presented in section 4.3.2). The tables below show the PPRs, by age group and parity, 
calculated from the two DHS surveys. 
Table 4.2 Parity progression ratios by age group, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
1998 DHS Parity progression 
Age group 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10+ 
15-19 0.142 0.051 0.246        
20-24 0.609 0.297 0.183 0.081       
25-29 0.840 0.586 0.428 0.337 0.360 0.301 0.146 0.604 0.500 1.000 
30-34 0.945 0.802 0.631 0.562 0.401 0.473 0.382 0.227 0.493 0.000 
35-39 0.961 0.876 0.776 0.698 0.613 0.559 0.449 0.428 0.371 0.457 
40-44 0.958 0.880 0.829 0.741 0.704 0.595 0.485 0.514 0.568 0.599 
45-49 0.959 0.906 0.855 0.813 0.766 0.697 0.626 0.608 0.609 0.672 
           
1987-9 DHS Parity progression 
Age group 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10+ 
15-19 .. 0.097 0.319        
20-24 .. 0.344 0.261 0.257       
25-29 .. 0.623 0.497 0.412 0.324 0.414 0.352 0.171 0.566 0.617 
30-34 .. 0.798 0.706 0.611 0.552 0.513 0.388 0.451 0.423 0.237 
35-39 .. 0.912 0.816 0.739 0.669 0.590 0.525 0.507 0.504 0.360 
40-44 .. 0.949 0.861 0.830 0.776 0.690 0.637 0.599 0.566 0.522 
45-49 .. 0.941 0.896 0.845 0.781 0.710 0.661 0.651 0.601 0.471 
Note:  Data on parity progression to first birth from the 1987-9 DHS are not shown as a consequence 
of the criteria imposed for inclusion in that survey. 
4.2.2 Projected parity progression ratios (Pi) 
A more detailed measure of the evolution of African women’s propensity to limit the 
size of their families is provided by the Projected Parity Progression Ratios (PPPRs) 
method, derived by Brass and Juárez (1983). These ratios, denoted Pi , are derived from 
the proportions of women in two contiguous cohorts (aged (x, x +5) and (x+5, x+10) 
respectively) with i children and who have had an i+1th child. The proportion for the 
older of the two cohorts is truncated by excluding births to women in that cohort in the 
immediately preceding five-year period. These truncated parity progression ratios are 
shown in Table 4.3. As a result of the truncation process, the experience of the older 
cohort is rendered comparable to that of the younger cohort, since they both refer to 
childbearing up to the same age. The method precludes the use of census data, since 
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these cannot be manipulated to permit identification and exclusion of all children born 
to mothers in the five years before the census.  
Table 4.3 Truncated parity progression ratios by age group, 1998 DHS and 
1987-9 DHS 
1998 DHS Parity progression 
Age group 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10+ 
20-24(t) 0.200 0.066         
25-29(t) 0.654 0.342 0.274 0.290 0.249 0.153 0.500    
30-34(t) 0.889 0.691 0.504 0.416 0.344 0.303 0.218    
35-39(t) 0.935 0.843 0.730 0.618 0.518 0.434 0.320 0.389 0.053 0.000 
40-44(t) 0.952 0.868 0.795 0.707 0.662 0.512 0.474 0.520 0.465 0.283 
45-49(t) 0.959 0.902 0.857 0.786 0.757 0.682 0.619 0.557 0.637 0.674 
           
1987-9 DHS Parity progression 
Age group 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10+ 
20-24(t) .. 0.189         
25-29(t) .. 0.403 0.301 0.346 0.390 0.441 0.269    
30-34(t) .. 0.701 0.562 0.492 0.456 0.358 0.381    
35-39(t) .. 0.875 0.752 0.662 0.570 0.526 0.479 0.363 0.530  
40-44(t) .. 0.934 0.850 0.807 0.757 0.637 0.572 0.529 0.614 0.388 
45-49(t) .. 0.936 0.890 0.836 0.770 0.703 0.660 0.636 0.547 0.471 
Note:  Data on parity progression to first birth from the 1987-9 DHS are not shown as a consequence 
of the criteria imposed for inclusion in that survey. 
 
The ratio of these two proportions (that for the younger cohort divided by the 
that for the older (truncated) cohort) for each parity and cohort gives “indices of relative 
change”, a measure of the change in fertility between the two equally truncated cohorts. 
An index less than one implies that the fertility of the younger cohort has fallen relative 
to the older cohort’s fertility five years previously, and conversely.  
These indices can then be chained to derive projected values of Pi , on the 
assumption that the relative speed at which women in each pair of cohorts progress to 
the next parity will differ by the same amount in the future as in the past. Starting with 
the value of Pi for the 45-49 cohort (which is also the projected Pi for that cohort), the 
projected Pi for the 40-44 cohort is derived by multiplying the projected Pi for the older 
cohort by the index of relative change between those cohorts, and similarly for each 
successively younger cohort. (Since the indices of relative change do not apply to the 
oldest cohort, the projected Pi for this cohort are identical to the parity progression 
ratios derived earlier). A comparison of the untruncated and truncated PPRs among 
older women confirms that the effect of truncation on the projected ratios is negligible 
(as would be expected, given that many of these women would have completed their 
childbearing), while the cohort differences in both the truncated and untruncated series 
are more substantial. 
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Table 4.4 shows, for example, that by the end of their childbearing years, 97.6 
percent of African women aged 30-34 surveyed in the 1998 DHS are expected to have 
had a child. More important for future fertility trends in South Africa, the proportions 
of women who go on to bear children of higher parities are declining rapidly in 
comparison to the cohort of African women aged 45-49. While more than four-fifths of 
older women in the 1998 DHS with three children have progressed to a fourth birth, 
less than 70 percent of women aged 30-34 are expected to do so. Higher proportions in 
almost all combinations of age and parity are observed in the 1987-9 DHS. 
Table 4.4 Projected parity progression ratios for African women, 1998 DHS 
and 1987-9 DHS 
1998 DHS Parity Progression 
Age group 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10+
20-24 0.858 0.624   
25-29 0.922 0.721 0.593 0.557 0.533   
30-34 0.976 0.850 0.697 0.688 0.509 0.723 0.554   
35-39 0.966 0.893 0.807 0.757 0.659 0.664 0.465 0.462 0.434 
40-44 0.958 0.884 0.827 0.766 0.712 0.608 0.490 0.561 0.544 0.598
45-49 0.959 0.906 0.855 0.813 0.766 0.697 0.626 0.608 0.609 0.672
    
1987-9 DHS Parity Progression 
Age group 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10+
20-24 .. 0.646         
25-29 .. 0.756 0.690 0.593 0.479      
30-34 .. 0.851 0.782 0.709 0.675 0.631 0.475    
35-39 .. 0.932 0.832 0.768 0.696 0.646 0.586 0.587 0.511  
40-44 .. 0.955 0.867 0.839 0.787 0.697 0.638 0.613 0.623 0.523 
45-49 .. 0.941 0.896 0.845 0.781 0.710 0.661 0.651 0.601 0.471 
Note: The first column of projected parity progression ratios cannot be calculated with accuracy from 
the 1987-9 DHS as a consequence of the criteria applied for inclusion of women in that survey. 
 
Other measures can also be derived from these projected parity progression 
ratios. The projected completed fertility of women in each cohort by the end of their 
childbearing years can be calculated from the 1998 DHS in a manner analogous to the 
calculation of cohort fertility rates from parity progression ratios described earlier (Table 
4.5). Equivalent data for women surveyed in the 1987-9 DHS cannot be calculated for 
the reasons outlined earlier. 
Table 4.5 Projected completed fertility of African women by cohort, 1998 
DHS 
Age group 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
 3.21 3.81 3.89 4.46 
 
Thus, based on the 1998 DHS data and the assumptions underlying the method, African 
women aged 30-34 will have had, on average, 3.2 children by age 49, while women aged 
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40-44 will have had 3.9 children by the end of their childbearing years. As mentioned in 
Section 3.2.2, however, the estimates for women aged 35-39 are likely to have been 
biased upwards, and those for women aged 40-44 to be biased downwards, as a result of 
age misstatement of rural women aged 40-44. 
4.2.3 Truncated pairwise measures of parity progression (Bt) 
Before developing the simplified approach set out in the previous section, Brass and 
Juárez proposed another method to derive unbiased estimates of quantum changes in 
fertility, using life table techniques to deal more effectively with the problem of 
censoring. This method is a variant of that proposed by Rodríguez and Hobcraft (1980), 
but avoids the structural bias introduced in this latter approach arising from its 
systematic exclusion of women with long birth intervals. 
The method uses the proportion (Bt) of women progressing to a subsequent parity 
within t months of the last birth. Adjusted Bts are derived using a truncated pairwise 
comparison method, similar to that used to derive projected parity progression ratios. 
As with the Pis this truncation technique deals with the fact that “fast breeders” are 
more likely to move from one parity to the next at younger ages than “slow breeders.” 
However, Bts deal more carefully with the problem of censoring than the Pi method 
discussed above. The method is preferable since the Pi are biased if the distribution of 
exposure-to-risk of women is changing, while the use of life table methods standardises 
for this. In addition, use of this method also allows one to calculate median birth 
intervals, which cannot be done with the projected parity progression ratio approach. 
Typically, a value of t is chosen so that the proportion of women ever progressing 
to a higher parity (i.e. the projected parity ratio, Pi) is close to the values of Bt . A value 
of 60 months (i.e. 5 years, and hence the term quintum, see Section 4.3.1) is frequently 
suggested as being long enough for most women who will ever do so to progress to a 
next birth, while avoiding the problem of increasingly sparse data when higher values of 
t are chosen. 
In South Africa, the mean progression time from one birth to the next is in excess 
of 40 months for most age groups and parities. Accordingly, a value of t of much greater 
than 60 months is required to estimate parity progression. After examination of the data, 
and calculating adjusted Bt (using the same truncation approach as above) values, a more 
appropriate value of t was adopted of 84 months – thus allowing 7 years between births. 
Values of the adjusted Bt closer to the Pi could be achieved through use of B90s, but the 
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additional data loss is not justifiable. The values of Pi, B60, and B84 calculated from the 
1998 DHS and the 1987-9 DHS are shown in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 Indices of parity progression by birth cohort and parity for African 
women, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
1998 DHS 
1987-9 DHS 
 
 
 
 
Looking at progression from first to second births in the 1998 DHS, values of 
both P1 and B84 remain approximately constant for women in the three oldest cohorts 
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(i.e. aged 35-49) but are lower for younger cohorts. Similar patterns can be identified for 
second to third order progressions. The implication is that there has been an increasing 
tendency (not discernible among older cohorts) for younger women to delay or stop 
childbearing even after the birth of a first child. There is no specific parity before which 
the Pn and B84s are invariant, and above which they drop. 
A further advantage of this approach is that it permits the use of data from the 
1987-9 DHS since it is not necessary to investigate the entry of young women into 
motherhood in order to derive the measure. Observations similar to those made above 
in respect of the 1998 DHS also apply. 
In addition, the (approximate) ten-year gap between the two surveys means that 
the values of B84 for women in the same birth cohort derived from two different surveys 
can be plotted against each other, and results in the patterns of parity progression 
shown in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 Proportion of women progressing to another birth within seven 
years: 1987-9 DHS and 1998 DHS 
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Except for the first transition (from a first to a second birth), the correspondence 
between the two data series is remarkable, suggesting that the quality of the 1987-9 DHS 
data (at least in relation to fertility and childbearing) may not be as poor as has been 
suggested. In particular, Figure 4.3 demonstrates that the proportion of women 
progressing to a subsequent birth has been falling for all cohorts of women born after 
1949. Thus, for example, while nearly four out of every five African women born before 
1949 were expected to progress from a third to a fourth birth, that proportion had 
declined to around half among women born twenty years later.  
Given the general level of agreement between the parity progression ratios 
calculated from the two surveys, the large discrepancy between the ratios at younger 
ages in the transition from a first to second birth is surprising. One explanation for the 
discrepancy may be that the sampling design of the 1987-9 survey (which included only 
married women, or unmarried women who had borne a child), encouraged fieldworkers 
to omit births to younger, unmarried women.  
One limitation of the B84s is that they mask the effect of changing times within 
that seven-year period during which women have a subsequent birth. This is 
investigated through the analysis of median birth intervals, which are presented in the 
next section. 
4.3 The length of birth intervals among African South Africans  
Survival analysis (or life table techniques) can reduce censoring bias by including 
truncated observations in the calculation of the exposed to risk. Summary measures of 
birth interval lengths that suffer less from censoring bias than simple means and 
medians can thus be derived from application of these techniques. Whereas life tables 
typically record the numbers of people surviving at a given age, those used in the 
evaluation of birth intervals record the numbers of women of parity i who have yet to 
have an i+1th t months since the ith birth. The survival function (a function of time, t) 
gives the probabilities of survival (i.e. not having a next birth within t months) and the 
median birth interval length is calculated (interpolating if necessary) as the time in 
months for which the survival function is equal to 0.5.  
4.3.1 Adjusted measures of birth interval length – trimeans and quintums 
Two variants of the approach outlined above are of particular value in assessing median 
birth intervals. The first is that suggested by Rodríguez and Hobcraft (1980). The 
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method involves calculating separate life tables by single months since the previous 
birth and for each parity. The quintum, the cumulative proportion of women having a 
subsequent birth within 60 months, is then calculated. By standardising the life tables 
used to derive the quintum so that the quintum is equal to one, and calculating the 
durations q1, q2 and q3 from this standardised life table at which 25, 50 and 75 percent of 
women who have a birth in the five year period have done so, the trimean, T, is 
calculated by 
T = ¼ (q1 +2 q2 + q3) 
Further insight into the nature of the South African fertility transition relative to 
that in other countries undergoing the fertility transition can be gained from using the 
1998 DHS data for African South African women to calculate quintums and trimeans 
comparable with those produced by Hobcraft and McDonald (1984) using data from 
the World Fertility Surveys. Values of the quintum for South Africa are shown in Table 
4.6, together with those for a few other countries considered by Hobcraft and 
McDonald. 
Table 4.6 Values of the quintum by parity, selected countries and African 
South African women 
  Parity Progression 
Country 3-year TFR 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 
Kenya 8.0 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.86 
Senegal 7.1 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.85 
Lesotho 5.9 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.74 0.75 
Venezuela 4.3 0.88 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.76 
South Korea 4.0 0.91 0.89 0.81 0.73 0.67 0.63 0.54 
Panama 4.0 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.73 
Costa Rica 3.5 0.85 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.79 0.79 
Sri Lanka 3.5 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.70 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.1 0.83 0.77 0.79 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.66 
SOUTH AFRICA 3.2 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.58 
Source:  Hobcraft and McDonald (1984), except South Africa: own calculation 
 
By this measure, parity progression and birth intervals in South Africa are such 
that less than 60 percent of African women progress from one parity to the next within 
five years. Even when South Africa is compared only to those countries with similar 
levels of fertility, a clear difference exists in the values of the quintum. South African 
women’s birth intervals are substantially longer than those elsewhere in the developing 
world.  
The trimean for South African women, too, is noticeably longer compared to 
those for women in developing countries with similar levels of fertility (Table 4.7). 
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Taken together, the two preceding tables indicate some substantive differences 
between the South African fertility transition and that observed elsewhere. Comparing 
the data for South Africa with that for South Korea, for example, indicates that the 
proportion of women having a birth within 60 months is much lower at all parities, and 
whereas the quintums for South Korean women show a strongly decreasing trend, those 
for African South Africans are roughly constant. Examination of the trimean, however, 
suggests that the interval between births of those women having a subsequent birth 
within 60 months is not dissimilar. Both Senegal and Lesotho demonstrate similar 
patterns of fertility and childbearing to those observed among African South Africans. 
Table 4.7 Values of the trimean, selected countries and African South African 
women 
  Parity Progression 
Country 3-year TFR 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 
Kenya 8.0 25.5 25.4 25.5 25.8 26.3 26.6 26.3 
Senegal 7.1 30.2 30.2 29.9 30.0 29.9 29.9 29.7 
Lesotho 5.9 32.1 31.8 30.8 32.6 32.6 31.7 32.1 
Venezuela 4.3 22.1 22.7 23.2 23.7 23.3 23.8 23.7 
South Korea 4.3 28.3 30.6 31.5 31.7 31.2 31.7 31.2 
Panama 4.0 22.7 24.1 24.5 24.3 24.4 25.0 24.8 
Costa Rica 3.5 21.6 21.3 22.5 21.6 22.4 22.2 21.6 
Sri Lanka 3.5 25.0 27.2 27.5 28.0 28.5 27.9 28.3 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.1 22.5 22.5 22.3 22.5 22.8 22.0 22.7 
SOUTH AFRICA 3.2 33.8 33.1 32.3 31.9 32.3 31.7 32.9 
Source: Hobcraft and McDonald (1984), except South Africa: own calculation from 1998 DHS 
 
 In all three instances, the quintum does not vary much by parity, while the 
trimeans in South Africa are somewhat higher than in those two countries. As 
mentioned in Section 4.2.3, though, a weakness of this approach is that by its very 
construction, women with long birth intervals are excluded from the analysis. As the 
quintums for South Africa show, this systematic bias against women with long birth 
intervals limits our ability to draw comparisons of birth spacing in South Africa with 
that in other countries.  
4.3.2 Projected median birth intervals 
The second approach to measuring median birth intervals is to calculate paired 
comparison median birth intervals. This approach, derived by Aoun (1989a; 1989b), is 
an extension of Brass and Juárez’ truncated projected parity progression technique. 
Projected median birth intervals are calculated in the same manner as that used for 
calculating adjusted Bts, but instead of using the proportion of women progressing from 
one parity to the next, the method uses truncated data to calculate the relative changes 
99
in median intervals between births. Thus, the approach uses the median interval 
between births for the untruncated and truncated cohorts (Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 
respectively) to derive “indices of relative change”, which are then applied to the 
untruncated median intervals to derive projected median birth intervals.  
Table 4.8 Median birth intervals (months) by age group and parity 
progression, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
1998 DHS Parity progression 
Age group 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
20-24 71.3 58.4 38.8      
25-29 60.6 56.4 47.0 50.1 56.3 35.2   
30-34 53.8 55.9 56.1 53.2 51.9 44.0 48.6  
35-39 43.2 47.2 51.6 54.5 52.9 57.6 41.1 42.5 
40-44 44.2 49.2 49.7 47.2 64.4 66.5 41.9 36.9 
45-49 35.4 38.8 40.5 42.1 50.2 49.2 48.2 42.8 
         
1987-9 DHS Parity progression 
Age group 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
20-24 57.6 50.8 43.0 37.4 31.6 45.3   
25-29 49.1 48.3 43.8 47.8 39.8 84.7   
30-34 41.4 42.3 43.2 38.8 41.6 39.7 44.7 27.6 
35-39 38.2 39.6 41.1 42.3 47.7 52.9 50.5 56.0 
40-44 33.3 33.9 34.8 37.9 45.1 51.9 46.2 45.5 
45-49 33.3 32.9 34.5 37.1 45.4 44.9 55.2 50.9 
 
Table 4.9 Truncated median birth intervals (months) by age group and parity 
progression, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
1998 DHS Parity progression 
Age group 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
20-24(t)         
25-29(t) 55.7 41.8 35.7      
30-34(t) 51.4 50.9 44.3 34.4 41.0 24.5   
35-39(t) 42.5 44.5 44.4 43.8 41.5 46.6 34.7  
40-44(t) 43.9 47.7 45.9 42.4 48.0 48.7 35.5 28.4 
45-49(t) 35.3 38.5 40.1 40.1 45.0 42.2 40.6 40.0 
         
1987-9 DHS Parity progression 
Age group 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
20-24(t) 49.4 44.8 30.8      
25-29(t) 43.7 41.4 38.0 47.1 41.3    
30-34(t) 39.7 39.6 37.7 33.5 44.4 30.2   
35-39(t) 37.7 38.1 37.3 38.6 41.5 47.7 50.7 35.8 
40-44(t) 33.1 33.2 33.9 35.6 40.1 47.7 37.3 38.0 
45-49(t) 33.2 32.8 34.2 36.3 41.6 41.3 44.6 39.5 
 
The method produces reasonable results only where the proportion of women who 
have actually experienced the parity progression of interest is high. In other 
circumstances, where only a few women have done so, the projected median birth 
intervals are distorted by the magnitude of the adjustment made in respect of the indices 
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of relative change. Hence, Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 present projected median birth 
intervals only for those combinations of age and parity where more than 80 percent of 
women have actually progressed to that parity. The data in italics reflect those 
combinations of age and parity where between 65 and 80 percent of women have 
undergone that progression. Clearly, these data are less reliable than those indicated in 
normal type. 
Table 4.10 Projected median birth intervals (months) using the truncation 
approach, 1998 DHS 
 Parity Progression 
Age group 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 
30-34 55.4  
35-39 43.7 49.3 56.7  
40-44 44.3 49.9 50.4 50.2  
45-49 35.4 39.0 40.5 42.7 50.3  
 
These data show very clearly that projected birth intervals are lengthening 
dramatically among younger women, irrespective of parity. A similar trend is exhibited 
in the earlier DHS data, with median birth intervals showing signs of lengthening for 
more recent births (i.e. earlier parities for younger women, later parities for older 
women). 
Table 4.11 Projected median birth intervals (months) using the truncation 
approach, 1987-9 DHS 
 Parity Progression 
Age group 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 
30-34 42.3 45.0  
35-39 38.4 40.5 42.5 46.0  
40-44 33.3 33.9 35.1 38.8 49.2  
45-49 33.3 32.9 34.5 37.1 45.4 44.9 55.2
 
From these data, it can be observed that the projected median birth intervals 
among older cohorts of women have lengthened dramatically in the 1998 DHS, while 
remaining virtually unchanged in the 1987-9 DHS. As with the investigation in the 
Projected Parity Progression Ratios, an examination of the untruncated and truncated 
data (presented in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9) indicates that among older women, as would 
be expected, the cohort effect far outweighs the truncation effect. In other words, the 
increase in birth intervals indicated by the application of this method is not a product of 
a distortion of the data introduced by the truncation procedure, but reflects significant 
changes in childbearing patterns between different cohorts of women. 
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4.3.2.1 Time location of projected median birth intervals 
A further elaboration of Aoun’s approach is to locate the median birth intervals in 
chronological time, so as to understand better the secular trend in birth intervals in 
South Africa over the last forty years. This is done by adding the projected median birth 
interval to the mean date of birth recorded for each parity by the mother’s age group at 
the survey, and comparing this with the projected median birth interval (Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.4 Time location of births using projected median birth intervals, 
1987-9 DHS and 1998 DHS 
 
Figure 4.4 suggests that there is little significant variation in median birth interval 
length associated with age of mother or parity: the median birth intervals of women 
aged 45-49 in the 1987-9 DHS progressing to their fifth birth are very similar to those 
of women ten years younger who at the time were progressing to their second birth. 
Thus, birth intervals seem to have followed a secular trend, increasing with time, rather 
than being determined by mother’s age or parity.  
4.4 Univariate analyses of differentials in birth intervals 
The method of analysing projected median birth intervals and their time location can be 
applied to assess differentials in median birth interval length according to background 
characteristics of the women being studied. Particular attention should be paid to those 
characteristics that are deemed to be the “proximate determinants” of birth intervals. 
Section 4.4.1 identifies these proximate determinants, and presents estimated projected 
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birth intervals analysed according to them. Urban and rural differentials in median birth 
intervals are also assessed. 
4.4.1 The proximate determinants of birth interval length 
As with fertility rates, only a limited number of mechanisms directly affect the length of 
birth intervals. It is only through the operation of these mechanisms, or proximate 
determinants, that other variables (education and urbanisation, for example, as well as 
social and institutional effects) impact on birth intervals.  
The proximate determinants of birth interval length are essentially those that 
determine fertility, since actions that delay or stop fertility have a direct influence on the 
length of birth intervals. From Davis and Blake’s list of 11 proximate determinants of 
fertility published in the 1950s (Davis and Blake, 1956), Bongaarts (1982) distilled seven: 
proportion of women married; contraceptive use and effectiveness; prevalence of 
induced abortion; post-partum infecundability; fecundability, or frequency of 
intercourse; spontaneous intrauterine mortality; and permanent sterility. Of these, 
Bongaarts identified marriage, contraceptive use, postpartum infecundability and the 
prevalence of induced abortion as being the most significant in determining differences 
in fertility between populations.  
Each of the intermediate fertility variables also affect (to greater or lesser extents) 
birth interval length. Of these, six hold the key to understanding the dynamics of 
changes in birth intervals in a given society over time. Longer birth intervals will be 
observed if one or more of the following occur: 
1. Contraceptive techniques are used to space or limit childbearing; 
2. Longer periods of postpartum abstinence are observed, suppressing fertility, 
since even if the woman is again fecund, abstinence restricts the possibility of 
conception; 
3. Breastfeeding is continued for longer durations, resulting in extended 
lactational amenorrhoea and, ceteris paribus, longer birth intervals (Locoh, 
1994); 
4. Marital relations are disrupted (or, in extremis, the institution of marriage is 
itself undermined), resulting in reduced frequency of intercourse;  
5. The prevalence of induced abortion rises; or 
6. The prevalence of subfecundity and secondary sterility rises as a result of the 
spread of sexually transmitted infections (such as syphilis or HIV) which 
reduce the probability of conception occurring. 
However, as with the proximate determinants of fertility themselves, not all of 
these factors will operate necessarily in the same direction. For example, as discussed in 
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Section 2.3, modernisation frequently leads not only to shorter durations of breast-
feeding and postpartum abstinence (indeed, this was suggested by the authors of the 
1974 South Africa fertility study for the small observed differential in rural and urban 
fertility (Lötter and van Tonder, 1976)), but also often expands women’s access to, and 
use of, modern methods of contraception.  
Figure 4.5 Schematic diagram showing the operation of proximate 
determinants on the length of women’s birth intervals 
 
As Figure 4.5 indicates, it is unlikely that the second and third factors listed above would 
account for the increase in birth interval length observed in South Africa. If anything, in 
the absence of the operation of counterbalancing proximate determinants (such as use 
of contraception, or higher levels of abortion), one would expect birth intervals to 
shorten over time. 
There is some evidence that induced abortion was (and remains) widespread in 
South Africa. Until 1975, abortion was prohibited under any circumstances. The 
Abortions and Sterilisations Act of 1975 made legal abortion possible, but only on five 
highly restricted grounds. According to the Department of National Health and 
Population Development (1991) and Nash (1990), fewer than 1 000 legal abortions were 
performed each year after 1975. The fact that abortion was, to all intents and purposes, 
illegal until the mid-1990s, means that no survey data exist to corroborate an increase in 
the prevalence of induced abortion. 
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Recent research has estimated that around 45 000 women present at South 
African hospitals each year with incomplete abortion, with induced abortion being 
positively confirmed in 8 percent of the 803 cases studied (Rees, Katzenellenbogen, 
Shabodien et al., 1997). From 1976 to 1987, the annual number of operations on women 
of all races for removal of residues of a pregnancy varied in a narrow range from 29 000 
to 36 000 (Nash, 1990). Clearly many of these operations would have been the 
consequence of miscarriage, but the data presented by Rees et al. suggest that a non-
trivial proportion of these would have been to complete an induced abortion. Indeed, 
according to Jewkes, Wood and Maforah (1997:418), “in many cases the role of the 
health services was perceived to be to ‘finish the job’”. Using data on maternal mortality, 
the Department of National Health and Population Development estimated the number 
of illegal abortions in 1989 as approximately 42 000 (Department of National Health 
and Population Development, 1991). Given that not all illegal abortions result in 
hospitalisation, this estimate seems credible.  
Access to medically assisted termination of pregnancy was expanded with the 
1996 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, but delays in making this service widely 
available mean that few women in 1998 would have had access to the service. The 
evidence from the 1998 DHS bears this out. Approximately half of African women 
interviewed were aware that the law on abortion had been changed recently. Of all 
African women interviewed, 10.8 percent admitted to having at least one termination, 
though the question did not distinguish between early miscarriage and voluntary 
termination. Almost twice as many White women reported an abortion, reflecting their 
greater access to overseas termination facilities, and the greater likelihood of their being 
granted a legal abortion under the earlier legislation (Nash, 1990). While there has been 
a noticeable upswing in the proportion of women in the 1998 South Africa DHS 
reporting terminations after 1996, the absolute numbers are still small: fewer than 120 
(out of almost 9000) African women interviewed reported a termination after 1996. 
However, despite this evidence of widespread illegal termination of pregnancy, no time-
series data exist to confirm or deny an increase in the incidence of such terminations in 
South Africa. Thus, while it is quite plausible that the incidence of illegal abortion 
increased over the apartheid years, the effect of this intermediate variable on women’s 
birth intervals in South Africa can not be ascertained or investigated.  
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The sixth route to longer birth intervals – rising infertility – also cannot be 
investigated, for reasons similar to those in respect of abortion, namely inadequate data 
collection or surveillance systems. Nevertheless, two points should be made. First, the 
incidence of sexually transmitted disease (STD) has been widespread for many years in 
South Africa. In the late 1940s, Kark (1949) commented that “few countries can have a 
higher incidence” of syphilis than South Africa, while a review article in 1957 described 
syphilis among Africans as “endemic” (Murray, 1957). A more recent review of the 
literature on sexually transmitted diseases in South Africa since 1980 concluded that 
The most compelling finding is undoubtedly that STDs are 
endemic in South Africa. Studies show that around 17% of 
antenatal clinic attenders harbour at least one urogenital tract 
infection, and between 49% and up to 90% of women 
attending family planning and antenatal clinics have at least one 
STD… up to 15% of family planning clinic and antenatal clinic 
attenders are seropositive for syphilis, 16% may be infected 
with chlamydia, 8% may be infected with gonorrhoea, and as 
many as 20-50% of women have vaginal infections. (Pham-
Kanter, Steinberg and Ballard, 1996:168)  
More recently, the results from an epidemiological surveillance centre in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal suggest that, in the late 1990s, approximately a quarter of African 
women of reproductive age (and more than half of pregnant women) were infected with 
at least one STD (Wilkinson, Abdool Karim, Harrison et al., 1999).  
It is likely then, that the level of secondary sterility as a result of infection with 
sexually transmitted disease is high (and possibly increasing) among African South 
African women.  
The second point is that the problem of secondary sterility will take on a hugely 
greater importance in future investigations of birth intervals in South Africa as a result 
of the spread of HIV/AIDS, since infection with the virus has been shown to inhibit 
women’s ability to conceive (Zaba and Gregson, 1998). Some evidence to support the 
contention that infection with HIV is associated with longer birth intervals is presented 
in Chapter 7. 
Thus, from the initial list of the proximate determinants of birth interval length, 
two are left open to initial investigation: the potentially lengthening effects of the use of 
contraception and the impact of spousal separation and marital disruption on birth 
intervals.  
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4.4.1.1 Use of contraception 
The data collected in the South African Demographic and Health Surveys are not ideal 
for assessing changing patterns of contraceptive use (and differentials within these 
patterns) over time, as contraceptive use histories were not collected in either the 1987-9 
or the 1998 survey. As a result, operationalisation of a contraceptive use variable is 
restricted to a simple binary: had a woman ever used any form of modern contraception 
prior to the birth of the index child. Such a variable does not distinguish between long-
term regular, efficient use on the one hand, and short-term ‘experimentation’ on the 
other. However, even with these limitations, a clear difference exists in projected 
median birth intervals between women who had never used modern contraception 
before the birth of the index child, and women who had (Figure 4.6), although there is 
some selectivity at work here, by virtue of the expanded access to modern contraception 
methods as a result of the government’s family planning programmes. Thus, the 
proportion of women in each group will not have remained constant over time.  
Figure 4.6 Projected median birth intervals (months) of African women, by 
ever use of contraception prior to birth, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
 
Birth intervals among women who had used modern contraception before the 
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who had not used modern contraception have drifted only upward gradually from 
around 35 to approximately 40 months. Thus, the overall increase in birth intervals in 
South Africa since 1960 is strongly associated with the uptake and increased use of 
modern contraception by an increasing proportion of the African population over time. 
4.4.1.2 Marital disruption 
The remaining proximate determinant, spousal separation and marital disruption, is of 
great importance in societies characterised by high levels of labour migration, as is the 
case in many Southern African countries. In these circumstances, men are frequently 
absent from their wives, thereby reducing the time available for conception to occur. 
However, the effect of spousal separation on fertility (and hence birth intervals) 
depends not only on the length of separation, but also on the ages of the partners while 
they are separated and “degree to which the separation coincides with fecundable 
periods rather than pregnancy or postpartum anovulation” (Millman and Potter, 
1984:122). Based on an analysis of the Lesotho World Fertility Survey data, Timæus and 
Graham (1989) found that male labour migration reduced the level of marital fertility by 
around 9 percent. In another study of the same country, Timæus (1984a) observed that 
“birth intervals tend to be rather long in Lesotho”. Similar factors are, and were, most 
probably at work in South Africa, too, since both countries are subject to similar forms 
and levels of labour migration.  
However, in South Africa, the association of marital status with longer birth 
intervals is less obvious than the effect of contraceptive use. As with the contraception 
data in the South African DHS surveys, the absence of a full marital history means that 
a simple binary variable has to be deployed to assess the effect of marital status on 
women’s birth intervals, namely whether or not the woman had ever been married at the 
time of the birth of the index child. Although there is no strong social sanction against 
pre-marital pregnancy in South Africa (Preston-Whyte, 1978), one would expect that 
birth intervals for never-married women would be somewhat longer than those among 
women who had ever been married (even if they were not necessarily married at the 
time of that particular birth).  
As expected, Figure 4.7 shows that birth intervals for never-married women are 
indeed longer than those for women who had been married at the time of birth. 
However, the trends in median birth intervals are broadly parallel, suggesting that the 
underlying forces on women’s birth intervals operated more or less uniformly, 
108
regardless of the women’s marital status at birth. One possible explanation is that 
marital relations in South Africa have become so disrupted that the situations in which 
many ever-married women bear children closely resembles that of women who have 
never been married. This may occur as a result of women bearing children from 
successively different fathers for example. No matter the explanation, Figure 4.7 
suggests that having married is not a strong predictor of the trend in women’s birth 
intervals. 
Figure 4.7 Projected median birth intervals of African women, by ever 
married status prior to birth, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
 
4.4.2 Preceding intervals as a determinant of birth interval length 
Several studies (see, for example, Gilks (1986) and Rodríguez, Hobcraft, McDonald et al. 
(1984)) have suggested that the single most significant variable in determining the 
duration between successive births is the duration of the woman’s preceding birth 
interval.  
This relationship, while interesting and intuitively obvious, should be treated with 
some circumspection as it is hard to conceptualise how the preceding birth interval acts 
on the proximate determinants in a directly causal fashion. More importantly, however, 
this relationship suggests that, in many respects, women’s birth intervals are both path-
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dependent, and unaffected by structural changes in society. By intimating that women’s 
maternity history determines their subsequent childbearing, this literature ignores the 
effect of secular changes in social perceptions and ideals. An analogy can be found in a 
woman’s reported ideal number of births, which has been shown to be correlated 
strongly with her current parity – and is hence self-fulfilling. Indeed, Hobcraft and 
Murphy (1986:11) question whether the association between the length of the preceding 
interval and the current birth interval duration is “due to true state dependency, 
unobserved heterogeneity, or omitted explanatory variables, themselves correlated 
between intervals”. 
This is not to deny that women can exercise control over their childbearing: 
clearly, women who desire many children will tend to have shorter birth intervals. 
Similarly, women who do not use modern contraceptive methods when others do, will 
have shorter intervals. The essential point, however, is this: that over an individual 
woman’s life-course, her own assessment of the number of children she would like to 
bear, and the desired interval between them, will be subject to change arising from 
changing social and cultural prescriptions and ideals, as well as her own experience. 
Taken together, this suggests that the immediately preceding birth interval cannot and 
should not be viewed as causally related to the subsequent interval. Rather, women’s 
preceding birth intervals should be viewed as an indicator of their fecundity, and of 
unmeasured (and unmeasurable) social, economic and cultural traits.  
4.4.3 Rural/urban differentials in birth interval length 
The final univariate analysis of trends and differentials in birth intervals is that of 
current residence. This analysis is included not because residence is deemed to be a 
proximate determinant of birth interval length (it is not), but because other data exist 
relating to women’s birth intervals in metropolitan areas in the early 1970s against which 
these more recent data can be compared. Since the DHS data do not provide a full 
residence history for women surveyed, current residential status is used instead. Median 
birth intervals among urban women are much longer than those among rural women 
(Table 4.12, Table 4.13 and Figure 4.8). 
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Table 4.12 Projected median birth intervals (months) using the truncation 
approach, urban and rural areas, 1998 DHS 
 Parity 
Age group 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 
Urban   
30-34 66.9  
35-39 50.6 64.3  
40-44 49.9 65.8 67.4 70.2  
45-49 37.8 44.0 48.0 53.3 66.0  
   
Rural   
30-34 43.8  
35-39 37.8 40.8 45.7  
40-44 38.8 39.4 37.3 40.6  
45-49 33.2 35.7 36.5 37.1 41.4  
Note:  Data in italics represent those projected median birth intervals calculated for women where 
between 65 and 80 percent of women of that combination of age and parity have progressed to a 
subsequent birth. Data in normal type represent birth intervals calculated for combinations of 
age and parity where more than 80 percent of such women have progressed to a subsequent 
birth. 
Table 4.13 Projected median birth intervals (months) using the truncation 
approach, urban and rural areas, 1987-9 DHS 
 Parity 
Age group 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 
Urban   
30-34 46.8 51.6  
35-39 38.9 46.9 53.5 69.5  
40-44 33.3 37.0 36.1 50.0 51.5  
45-49 34.3 33.5 35.0 39.2 48.8 46.3 
   
Rural   
30-34 38.1 42.1  
35-39 37.7 37.7 38.2 40.2  
40-44 33.3 31.9 34.5 34.3 45.5  
45-49 32.3 32.4 34.0 36.0 42.4 43.6 42.3
Note:  Data in italics represent those projected median birth intervals calculated for women where 
between 65 and 80 percent of women of that combination of age and parity have progressed to a 
subsequent birth. Data in normal type represent birth intervals calculated for combinations of 
age and parity where more than 80 percent of such women have progressed to a subsequent 
birth. 
 
Interestingly, however, this differential was not apparent until after the 
implementation of the first National Family Planning Programme in 1974, suggesting 
that the pattern of increase in birth intervals is strongly associated with the availability of 
modern contraceptive methods in both urban and rural areas. As shown earlier, birth 
intervals among women who had not used modern contraceptive methods before the 
birth under investigation have hardly altered in the last thirty years, while birth intervals 
among women who had, have increased dramatically. In many respects, this finding is 
intuitive, since lengthening of birth intervals is made much easier with the use of 
modern contraception. 
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Figure 4.8 Projected median birth intervals (months) of African women, by 
place of residence, 1998 DHS and 1987-9 DHS 
4.5 Unadjusted mean and median birth intervals 
As a summary measure, mean birth intervals suffer from both truncation and censoring 
biases. They can only be calculated using those intervals that are closed. If open birth 
intervals are included, the invalid assumption is made that all open intervals are closed 
on the survey date. By restricting the calculation only to closed intervals, however, the 
measure is biased by the fact that “fast breeders” (i.e. women with shorter birth 
intervals) are likely to be disproportionately represented in the calculation, and hence the 
mean closed birth interval will tend to indicate somewhat shorter mean birth intervals 
than is actually the case.  
The use of median closed birth intervals suffers from the same drawbacks. 
However, the use of the median is preferable to the use of the mean, since the 
distribution of closed birth intervals will tend to be strongly right tailed and hence the 
median provides a more robust summary measure of closed birth intervals, undistorted 
by the underlying distribution of birth intervals.  
Due to the limitations of this summary measure, mean birth intervals are 
presented only for comparative purposes with other published data. The analysis of 
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birth intervals in urban areas, and their time location presented in the preceding section 
gives a strong indication of the changes in birth intervals by cohort. Further evidence of 
the magnitude of this change can be gleaned from a series of reports issued by the 
Human Sciences Research Council (Mostert, 1972; Mostert and du Plessis, 1972; 
Mostert and Engelbrecht, 1972; Mostert and van Eeden, 1972). These surveys 
investigated fertility, contraceptive use and family formation among married (legally or 
otherwise) African women aged 15-44 living in four major urban areas in 1969-70. 
Unfortunately, a breakdown of these data by age of woman is not available, 
necessitating the presentation of data unstandardised by age. 
Table 4.14 Mean (closed) birth intervals in months for married African 
women in major metropolitan areas, by parity 
   Parity progression 
City & Year N Mean age 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
Cape Town 1969-70 573 31.3 30.9 30.3 27.8 31.0 29.7 30.3 29.1 27.0
Durban 1969-70 1071 32.1 33.0 31.5 29.3 29.6 28.9 26.6 28.1 28.8
Pretoria 1969-70 978 32.6 37.6 33.1 32.2 32.2 30.5 30.3 30.9 28.5
Soweto 1969-70 1016 33.4 38.2 33.7 34.0 33.2 31.0 28.2 25.6 28.2
Weighted 1972 3638 32.5 35.4 32.4 31.2 31.5 30.0 28.6 28.3 28.3
DHS 1987-9 316 29.5 38.6 36.5 37.4 36.1 38.6 30.4 -- --
DHS 1998 633 33.5 52.7 51.5 49.5 44.1 49.1 41.7 23.3 27.5
Annual percent change (1972-1987/9) 0.5 0.8 1.2 0.9 1.6 0.4 
Annual percent change (1987/9-1998) 3.2 3.5 2.8 2.0 2.4 3.2 
Annual percent change (1972-1998) 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.5 -0.8 -0.1
Source:  DHS 1998, DHS 1987-9, Mostert (1972), Mostert and du Plessis (1972), Mostert and 
Engelbrecht (1972), Mostert and van Eeden (1972) 
In order to compare these results with those from the 1987-9 and 1998 South Africa DHS, the 
data have been restricted to married or cohabiting African women living in cities aged between 
15 and 44. While the equivalent sample sizes in the 1987-9 and 1998 Demographic and Health 
Surveys are much smaller than those of the 1969-70 studies, they are still sufficient to be of use. 
 
The use of closed birth intervals biases the mean birth intervals downwards, as 
can be seen from a comparison between the data presented in Table 4.14 and the 
previous two tables. Moreover, while the results are not indicative of national trends in 
childbearing and birth intervals, they are nevertheless instructive. The results presented 
in the last three rows of Table 4.14 indicate that a major change has occurred in urban 
African fertility in South Africa over the last 30 years. While mean intervals at higher 
parities have changed little, at lower parities mean closed birth intervals have increased 
by between 40 and 60 percent. Furthermore, the data show a substantial increase in the 
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annual rate at which closed birth intervals have lengthened over the time period covered 
by the three surveys. 
These findings are both important and significant. Younger women in South 
Africa are less likely to progress to higher-order births than older women. At the same 
time, those that do progress are taking much longer to do so. The mean closed birth 
intervals at lower parities of married women of reproductive age have increased by more 
than a year over the last 30 years in South Africa’s cities – from under 3 to over 4 years. 
4.6 Discussion 
This chapter set out to investigate the pattern of childbearing and birth spacing among 
African South Africans using two DHS surveys. A number of highly important findings 
emerge from the investigations undertaken, and it is worth dwelling on these at some 
length. 
First, African women’s progression from one parity to the next shows that the 
South African fertility decline has not been characterised by parity-specific fertility 
limitation in order to conform to social norms relating to an ‘optimal’ number of 
children that women should bear. This confirms the findings presented in Chapter 3 
that the South African fertility decline exhibits some similarities with that in other 
African countries.  
Second, the values of B84 from two sets of DHS data reveal that the proportions 
of women progressing to a subsequent birth have been declining for all cohorts of 
women born after 1949. Since high levels of teenage pregnancy have prevailed in South 
Africa since the 1950s at least (see, for example, Eloff (1953a) and Nash (1990)), this 
suggests that parity progression ratios in South Africa probably started falling no later 
than the late 1960s. The cohort of women born between 1949 and 1953 would have 
been aged between 21 and 25 at the official launch of the government’s family planning 
programme in 1974 (although, as shown in the next chapter, Africans’ access to 
contraception had been expanded gradually from the mid-1960s. That chapter, too, 
indicates that large numbers of African women were using modern contraceptive 
methods by the mid-1970s.) Thus, the decline in parity progression ratios documented 
above is at least temporally associated with this greater access. Furthermore, it is 
apparent that the increase in African women’s birth intervals commenced at 
approximately the same time, suggesting that the increase in birth intervals, too, is 
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associated with the implementation of the government’s family planning programme. 
Thus there is evidence of both cohort and period effects in the timing of the South 
African fertility decline.  
The evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests that African fertility had 
begun to fall (albeit very slowly) before 1970. Given that estimated onset of the fertility 
decline, it is not surprising that the general trend in parity progression has been 
downwards for all parities, across all the cohorts covered by the two DHS surveys. The 
B84 values decline roughly in parallel with the values of Pi . Thus, there is little evidence 
that the latter have been distorted by changes in the tempo of fertility.  
The calculation of these Censored Parity Progression Ratios also provides the first 
intimation of the possibly unique length of birth intervals in South Africa. Previous 
research into birth intervals in the developing world found that the majority of women 
who will ever progress to a subsequent birth do so within five years of their previous 
one. In South Africa, a window of seven years was required for the values of the 
Censored Parity Progression Ratios to come close to the Projected Parity Progression 
Ratios.  
The greatest limitation of the approaches used to determine parity progression 
ratios and birth intervals, however, is that they do not readily permit statistical testing of 
hypotheses relating to differentials in, and determinants of, birth interval length. Survival 
functions can be graphed and examined visually for differentials in birth interval length, 
but these do not tell us whether any differences are statistically significant or not. 
Furthermore a formula does not exist whereby confidence intervals can be placed 
around the values of B60 and B84 calculated according to Brass and Juárez’ approach1. 
Chapter 7 sets out and applies an approach to analysing survival data using statistical 
techniques.  
 
Chapter 3 presented results that showed that the age pattern of fertility in South Africa 
is fundamentally similar to that observed in other African countries, even though the 
fertility decline had started much earlier, levels of fertility are lower and contraceptive 
use in the country is higher than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Further insights into 
the similarity (or otherwise) of the South African fertility transition relative to other 
                                                 
1 Confidence intervals for these measures can be derived using Monte Carlo simulation approaches, provided the underlying 
distributions are well specified. The calculation of such confidence intervals are, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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countries in sub-Saharan Africa can be gained from a comparison of values of B60 for 
South Africa with those for other African countries presented by Cohen (1993). He 
calculated values of B60 for eight countries, three of which (Botswana, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe) had already shown evidence of a decline in fertility. The data for these three 
countries, as well as values of B60 calculated from the 1987-9 and 1998 South African 
demographic surveys, are presented in Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15 Values of B60 by age group and grouped parity, selected African 
countries 
 Parity Progression 
Country (Year; TFR) 1-3 3-5 5-7 7-9 
Botswana (1988; 5.0)     
20-24 0.308    
25-29 0.487 0.312   
30-34 0.604 0.446 0.395  
35-39 0.652 0.549 0.379 0.356 
40-44 0.678 0.571 0.480 0.388 
45-49 0.644 0.615 0.495 0.505 
     
Kenya (1988-9; 6.6)     
20-24 0.704    
25-29 0.761 0.675 0.626  
30-34 0.771 0.734 0.547 0.408 
35-39 0.794 0.759 0.616 0.504 
40-44 0.797 0.772 0.652 0.553 
45-49 0.813 0.811 0.650 0.596 
     
Zimbabwe (1988-9; 5.5)     
20-24 0.622    
25-29 0.664 0.500 0.237  
30-34 0.682 0.598 0.518 0.481 
35-39 0.741 0.666 0.559 0.504 
40-44 0.733 0.689 0.616 0.560 
45-49 0.765 0.709 0.605 0.518 
     
South Africa (1987-9; 4.6)     
20-24 0.189 0.198   
25-29 0.270 0.211   
30-34 0.392 0.315 0.267  
35-39 0.479 0.354 0.249 0.188 
40-44 0.587 0.466 0.299 0.309 
45-49 0.638 0.486 0.363 0.294 
     
South Africa (1998; 3.5)     
20-24 0.139    
25-29 0.190 0.113   
30-34 0.254 0.175 0.169  
35-39 0.370 0.240 0.153  
40-44 0.360 0.311 0.179 0.259 
45-49 0.535 0.405 0.316 0.322 
Source:  Data for Botswana, Zimbabwe and Kenya come from Cohen (1993). Data for South Africa 
calculated from 1987-9 and 1998 South Africa DHS. 
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the year to which the data refer, and the total fertility rate at that 
date. 
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By this measure, the fertility decline in South Africa again shows both similarities 
to (and differences from) that in other African countries. Presented graphically (Figure 
4.9), these data encourage (and demand) further reflection on the nature of the South 
African fertility decline relative to that elsewhere in Africa. 
Figure 4.9 Values of B60, by cohort and grouped parity, selected African 
countries 
 
In all cohorts, and at all parities, the proportion of women progressing to higher 
order parities is much lower in South Africa (at both surveys) than in the three other 
countries shown. At the higher parities, a remarkable similarity in trend (if not level) 
between the data from the five surveys is apparent. 
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Strong similarities in the pattern of childbearing in Zimbabwe and Kenya are 
evident, while the pattern of B60s in Botswana lies between those for those two countries 
and South Africa. The two sets of data from South African surveys show how the 
proportion of women progressing to a subsequent birth within five years of their last 
has fallen over a fairly short period of time. The fall in the values of B60 in South Africa, 
and the similarity to other African countries in their pattern across cohorts raises the 
possibility that the pattern of fertility decline in South Africa may be a harbinger of the 
pattern of decline in other African countries. 
The further investigation of these similarities and differences lies outside the 
scope of this thesis. However, the data presented above might suggest that there is a 
general pattern in parity progression that stretches across African countries. In 
particular, it would be of interest to investigate whether the proportion of women 
progressing to higher parities in more recent years in those three other African countries 
have moved closer to the levels shown in South Africa. 
Thus, again, the South African fertility decline exhibits some similarities to that in 
other sub-Saharan African countries. The decline has resulted more from a general fall 
in the proportion of women progressing to higher parities than from parity-specific 
fertility limitation. In many respects, then, the South African fertility decline is occurring 
as Caldwell, Orubuloye and Caldwell (1992) hypothesised. Fertility decline is occurring 
at all ages and parities simultaneously. 
 
The major finding of this chapter, however, is indubitably the observation of 
exceptionally long birth intervals in South Africa. The median birth intervals presented 
in Section 4.3 indicate a level of spacing between births that is unique to South Africa, 
with recent intervals for younger women frequently greater than seven years.  
Furthermore, birth intervals in South Africa have lengthened enormously over the 
last thirty years, certainly by African standards and also in comparison with those 
observed elsewhere in the developing world. Data were presented in Chapter 2 showing 
the median birth intervals for a sub-population of women of childbearing age in 13 sub-
Saharan African countries. The longest birth intervals identified were those in 
Zimbabwe, of 39 months. The same calculation for the equivalent group of African 
South Africans, however, yields a median interval of 59 months. By this measure, then, 
the pattern of childbearing in South Africa is qualitatively different from that elsewhere 
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in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, the quintums and trimeans calculated in this chapter 
indicate that the proportion of African South Africans progressing to a subsequent 
parity within five years of the last birth are much lower than those observed elsewhere 
in the developing world, even in countries with similar levels of fertility. Further, even 
for women who do have another child within five years, the trimean for African South 
Africans is appreciably higher than that generally observed. In this regard at least, the 
pattern of childbearing in South Africa is – and has been historically – qualitatively 
different from that seen elsewhere in the developing world. International comparisons 
are of little help in understanding or explaining why this pattern has emerged. 
From this perspective, South Africa can be said to be following a new variant of 
the fertility transition, characterised by both lengthening birth intervals and low parity 
progression ratios. Whether other African countries are following this pattern might be 
a profitable direction for future research. However, in the absence of being able to 
determine whether or not this is indeed the case, it is necessary to consider the forces 
that have precipitated this pattern of fertility and childbearing in South Africa. An 
explanation for this pattern might well lie in the history and evolution of political, social 
and economic institutions under apartheid and its segregationist antecedents. The 
validity of this as a potential explanation is investigated in the next two chapters. 
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5 HOLDING BACK THE TIDE, WAITING FOR THE FLOOD: POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE ON POPULATION AND AFRICAN FERTILITY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
Chapter 2 set out an argument that, although recognising the existence of an intellectual 
orthodoxy that prevailed in demographic research from the end of the Second World 
War, this orthodoxy was far from hegemonic. This chapter investigates the rhetoric and 
discourse of population policies in South Africa from the turn of the twentieth century 
through to the dismantling of apartheid in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
The primary purpose of this investigation is to provide a historical context for the 
analysis of the effect of apartheid institutions on the African South African fertility 
decline presented in the next chapter. The material presented here shows how apartheid 
intellectuals and ideologues constructed the threat of rapid African population growth, 
state responses to this apparent threat, and the consequent evolution of population 
policies in South Africa. The rhetoric and the population policies adopted, furthermore, 
are situated in the context of the changing international debates and theories on 
population growth, family planning programmes and development (and the 
relationships between them) from the 1950s onwards. 
5.1 The racialisation of the South African polity: 1900-1948 
Matters relating to race, and the establishment and maintenance of White hegemony 
became increasingly central to South African politics and policies from the turn of the 
twentieth century. Legassick (1995:44) argues that the “crucial formative period for the 
policy of segregation” was between 1901 (the penultimate year of the Boer War) and the 
start of the First World War in 1914. While components of a segregationist polity had 
been established earlier in the nineteenth century, these did not take on the mantle of a 
“totality created of ideological rationalisation, economic functions and legislative-
administrative policy” (Legassick, 1995:44-5). Nevertheless, as Legassick observes, 
colonial administrators and commentators in the nineteenth century were entirely aware 
of the differential rates of population growth in the country, and their likely 
consequences. 
Contemporary anthropologists wrote about Africans in terms that were likely to 
feed the paranoia of the colonial elite about the numbers of Africans vis-à-vis the 
number of Whites. According to one, native Africans (“Bantu”) were possessed of 
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robust constitutions, looked younger and were likely to live longer than Whites, and 
were particularly worthy of detailed study because they “outnumber by more than 
threefold all the other inhabitants of [South Africa] put together, and are still increasing 
at a marvellous rate” (Theal, 1910:102). An entire subsequent chapter of this book was 
simply entitled “Rapid Increase of the Bantu in Number”, and devoted itself to an 
exposition of the supposed causes of rapid population growth among Africans. 
Commentators and anthropologists such as Theal placed emphasis on the fact that, 
unlike other colonial situations, native South Africans had suffered no large 
demographic setback as a result of disease introduced by colonial settlers. Hence, unlike 
elsewhere, there was no obvious brake being applied to the growth of the indigenous 
population. 
The histories and anthropological accounts of the time thus suggest that the 
numerical dominance of the indigenous inhabitants over the colonial settlers was an 
important concern of colonial administrators. It is in this context, Beinart and Dubow 
(1995:2) argue, that segregationist policies emerged from the realisation that although 
Europeans had “conquered the indigenous population, [they] could only partially 
displace it”. It was in this desire for displacement that the racialisation of South African 
demography took root. 
Initially, the justification for the displacement of the indigenous population (and, 
hence, the maintenance of urban areas for Whites, while still retaining a population of 
African workers) found its expression in the discourses of public health. One such 
example was the forced removal of Africans to Ndabeni township on the outskirts of 
Cape Town in March 1901, motivated primarily by the threat posed by Africans to 
public health after an outbreak of bubonic plague in the Cape Town docks (Swanson, 
1977). While these concerns (what Swanson terms the “sanitation syndrome”) offered a 
convenient pretext for enforced urban segregation, Maylam (1995) and other historians 
have argued that this discourse also (and more importantly) provided a vehicle by which 
White capitalist interests in the cities could be safeguarded and preserved. Through a 
series of legislative acts in the years after Union in 1910 (including the 1913 Native Land 
Act which set aside 13 percent of South Africa’s land area for Africans, and the first 
legislation of race-based job reservation – the “civilised labour policy”), these interests 
were further entrenched and their continuity assured. With this, the concerns of White 
South Africans turned increasingly to the ‘political arithmetic’ of the Union, and from 
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the mid-1920s, the racialised discourse of public health was superseded by White fears 
that they were being overwhelmed by the pace of growth of the African population, 
fears in keeping with the eugenicist ideas prevalent in Europe and America at the time. 
Prior to, and in the aftermath of, the formation of the Pact Government in 1924, 
JBM Hertzog (elected Prime Minister in 1924) used the rhetoric of swamping to call for 
the extension and preservation of White privilege, and the continued denial of African 
rights. In three speeches between May 1924 and May 1926, Hertzog gradually developed 
his theme that segregation was required because of the numerical superiority of 
Africans. Initially, his overriding concern was with the government’s “civilised labour 
policy”, although he did argue that if a solution to the “native question” was delayed 
much longer, it would be the “death of both European and native” (Hertzog, 1977 
(1924):307*)1. By November 1925, the use of the swamping metaphor was in currency: 
extending the (qualified) franchise that Africans enjoyed in the Cape to other provinces 
“necessarily must lead to the swamping of the White population, and European 
civilisation in the Union” (Hertzog, 1977 (1925):21*).  
These ideas were developed in the following months. At a speech in Malmesbury 
in early 1926, after presenting summary statistics of the racial composition of the Union 
(Africans then outnumbered Whites by a margin of 3 to 1), he proposed that “numbers 
take on practical value only when they are raised in connection with matters of 
importance. Only then do they carry any meaning for us. Therefore, the relationship of 
the population numbers of the native relative to the European only are imbued with 
their full meaning when we can grasp the difference between the two races….” 
(Hertzog, 1977 (1926):71*).  
Thus, according to Hertzog, the numerical balance between Whites and Africans 
would be unimportant were it not for the supposed cultural, religious and socio-
economic differences between the two race groups. Hertzog’s views set the parameters 
for the debate on population issues for the next twenty years. Dubow argues that, while 
the significance of Hertzog’s use of rhetoric on swamping has been overlooked and 
ignored by South African historians of the liberal school, the rhetoric of swamping is 
more comprehensible when assessed in the context of the eugenicist movement “with 
its paranoia about civilisation’s retrogressive tendencies and its vulnerability in the face 
                                                 
1 Throughout this chapter, an asterisk in the citation indicates that I have translated the quoted text from the original Afrikaans.  
122
of the ‘virile’ mass of ‘barbarians’ who were ‘flooding’ into the cities” (Dubow, 
1995:156).  
In a series of House of Assembly debates in the early 1930s (cited in Kaufman, 
1996:15-7), African population growth was described variously as “disturbing” and as a 
possible “menace”, while the African urban areas themselves were described as 
“congested with a large, and superfluous, native population”. Although the first clinics 
were set up by private organisations to minister to the family planning needs of non-
Whites in the mid-1930s in response to these concerns, Kaufman (1996) points out that 
far greater emphasis was placed at the time on maintaining or ‘improving’ the ‘quality’ of 
the White population. 
While the rhetoric of swamping continued unabated through the twenties and 
thirties, it was only in the mid-1930s that Afrikaner nationalists first began to consider 
seriously the possibility of legalised and systematic segregation of the Black and White 
South African populations (Dubow, 1992). Their unanticipated victory in the 1948 
election, during which they “hammered relentlessly at the theme of the black oorstroming 
(inundation) of the cities” (O’Meara, 1996:34), gave the Nationalists an opportunity to 
put some of these ideas into practice. 
5.2 Contradiction, continuity and change: 1948-1968 
Although the apartheid era commenced with the electoral victory of the National Party 
over the United Party in 1948, many of the foundations of the apartheid state had been 
laid down gradually over the preceding decades. Thus, while post-1948 South Africa saw 
the codification and consolidation of many segregationist policy measures, in many 
respects the 1948 election did not mark a watershed in the nature of racialised 
discourses, but rather a formalisation and extension of debates and policies that had 
been in play for some time.  
Through a detailed analysis of the evolution of government policies on influx 
control, Deborah Posel (1991; 1995) has shown that, contrary to the perceptions of 
many, apartheid was not a singular, hegemonic or monolithic ideology. In the decade 
after 1948, she claims, apartheid was an amalgam of policies forged out of conflict and 
compromise within and between White ruling classes and other interest groups with 
consequently serious internal contradictions existing between and within different policy 
arenas.  
123
The emergence of similar contradictions in the framing of the debate on 
population issues in South Africa between 1948 and the late 1960s can be identified. On 
the one hand, driven by the fear of White South Africans being “swamped”, the 
government desired a rapid reduction in African fertility. On the other, it pursued 
policies that ensured that Africans were systematically denied access to education, health 
care and urban residence. Yet – according to the modernisation thesis to which the 
government subscribed – all these factors are conducive to fertility change. These 
tensions were to play themselves out right up to the 1990s. Indeed, it is one of this 
thesis’ central arguments that these tensions (and their institutional consequences) are 
responsible in a large measure for the pattern of fertility decline observed in South 
Africa since the 1950s. 
 
What was significant post-1948, however, was the explicit articulation of White fears 
about the population dynamics that were afoot in the country, and the attempted 
resolution of these fears within a broader set of government policies. Within two years 
of the Nationalists’ coming to power, Jan Sadie, one of the most eminent and prolific 
South African demographers, wrote in the first volume of the Journal of Racial Affairs2: 
Numbers are the essence of democracy, where one person 
means, or may mean, with certain reservations of course, one 
vote. The population, its growth or decline, births and deaths, 
the racial composition, are the basic data of politics. The need 
for the study of population statistics is obvious. 
In South Africa the outstanding problem, dominating all others, 
is the relative numbers of the different races constituting the 
Union’s population, and their differential rates of growth. For 
in the long run numbers must count. (Sadie, 1950:3) 
and later in the same article: 
For those who profess interest in the preservation of European 
civilisation in South Africa and who are willing to face the facts, 
there is only one inference to be drawn from the above 
conclusions. If the Europeans do not want themselves to be 
swamped – and it may be in the interest of the Native too that 
the European are not so swamped, at least during the next fifty 
                                                 
2 This “journal”, published by the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) has been described by one British academic as 
consisting “entirely of pseudo-scientific propaganda supporting apartheid” (Billig, 1979). SABRA’s mission was, inter alia, to 
“influence people who are in positions of responsibility relating to our racial problems and the creation of a good relationship 
between the different population groups” (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, 1949b:1*). The intellectual core of SABRA at its 
formation was the faculty of the Department of Bantu Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, who wanted to undertake the 
“scientific study of our country’s racial questions, the propagation of sound racial policy, and research into racial affairs” (South 
African Bureau of Racial Affairs, 1949a:3*). 
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or hundred years – the Natives will have to be put into a 
position where they are themselves responsible for their well-
being. (Sadie, 1950:8)  
Sadie also echoed Theal’s sentiments from almost half a century earlier on the 
absence of a colonialism-precipitated demographic setback for the African population 
of South Africa: 
South Africans did not, and cannot, follow the example set by 
some of our overseas cousins, who, when colonising new 
territories, simply eliminated their problem on arrival; actively 
by means of fire-arms and fire water and, passively, by 
refraining from preventing the spread amongst the aborigines 
of disease, which although endemic in the Old World, assumed 
the character of epidemics in the new. (Sadie, 1950:7)3 
 
By 1950, the concept of swamping, the need for the separate development of Africans 
and the formulation of African population growth as a distinct ‘problem’ requiring a 
‘solution’ were firmly embedded in a single discourse of racial politics which became 
increasingly influential in the formulation of government policy. This discourse can be 
found in the section of the South African yearbooks, almost unchanged between 1958 
and 1978, entitled “South Africa’s multiracial population”: 
A contradistinction: In many parts of the world, contact with 
European civilisation caused the disappearance of the 
indigenous populations…Under the benevolent care of their 
White rulers, the non-Whites in South Africa not only survived 
the impact of White civilisation, but began to increase at such a 
rate that they now outnumber the Whites 3:1. In consequence, 
a complicated population pattern has developed, which has 
brought in its train delicate political and social problems, the 
like of which few other countries have to face. (South Africa, 
1958:53)4 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Sadie shows some disregard for historical fact here, since the early Dutch settlers had hunted the Khoi and the San almost to 
extinction. 
4 Subsequent editions (see, for example, South Africa (1965, 1978)) retained almost exactly the same wording, replacing “White 
rulers” with “the Whites” and changing the ratio to 4:1. In keeping with the need to legitimise the process of granting independence 
to the bantustans, later editions also changed “multiracial” in the chapter title to “multi-national”. 
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Following Sadie’s lead, a dominant view emerged that a decline in African fertility 
could be brought about by containing Africans on their ‘own’ land, and forcing them to 
become reliant on their ‘own’ resources, and thus allowing ecological and Malthusian 
pressures to run their course in reducing African population growth. Implicit in this 
notion, of course, was that – with self-governance being granted to the bantustans – the 
effect on White South Africans of high rates of African population growth in these 
areas would be diminished, since the homelands would be politically and 
administratively independent of the Union. One proponent of these views was Bruwer 
(1954), who argued in an article in the Journal of Racial Affairs that encouraging Africans 
to adopt parity-specific fertility limitation would be futile: 
… it is clear how utterly difficult it will be to change the 
reproductive philosophy of the Bantu… It is generally accepted 
that industrialisation exercises a retarding force on population 
growth. In the South African pattern of industrialisation, this 
proposition probably does not hold for the Bantu. In the first 
instance, the economic pattern does not affect the way of living 
of the entire Bantu population … The economic pressure, lack 
of space and housing etc. that tends to retard White population 
growth in industrial areas, does not therefore have the same 
effects on the Bantu population because they, in addition to the 
living possibilities in the White sector, can also enjoy the 
advantages of their own reserves. 
Secondly, the mortality rate among the Bantu continues to fall 
as a result of better medical and other facilities … As the death 
rate among Bantu children falls as a result of improved living 
standards, the mean number of children per family will thus 
probably overtake that of Whites… 
…The pattern of South African food production is, to a large 
extent, one-sided. Although the Bantu, as the largest 
component of the population, also contribute to the production 
of food, this contribution happens largely in the White areas. 
Native reserves constitute about 13% of the total surface area 
of South Africa. Virtually all these areas lie in good rainfall 
areas, but they are not only undeveloped and unproductive, but 
are being robbed of their productive potential by primitive 
methods and overcultivation. In the meantime, the White areas 
must employ their carrying capacity to saturation point in order 
to provide food for the majority of the Bantu population. 
This one-sided burden on the land in respect of food 
production as well as industrial development shows the roots of 
our immediate population question to be both economic and 
sociological. Large-scale and planned development of the 
Native reserves is, without a doubt, a more realistic approach to 
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our current population problems than the illusion of a 
quantitative population policy that, if it is applied, will make 
reproduction just as one-sided in the coming decades as the 
current arrangements in respect of production. (Bruwer, 
1954:21-23*) 
At about the same time, Sadie (1955) suggested that an alternative solution to the 
threat of “swamping” would be to encourage White immigration, an idea first mooted 
by Badenhorst (1950). However, Sadie acknowledged that such a policy (implemented in 
the 1950s, resulting in the immigration of large numbers of Whites, particularly from the 
United Kingdom) was unlikely to rebalance the racial composition of the country to any 
significant degree: 
It seems fair to conclude that there is a more than average 
probability that the Bantu population will grow at an increasing 
rate in the near future. This coupled with the fact that their 
multiplicand is so much larger than the corresponding 
multiplicand of Whites, means that the excess in number of 
Bantu over White will grow cumulatively … [O]n the basis of 
very reasonable assumptions with respect to growth and 
urbanisation, and assuming that future policy does not stop the 
flow to the present urban centres, there will be [two or three 
times more Bantu than Whites] unless we embark on a policy of 
large scale White immigration. Even so, the disparity in 
numbers cannot possibly be eliminated by means of White 
immigration. (Sadie, 1955:47) 
Bruwer’s argument, however, is noteworthy for the fact that it represents one of 
the first applications of the emergent theory of development via modernisation (and its 
demographic counterpart, demographic transition theory) to the South African context. 
However, even in 1954, this interpretation of modernisation theory was being subverted 
by the pressures of racial politics: modernisation of Africans was seen increasingly as 
occurring within the spatial and political realm of the bantustans, rather than within the 
White areas of South Africa. 
More importantly, though, his arguments established the conceptual framework 
that dominated official demographic analysis in the country for the next thirty years. By 
paying little attention to the effects of the social and institutional characteristics of the 
South African polity on demographic outcomes, the inhibiting effects of apartheid 
polices on fertility decline were generally ignored, and the structure of South African 
society was treated as conceptually and theoretically unrelated to the process of fertility 
decline. The formulation and maintenance of this conceptual separation meant that 
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subsequent analyses of the causes and consequences of rapid African population growth 
neglected to investigate the effects of apartheid institutions on African fertility. 
However, segregationist policies preserved (and, indeed, were intended to preserve) 
urban Africans’ links with the bantustans, and hence limited the fertility-inhibiting 
effects of urbanisation in the White areas, while modernisation of the bantustans was 
contingent on expensive infrastructural and development programmes.  
In 1954, this conceptual separation was less problematic than it would become. 
The homelands policy had yet to be fully developed and the principles behind “Bantu 
education” had yet to be fully implemented (although the Bantu Education Act had 
been passed a year earlier5). Moreover it is, at least theoretically, possible that large-scale 
industrialisation of, and investment in, the bantustans might have had the desired effect 
of promoting modernisation, and consequently fertility decline.  
5.2.1 The Tomlinson Commission (1951-55) 
The Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu within the Union 
of South Africa6 (South Africa, 1955) was a further milestone in the integration of 
population concerns into a broader social and political framework for South Africa. The 
Commission’s terms of reference were set out in very general terms: to “conduct an 
exhaustive inquiry into and to report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation 
of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping 
with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning” (South 
Africa, 1955:xviii).  
With this remit, the Commission could not but stray into matters of population 
policy, and in particular the link between modernisation and economic growth on the 
one hand, and population growth and the need to limit African fertility on the other: 
…it cannot be assumed that [Africans’] attitude towards 
reproduction will change quickly enough in a spontaneous 
manner to realise the fruits of economic development in the 
form of a higher material standard of living… What is 
indicated, therefore, appears to be a campaign for the 
promotion of planned parenthood. (South Africa, 1955:30) 
                                                 
5 In a now-infamous speech in the Senate on the 1953 Bantu Education Act, HF Verwoerd had argued that “[T]here is no place for 
[the African] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour… It is of no avail for him to receive a training 
which has as its aim the absorption in the European community, where he cannot be absorbed. Until now he has been subjected to 
a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European 
society in which he was not allowed to graze”. (Verwoerd, 1975(1954):266) 
6 Hereafter referred to as the Tomlinson Commission. 
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However, in the concluding chapters of the Commission’s Report, the call for a 
family planning service had been toned down into a recommendation that “an 
investigation into the possibilities of such a campaign [for the promotion of planned 
parenthood], should be undertaken” (South Africa, 1955:207). This modification 
probably resulted from the strong objections of Afrikaner theologians in the Dutch 
Reformed Church (to which almost all Nationalist politicians belonged, and described 
by O’Meara (1996:43) as playing “a crucial role in defining the moral parameters of the 
Nationalist agenda”) to artificial family planning. As a result, even this (modified) 
recommendation was not acted on for another decade. 
The “Native problem” as outlined by the Commission emphasised the numbers 
game in terms redolent of Hertzog’s fears: “of all factors, the numerical relationship 
[between Whites and Africans] is probably the one which counts for most”. As a result, 
the Commission argued that giving equal right to Africans would endanger “the 
existence of the European and his civilisation” (South Africa, 1955:9). The 
Commission’s concluding recommendations summarised four years of work and almost 
4 000 pages of the full report as follows: 
(i) A choice will have to be made by the people of South 
Africa, between two ultimate poles, namely, that of 
complete integration and that of separate development 
of the two main racial groups. Taking all factors into 
consideration, the Commission recommends the latter 
choice, namely, separate development. 
(ii) The initial step towards the practical realisation of 
separate development of Europeans and Bantu, lies in 
the full-scale development of the Bantu Areas. 
(iii) The development of the Bantu Areas will have to 
embrace a fully diversified economy, comprising 
development in the primary, secondary and tertiary 
spheres. (South Africa, 1955:207) 
 
The genesis of many apartheid policies implemented after 1960 can be found in the 
Report’s recommendations that Africans be removed from so-called ‘black spots’, and 
its arguments in favour of the desirability of ‘retribalising’ Africans. As Posel discusses 
at length, changes in government policy on influx control and urbanisation represented 
the consequences of an ideological victory by the more conservative faction of the 
National Party under the guidance of the Broederbond, a secretive network of Afrikaner 
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intellectuals, capitalists, administrators and theologians. Official policy on African 
urbanisation up until 1959 (under the Native Affairs Department) had sought to 
accommodate the growing demand for African labour in White areas. However, with 
the transformation of the Native Affairs Department into the Bantu Affairs 
Department, government policy underwent a marked shift. Whereas detribalisation (and 
permanent African settlement in urban areas) had been previously thought to be 
inevitable, the new approach actively sought to “curb white dependence on African 
labour in the cities” (Posel, 1991:228-9), and cast the need for independent homelands 
as being in the interests of the preservation of African culture.  
However, as a result of that strong rightward shift (described in detail by O’Meara 
(1996:70-1)), the developmental aspects of the Commission’s recommendations were 
generally ignored. Posel notes that the recommended “ambitious and expensive 
programme of agricultural, industrial and mining development”, was estimated by the 
Commission to cost £104 million over the first ten years. However, “by the end of 1958 
the government had allocated a mere £3,500,000 for reserve development” (Posel, 
1991:126). 
The extent of the political shift after 1960 was clearly visible in the realm of 
population policy too. The emergence of new political priorities in the wake of the 
political struggles within the ruling party set in place a set of contradictory approaches 
and policies towards African population growth and the need to reduce African fertility. 
The assumed importance of modernisation in reducing African fertility was replaced by 
a view that sought to solve the “native problem” by means of rigid social and spatial 
segregation and the granting of ‘independence’ to the bantustans. Doing so would also 
shift the burden of modernisation onto the new homeland administrations, and hence 
the cost of modernisation would not be borne by White South Africans.  
Sadie’s arguments that “the numbers must count”, and his warnings of the 
dangers of African urban population growth resonated with the newly elected leadership 
of the National Party. In 1962, Prime Minister Verwoerd gave a speech in the (White) 
House of Assembly motivating strongly for the Transkei to be given its independence. 
Failure to do so would lead to the swamping of White South Africans in the Republic, 
he argued, and quoting Sadie directly, “… it would inexorably lead to Bantu domination. 
Because in the long run numbers must tell.” Verwoerd continued with the bluntest 
possible threat of not granting independence to the homelands: “And I say it 
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unequivocally that the people of South Africa cannot accept the consequence of having 
a multi-racial state unless the Whites, the Coloureds and the Indians are prepared to 
commit race suicide” (Verwoerd, 1978 (1962):179-180). 
The prospect of White “race suicide” reached its apogee in 1967 when MC Botha, 
Minister of Bantu Affairs, launched a campaign to encourage White South Africans to 
increase their fertility through tax relief and other benefits, and “have a Baby for 
Botha”. Contrary to Kaufman’s assessment (1996:32) that this call went unheeded (its 
sole, and unintended, effect according to her being a reduction in attendance at non-
White family planning clinics), the campaign may have had a marginal impact on White 
fertility. According to Mostert (1979), total fertility among Whites in 1965 was 3.08 
children per woman and that in 1970 was 3.09. White fertility had been in decline for 
some time, and the apparent stasis between 1965 and 1970 (total fertility had dropped to 
2.58 children per woman in 1974) could mean that while the programme did not 
increase White fertility, it did – for a while – halt its decline. Further evidence in this 
regard is that between 1965 and 1970, the age-specific fertility rates for White South 
Africans actually increased in the 25-34 age group, while declining in all other age 
groups. Women in these age groups would, presumably, have been most susceptible to 
the campaign’s message. 
 
As Greenhalgh (1995b) has observed, ‘classical’ demographic transition theory shares 
many of the same tenets as modernisation theory, particularly in relation to the process 
of fertility decline. In parallel with their hypothesised significance for modernisation, 
education (especially that of women), wage employment and urbanisation were all 
assumed to be important, even if neither necessary nor sufficient, in the transition from 
high to low fertility. The rise (and acceptance by apartheid planners) of the 
modernisation thesis, with its emphasis on development as a determinant of 
demographic transition began to highlight some of the contradictions inherent in 
government policy in the mid- to late 1960s.  
With the rejection of the developmental aspects of the Tomlinson Commission’s 
recommendations, government policies after 1960 had the explicit intent to limit 
African urbanisation and to restrict their participation in the labour force. The education 
of Africans, too, was seen as being of minor importance. The government’s desire for 
Africans to maintain strong links with the bantustans, coupled with the increasingly 
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draconian system of forced removals to the homelands, thus greatly restricted the extent 
to which modernisation might precipitate a decline in fertility.  
Furthermore, these policies were seen to obviate the need for significant 
modernisation and development of the African population in White areas (since 
Africans were not supposed to be there). Equally, the desire to grant political autonomy 
to the bantustans meant that their underdevelopment was construed as a matter outside 
the ambit of government policy. 
In the absence of either socio-economic development or family planning 
programmes, African fertility unsurprisingly remained high in White areas, further 
increasing White fears of being swamped and leading to louder calls for even more rigid 
patterns of spatial separation along racial lines. 
If apartheid demographers and ideologues were aware of the incompatibility of 
government policy with modernisation theory, this was not stated openly. Instead, 
African population dynamics were increasingly discussed in isolation from the broader 
social, economic and political context of the South African polity (much as Bruwer had 
done in the 1950s). This allowed lip service to continue to be paid to the benefits of 
modernisation theory, while not engaging with the negative effects of government 
policy on the viability of a modernisation-led fertility transition. Thus, the result was a 
curiously naïve framing of the terms of the debate within government on population 
policy in South Africa, taking as axiomatic the preservation of the status quo, particularly 
the need for separate development, the necessity and desirability of maintaining the 
bantustans as quasi-independent entities, and the desire to control the migration of 
Africans to White urban areas. 
5.3 Contradictions in the modernisation thesis, population control 
and family planning: 1968-1974 
Towards the end of the 1960s, two international developments helped to deflect 
attention from the increasingly obvious contradictions between the government’s desire 
to reduce African fertility through modernisation and its espousal of policies that denied 
the beneficial effects of modernisation to most African South Africans. The first was 
the publication of Paul Ehrlich’s book (Ehrlich, 1968), with its alarmist prognostications 
of overpopulation and resource shortages; the second was the support lent to family 
planning programmes by the international community from the 1960s onwards. 
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Ehrlich’s work proved a boon for South African demographers in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. Not only did the notion of the “population bomb” reflect their own 
concerns about Whites being swamped by the higher fertility of Africans but the explicit 
threat of overpopulation (especially urban crowding) and environmental degradation 
provided additional justification for the extension of apartheid policies, and the desire to 
grant independence to the bantustans. The significance of the “population bomb” 
metaphor, and the alacrity with which it was adopted, cannot be understated.  
The metaphor of the “population bomb” was most clearly expressed at a 
symposium organised by the South African Medical Association in October 1971 on the 
“Population Explosion in South and Southern Africa”. An indication of the seriousness 
with which the government viewed the matter is given by the fact that, of the nine 
papers delivered at the symposium, senior ministerial officials gave four, including an 
opening address by Dr Connie Mulder, then Minister of Information. The theme of 
Whites being swamped was elaborated and found a new voice in the rhetoric of the 
population bomb: 
The Whites increased by about 662 000 from 1960 to 1970 as 
against a total Non-White increase during the same period of  
4 782 000. That means for each White person added to the 
South African population, there was a corresponding increase 
of 7.2 Non-Whites… The conclusion to be drawn from the 
above is THAT THE WHITES ARE A DWINDLING 
MINORITY IN THE COUNTRY. (Dr C. J. Claassen in van 
Rensburg (1972:7), original emphasis) 
Not only were Whites in imminent danger of being swamped but, with judicious 
choice of comparisons, it was possible to claim that “South Africa’s population is 
increasing at the highest rate in the world” (van Rensburg, 1972:10). The implications of 
this growth for the South African polity were terrifying: high rates of African population 
growth would tilt the numerical balance of the population further in favour of Africans, 
thereby threatening still more any vestige of legitimacy for White control.  
The metaphor also appeared increasingly frequently in reports on population 
growth and fertility in South Africa produced from 1968 onwards. These reports tended 
to commence with an introductory chapter outlining the ‘problem’, and establishing that 
if the population explosion carried a threat for the planet en masse, the threat was notably 
worse for White South Africans. After setting out the rates of global population growth 
from pre-Christian times and comparing the rates of population growth in developed 
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countries relative to developing countries, these reports would then focus on South 
Africa, its high rate of (African) population growth, and conclude with a jeremiad that 
Africans would not, or could not, limit their fertility7.  
References to the “population bomb” could be found also in government reports 
throughout the early 1970s. In a set of population projections based on the 1970 census 
published in 1973, for example, projected African population growth over the next forty 
years was described as “explosive” (Mostert, van Eeden and van Tonder, 1973b:11*).  
 
The new family planning paradigm, based on fertility reduction through the provision of 
family planning services, offered a way of resolving the incompatibility between 
apartheid policies and the perceived need for modernisation to deliver rapid fertility 
decline among Africans. Calls for a family programme directed at Africans grew louder 
from the late 1960s, despite concerns expressed in parliament that the adoption of 
family planning programmes might open the government up to charges of “racial 
murder” or even genocide (Kaufman, 1996:35-37). These concerns (even though they 
were periodically expressed over the next few years) were increasingly dissipated by the 
international support given to the implementation of family planning programmes 
across the developing world, and the belief in the possibility of a contraception-driven 
fertility transition. 
Thus, in his speech to the 1968 SABRA congress, Dr PM Robbertse, the chair of 
the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), was among the first South Africans to 
publicly invert the original formulation of the modernisation hypothesis by arguing that 
African socio-economic development was being compromised by high rates of 
population growth. In keeping with the congress’ theme, however, he paid greater 
attention to the promotion of White fertility. Using Nazi Germany as his principal 
example, he proposed that White fertility should be increased through incentives to 
marriage (in the form of state transfers), further substantial transfers in respect of third, 
fourth and higher order children, and subsidisation of housing and tertiary education for 
large families. However, he was at pains to point out the necessity of family planning 
programmes for Africans, too: 
                                                 
7 The clearest examples of how this discourse was used are found in Cilliers (1971), Lötter and van Tonder (1976) and Schutte 
(1978). Similar instances are found in many of the papers, especially Robbertse (1969), presented at the 1968 South Africa Bureau of 
Racial Affairs congress in Bloemfontein, whose theme was “White Population Growth”. These papers can be found in Journal of 
Racial Affairs (1969), Vol. 20(1). 
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A population policy for the Non-Whites is as urgent as one for 
Whites … If the birth rate of the Non-Whites is to fall, it would 
have the advantage that the proportional increase of the various 
population groups would become more equal … it would also 
have the benefit of allowing the living standards of the Non-
Whites to rise much faster. 
I am not prepared to guarantee that the proposed, or similar, 
measures will increase the White birth rate. I am, nevertheless, 
prepared to guarantee that this rate will decline further, unless 
attempts are made to halt the trend. Therefore, I am in favour 
of a population policy. Even if the measures only halt the trend, 
it would still be worth the effort. And these measures will 
promote social justice by easing the burdens that are placed on 
the large family. Along this road, the quality of the population 
will be raised.  
The time has also come to formulate a comprehensive 
population policy for the Non-White population groups, and I 
make the proposition that the majority of the Non-Whites 
would welcome such a policy… (Robbertse, 1969:61-62*) 
 
From early in the 1970s, apartheid-supporting academics and administrators had to 
come to terms with the demographic consequences of the government’s failure to 
modernise the African population. In response, they began to reformulate government 
population policy in a manner that attempted to square the contradictions between 
modernisation and apartheid, and simultaneously embrace the new family planning 
paradigm.  
One tendency, most coherently represented by Jan Sadie and SP Cilliers, followed 
on from Robbertse, elaborating on the inversion of the modernisation hypothesis, and 
calling for immediate action to implement a family planning programme and a revision 
of existing population policy. Their solution reversed the central argument of the 
modernisation hypothesis and demographic transition theory, and – instead – proposed 
that socio-economic development of the bantustans would only be possible if the rate 
of population growth was slowed significantly. Modern contraception offered an ideal 
mechanism for doing so. 
Thus, for example, Sadie (1970, 1973) argued for the introduction of a “vigorous” 
family planning campaign, while still pushing for increased ‘decentralisation’ of the 
South African economy. Decentralisation was, broadly speaking, a euphemism for 
forced removals and stronger spatial and economic segregation of Black and White in 
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South Africa. In particular, the decentralisation policy aimed to promote the growth of 
(White-owned) industry within the bantustans, or on their periphery, thereby creating 
employment opportunities for Africans in or near the homelands, while increasing the 
scope for removing ‘surplus’ Africans from the White cities. In 1970, Sadie concluded a 
review of demographic data on Africans with the opinion that the African population 
would “remain in the explosive phase, unless a vigorous family planning programme 
[was] successfully conducted” (Sadie, 1970:190). Three years later, in the commentary on 
a frequently cited series of population projections, he took a fairly pessimistic view of 
the potential for African fertility to decline. With a projected level of fertility of 5.2 
children per woman for 1990-1995 and 4.1 for 2010-2015, he estimated a need by 2000 
for new or existing cities to accommodate an additional 28 million inhabitants, and 
called for faster industrial decentralisation to reduce this growth, while noting again the 
additional need for a “sustained and vigorous family planning programme”. Failure to 
implement such a programme, in his opinion, would result in an ever-diminishing 
proportion of Whites and Asians (who “provide the major proportion of 
entrepreneurial initiative”). This dilution would then further impoverish Africans and 
Coloureds (and inhibit the decline in their fertility), since they have “for practical 
purposes, only their labour to offer whose employment is dependent upon the 
enterprise and capital supplied by the other two groups” (Sadie, 1973:37-8). Thus, by the 
early 1970s, White demographers had ceased to believe in the possibility of a neo-
Malthusian solution to the problem of African population growth. 
Cilliers (1971) took a similar view to Sadie, arguing that high population growth 
was retarding the “upgrading” of the African population. Consequently, the “need for 
population control” was based on the belief that modernisation was impossible without 
a prior fertility decline. Like Sadie, Cilliers called for the family-planning paradigm to be 
closely integrated into a broader programme of socio-economic development in the 
bantustans. In his monograph, “Appeal to Reason”, an entire chapter was devoted to 
“The need for population control”: 
…I am convinced that the time has arrived for South Africa to 
formally and openly aim at population control through family 
planning. We must, without delay, incorporate a population 
programme into our broad programme for social and economic 
advancement for all sectors of our society. In fact, it cannot be 
disputed that without such a population programme, which 
should consciously and openly strive towards motivating all 
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sectors of the community to limit family sizes in accordance 
with the ability to provide adequately for dependants and 
towards providing all sectors of the community with the 
knowledge and means of implementing fertility control, we will 
not succeed in our efforts at social and economic advancement 
for the masses. (Cilliers, 1971:79-80) 
 
The centrality of demographic concerns in the formation of government policy, and the 
importance of demographers to this, became increasingly evident in the early 1970s. For 
example, in a subsidiary report to the HSRC’s 1973 projections, Mostert, van Eeden and 
van Tonder actively argued the case for further removals of Africans from White areas: 
[i]n the case that only the current homeland populations, 
together with their natural increase, must be kept in these areas, 
economic development must at least keep pace with population 
growth. However, the ideal must rather be for homeland 
development to take place at such a rate that a much larger 
volume of Bantus will flock out of the White areas to the 
homelands than the natural increase of [those Bantu in the 
White Areas]. … Even to be able to restrict the numbers of the 
[Bantu in White Areas] to the 8.2 million in 1970, more than 
200 000 Bantus will have to be resettled in the homelands each 
year. (Mostert, van Eeden and van Tonder, 1973a:3*) 
The threat posed by African population growth to the political integrity of White 
South Africa was picked up on by contributors to the 1972 symposium. Modernisation 
of the bantustans, it was argued, was essential to maintain the integrity of White South 
Africa. Thus, for example, van Rensburg (1972) argued that 
[t]he more successful the policy of separate development is, 
(with the concomitant increase in the percentage of Whites in 
the White areas), the more successful the policy of the 
development of the homelands will have to be… In view of 
existing government policy, the possibility of no African 
emigration from the White areas in the years to come will not 
be considered, because such an eventuality would be 
tantamount to the total collapse of the present policy of 
separate development, an event which the author cannot or will 
not predict. (van Rensburg, 1972:13) 
However, these views held their own contradictions: if van Rensburg could not 
countenance the failure of the government’s influx control policies, he was also aware 
that the homelands were incapable of supporting the projected African population, 
thereby leading to possible further demands for Whites’ land by Africans and still 
greater threats to White domination:  
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A situation could very well arise where the Whites would have 
to safeguard their land by force of arms. In the best interests of 
all the people of South Africa it is imperative that the evil 
political consequences of a chronic and ever increasing African 
land hunger (a direct result of their uncontrolled proliferation), 
should be avoided at all costs. (van Rensburg, 1972:14) 
The 1972 symposium reflected an elaboration and sophistication of official 
thinking on the population question. Van Rensburg attacked the past discourses on 
population as being a “dualistic White view which seeks to generate an increased growth 
of the White population and, at the same time strives to bring about a drastic reduction 
in the growth of the Non-Whites” (van Rensburg, 1972:94). He argued that it was 
implausible to expect White fertility to increase to the rates required to stabilise its 
constituent proportion of the South African population. Second, even though a national 
family planning programme aimed at all population groups might precipitate a further 
decline in White fertility, he argued that in absolute terms the formulation of such a 
programme would decrease African numbers more than they would those of Whites. 
Third, he recast earlier White fears of being accused of genocide by arguing that 
Africans would refuse to limit their fertility on such terms: 
Stated in plain language, they could argue: We do not see our 
way clear to committing racial suicide while you Whites are 
actively encouraged to have larger families … This 
understandable Non-White attitude (the result of the Whites’ 
dualistic approach) can have only one conclusion – an 
increasingly uncontrolled Non-White population growth 
causing, in turn, two inevitable results: ultimate and unavoidable 
“swamping” of the Whites and a rapid and ultimately disastrous 
drop in the Non-Whites’ standard of living until widespread 
famine and misery step in to restore the balance. The results of 
the White’s dualistic views can be summed up as suicide for the 
Whites, and indirectly suicide for the Non-Whites too. Strongly 
stated perhaps, but unfortunately the sober truth. (van 
Rensburg, 1972:96) 
 
These calls from academics within the ruling party and generalised White concern about 
African population growth, together with the growing international support for the 
family planning movement, no doubt encouraged the South African government to 
launch its National Family Planning Programme in 1974. However, according to 
government officials, the decision to launch the programme and make contraception 
available was driven by a growing demand for contraception from African women 
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(Mostert, 1978). While the public face of the campaign might have suggested that the 
programme was demand-led, the National Family Planning Programme was plainly not 
simply a response to that demand, as Mostert makes plain: 
the introduction of a (family planning service) in South Africa 
was stimulated by growing genuine demand. This was, in truth, 
not the only reason. From the beginning, too, the government 
viewed the programme as a mechanism for hastening the socio-
economic development of the population. (Mostert, 1978:86*) 
Thus, by the end of the 1970s, interpretation of the modernisation-fertility nexus 
had come full circle. While the Tomlinson Commission had recommended in 1955 that 
fertility decline would come about through modernisation, by 1974 the government was 
advocating the exact reverse: modernisation through fertility decline. This volte-face 
however, should be understood in the context of the inversion of demographic 
transition theory that occurred in the early 1950s, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Family planning services had been available to Africans, albeit unofficially and mostly in 
urban areas, since the mid-1960s, and Mostert’s claim that there was a “genuine 
demand” for family planning among African women is probably correct. Government 
surveys on family formation conducted in late 1969 and early 1970 in the four major 
metropolitan areas of the country had shown low levels of current use of modern 
contraceptive methods, but a high degree of desire for further information (although 
this simply may be the product of using a leading question), as Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 
show. 
Table 5.1 Percentage of fertile married African women in 1969-70 wanting 
more information on contraception, by age and city 
City  15-24 25-34 35-44 
Durban 77 73 53 
Johannesburg 80 84 75 
Pretoria (all ages)  -----70------  
Cape Town (all ages)  -----84------  
Source:  Mostert (1972); Mostert and du Plessis (1972); Mostert and Engelbrecht (1972); Mostert and van 
Eeden (1972) 
Note:  The definition of “fertile” here is that used by the authors. It excludes women who are definitely 
or probably infertile (no use of contraception, and no conception in the past decade), as well as 
those deemed semi-fecund (no conception in the absence of contraceptive use in the last two to 
three years) 
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Five years later, shortly after the official announcement of the 1974 National 
Family Planning Programme, a national survey8 on family planning use and fertility 
among Africans found much higher rates of current use of modern contraceptive 
methods among urban women meeting the same fertility criteria. 29 percent of fertile 
urban African women aged 15-24; 33 percent of those aged 25-34 and 27 percent of 
women aged 35-44 were then using some form of effective contraception (Lötter and 
van Tonder, 1976).  
Table 5.2 Percentage of fertile married African women in 1969-70 using 
contraception, by age and city 
 
City  
 
Age group 
 
Not using 
Modern 
methods 
Traditional 
methods 
Modern and 
Traditional 
Durban 15-24 74 8 18 -- 
 25-34 72 14 15 -- 
 35-44 82 6 12 -- 
Johannesburg 15-24 76 18 6 -- 
 25-34 66 24 10 -- 
 35-44 79 16 6 -- 
Pretoria 15-24 74 15 10 1 
 25-34 71 13 14 1 
 35-44 68 16 16 0 
Cape Town 15-24 50 22 18 9 
 25-34 41 22 22 16 
 35-44 56 18 17 9 
Source:  Mostert (1972); Mostert and du Plessis (1972); Mostert and Engelbrecht (1972); Mostert and van 
Eeden (1972) 
Note: The definition of “fertile” is as in Table 5.1 
 
Thus, over the five years before the official launch of the National Family 
Planning Programme, contraceptive use among urban African women had increased 
quite dramatically. The desire for further information about contraception noted in 1969 
and 1970, and the subsequent rise in current contraceptive use (much of which 
happened without the benefit of a co-ordinated government programme), provides 
some indication that by the early 1970s a fairly strong demand for contraception had 
evolved, at least among urban African women. 
The programme expanded rapidly after its official endorsement in 1974. By 1977, 
there were more than 2 700 clinics in (the White areas of) South Africa where 
contraceptives were available, and nearly a quarter of a million women were visiting 
                                                 
8 The survey covered all ‘homeland’ areas, but did not sample any Africans living in the Western Cape. One of the recommendations 
of the Tomlinson Commission was that the Western Cape be declared a Coloured “Labour Preference Area”. Accordingly, Africans 
were not supposed to be resident there. Hence, one suspects, Africans were not sampled in the Western Cape, since doing so would 
be tantamount to an admission that the policy of influx control in the Western Cape had failed. 
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these clinics every month9 (Mostert, 1978), leading Caldwell and Caldwell (1993) to 
describe the programme as being “super-Asian” in its intensity. However, as shown in 
Chapter 3, widespread contraceptive use did not translate into a rapid decline in the 
level of African fertility, nor did it have a discernible effect on women’s fertility 
intentions. Reasons for this lack of effect are proposed in Chapter 6. 
5.4 From the National Family Planning Programme to the 
Population and Development Programme: 1974-1983 
Compared to the early 1970s, research on African fertility almost ceased after 
publication of the report on the 1974 fertility survey. What little research was conducted 
tended to avoid dealing with the inconsistencies of apartheid policy vis-à-vis population 
growth, and concentrated instead on the social and financial implications of continued 
African urbanisation (see, for example, Schutte (1978)). 
Several reasons can be suggested for the relative paucity of substantial 
demographic research in the period after 1974. First, the National Family Planning 
Programme represented an end in itself. Given the sheer weight of argument within the 
ruling elite that such a programme was the only way to ensure White survival and limit 
African fertility, it is perhaps unsurprising that, until the programme was evaluated, few 
further data were collected. Second, with the granting of ‘independence’ to four 
homelands over the following decade, data sources became increasingly fragmented. No 
census for the entire Republic including its homelands was conducted again until after 
1990, and collection of demographic data had to rely on co-operative ventures with 
homeland administrations. As a result, the usefulness of the WFS-type survey conducted 
in 1982 (van Tonder, 1985) is limited by the fact that data were collected only in the 
‘White areas’ of the country. In addition, political unrest after the Soweto uprising of 
1976 and its consequences undermined the legitimacy, the capacity and (probably) the 
desire of government authorities to conduct research into the demography of the Black 
population of South Africa. 
A commentary on population growth published by Mostert in 1979 employed the 
device first used by Bruwer in 1954, paying much attention to the effects of high 
African fertility and ignoring the possible structural causes of that high fertility induced 
by apartheid policies:  
                                                 
9 It is unlikely that many of these women were White, since most White women would have received contraceptive advice from their 
(private) general practitioner. 
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In the White areas of South Africa, where more than half of 
Blacks are urbanised, and where a strong family planning 
programme is being pursued, it can be expected that that the 
birth rates will fall quickly, but in the Black areas it is probable 
that the birth rates will decline only slowly – on account of the 
lack of dynamism in their family planning programmes on the 
one hand, and the low rate of modernisation and urbanisation 
on the other. (Mostert, 1979:38*) 
It is difficult to credit that a demographer of Mostert’s standing was oblivious to 
the retardant effects of apartheid on the fertility transition in South Africa, or to the 
reasons behind the “low rate of modernisation” and the “lack of dynamism” of family 
planning programmes in the homelands. The more plausible explanation is that he 
constructed the argument thus because any deeper analysis would expose the full extent 
of apartheid’s contradictions with the theory and practice of modernisation.  
 
In almost all respects, the period from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s was a difficult 
one for apartheid ideologues. The relatively high rates of economic growth that had 
been achieved in the 1960s fell away. Organised African labour power asserted itself for 
the first time in a generation in the 1973 Durban Strikes. The 1976 uprising, led by 
students protesting against the forced teaching of Afrikaans in schools, marked the end-
point of a period when the balance of power tilted briefly against the state. A period of 
relative quietude followed the suppression of the 1976 riots.  
Despite the continued application of the Pass Laws and the granting of autonomy 
to homelands (often whether they wanted it or not), the underlying social fabric of 
South Africa was beginning to change fundamentally. Since 1973, African wages had 
increased sharply relative to those of Whites. In 1979, the Wiehahn Commission 
recommended allowing the formation of African trades unions (albeit under restrictive 
conditions). PW Botha’s accession to power in the 1978 election marked the onset of a 
new era, frequently referred to as being characterised by “reform and repression” under 
which piecemeal legislative reform was made while the state simultaneously increased its 
internal security apparatus under the guise of the threat of the “Total Onslaught”, a 
catch-all phrase, covering supposedly Soviet- or Marxist-inspired “social and labour 
unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the Republic, the 
intimidation of Black leaders and members of the security forces” (O’Meara, 1996:264-
5). 
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In late 1981, the President’s Council commissioned a report from its Science 
Committee with a brief to examine, inter alia, “the extent to which the economic and 
social development, the quality of life and the productivity of the population of the 
Republic of South Africa, are significantly being harmed by the population growth and 
population structure, now and in the future” (South Africa, 1983:foreword). The final 
report10, submitted in March 1983, provided the blueprint for the South African 
population policy that followed, as well as providing important signs that apartheid 
intellectuals were aware that the apartheid edifice was in danger of crumbling. 
The historical and political context in which the report was written is of particular 
importance. Later that year, White South Africans were to be asked to approve the 
dismantling of the Westminster-style parliament, replacing it with a tricameral system, 
one house for each of the Whites, Coloureds and Asians/Indians. Africans were still to 
be denied any form of parliamentary representation. The introduction of the tricameral 
system precipitated the launch of the United Democratic Front as an internal front for 
the then-banned African National Congress, and ushered in seven years of internal 
instability (and successive States of Emergency) that culminated in the start of 
negotiations with the ANC about a future dispensation in 1990. 
In many respects, the President’s Council Report is a masterpiece of obfuscation, 
allowing its readers to interpret it in a huge variety of ways. On one level, it is apparent 
that – in common with so much demographic research in South Africa from the 1950s 
onwards – the authors had struggled from the outset to avoid contradiction. In a 
comment on educational levels in the country, for example, bland assertions of fact 
(“the general level of education of Whites is considerably higher than that of the other 
three population groups…” (South Africa, 1983:24)) are made with little or no attempt 
to explore the underlying reasons behind those facts or criticise the structural iniquities 
caused by apartheid policies. Elsewhere, the report noted that  
Of importance, moreover, is that the lowest numbers of children 
occur in families which are urbanised; in which both husbands and 
wife have reached a high level of education; and in which the wife is 
employed outside the agricultural sector and outside the family. (South 
Africa, 1983:74-75, original emphasis) 
Thus, the separation of the links between cause and effect that was so necessary in 
earlier years was again needed to mask contradictions between the consequences of 
                                                 
10 Hereafter termed the President’s Council Report. 
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apartheid policies and desired demographic outcomes. However, despite the 
contradictions that modernisation theory now held for apartheid South Africa, and 
despite the adoption of the family planning model and the inversion of the population-
development argument in the 1970s, the converse was still believed to be of 
significance: “population growth in all countries is related to development and modernisation” (South 
Africa, 1983:64, original emphasis). To avoid the obvious contradiction between 
modernisation and apartheid policies, this absolute statement was then qualified:  
The conclusion arrived at is not that fertility is not related to 
modernisation and development – it is abundantly clear that it 
is – but rather that there is a loose relationship that differs 
between regions, countries and cultures. (South Africa, 1983:68) 
Despite the implementation of, and support given to, the National Family 
Planning Programme, and the high levels of contraceptive use (the President’s Council 
Report itself claimed a 45 percent current use rate in Soweto in 1980), the report opined 
that Africans were not capable of adopting modern contraception on a large scale to 
reduce fertility due to their not being sufficiently modernised, and the “psychological 
climate” among Africans not yet being “favourable”: 
The continuing high fertility and low usage rates of modern 
contraception can be attributed largely to a combination of low 
levels of modernisation, or socio-economic status, and 
accessibility of modern contraceptive services, particularly in 
the rural areas where about two-thirds of the Black population 
lives. In contrast with the Asian and Coloured populations, the 
level of socio-economic development and the psychological 
climate among Blacks are not yet favourable enough for 
modern contraceptive usage to be accepted on a large scale and 
to be conducive to rapidly declining fertility. (South Africa, 
1983:103) 
Once again, high African fertility is explained by the failure of modernisation, 
rather than a deeper analysis of the constraints on the potential for modernisation to 
work imposed by other apartheid policies. However, had apartheid demographers 
analysed the changing pattern of birth intervals that were then becoming apparent, they 
might have reached very different conclusions, since these would have shown that 
African women were adopting modern contraceptive methods, but were not using them 
in the manner desired by the government. 
At another level of analysis, the report attempted to justify some of apartheid’s 
more grotesque social engineering in terms of international trends and policies: “policy 
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measures relating to population redistribution are applied by 95% of the governments of 
developing countries” (South Africa, 1983:7).  
Finally, the report reads as a damning internal indictment of apartheid policies and 
their retardant effect on African fertility decline, acknowledging the existence of the 
contradictions outlined above. These criticisms are found predominantly in the Report’s 
recommendations and, in effect, call for the dismantling of the apartheid edifice. In this 
regard, however, the report is more tentative, as if the authors were uncertain how 
President Botha and his cabinet would receive the conclusions drawn. For example, 
despite “the determined attempts by the government to limit flocking to White areas” 
(Schutte, 1978:83*), the President’s Council Report viewed the urbanisation of Africans 
as “inevitable and universal”. At the time of the Report, the proportion of the African 
population in urban areas had increased only slightly – from one third at the time of the 
1970 census, to 38 percent in 1983. Thus, although influx control had limited and 
controlled urbanisation to a considerable extent, the Report concluded that the 
maintenance of influx control was no longer possible (South Africa, 1983:33). 
 
The President’s Council Report also presented data showing a decline in the level of 
African fertility from 6.8 in 1955 to 5.2 in 1980 (a 23 percent reduction in fertility – 
more than twice the 10 percent generally accepted as heralding the onset of an 
irreversible fertility transition). Despite this decline, in one of the more significant 
passages, the third chapter of the Report concluded that “in the case of the Blacks, only 
a slight fertility decline has occurred” (South Africa, 1983:105, original emphasis). Three of 
the seven reasons given for that slow decline focused on the administrative deficiencies 
of the National Family Planning Programme, including its lack of integration into other 
social and development programmes, limitations on resources (both human and 
material) and problems of communication across the various ministries, both in White 
South Africa and in the ‘homelands’.  
Two reasons blamed Africans for the failure, attributing to them “cultural 
resistance and ignorance, particularly among the tradition-bound Blacks”, and holding 
“certain Black leaders” accountable for their politicisation of family planning. As the 
next chapter argues, this “inadequate piece of political analysis” (Timæus, 1984b) is, in 
many respects, disingenuous and incompatible with the high level of contraceptive use. 
In the context of an increasingly aggressive state and its hostility to criticism of any 
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form, it is perhaps unsurprising that the report’s authors attempted to shift some of the 
blame for the slow pace of the South African fertility decline onto Africans. This is not 
to deny that there was not politicised resistance to the government’s family planning 
policy, but as shall be argued later, it is highly debatable whether this had any substantial 
effect. 
The final two reasons for the slow decline (the second and third given in the text), 
are for the present purpose, the most interesting. They at least acknowledge the 
contradiction that had plagued South African population policy for so long, attributing 
the slow pace of decline to the “large percentage of Blacks who are still in 
underdeveloped areas” and the “relatively poor and underdeveloped socio-economic 
circumstances of rural and urban Blacks”. While these observations echo those of 
Mostert (1979) quoted earlier, they represent the first official admission of the 
institutional context of fertility decline in South Africa. Nowhere are the underlying 
reasons for the slow decline in African fertility openly discussed, but the implications 
must have been clear to those who read the report: Apartheid policies had retarded the 
fertility transition among African South Africans.  
5.5 The Population and Development Programme (1984) 
The 1984 Population and Development Programme (PDP) was set up to implement the 
recommendations arising from the 1983 President’s Council Report. The PDP offered a 
more coherent and holistic understanding of the dynamics of population and 
demographic change than the National Family Planning Programme it superseded. It 
afforded great weight to the presumed importance of social and economic variables in 
hastening a fertility decline, and recognised the need to remove some of the barriers to 
fertility decline caused by apartheid policies. The overriding ambition of the programme 
was to reduce national fertility to replacement levels (around 2.1 children per woman) by 
2020. The principal motivation for this target was concern over the country’s water 
supplies, which – it was felt – were incapable of supporting a population of more than 
80 million. The target fertility rate, would on the basis of government projections, result 
in a stable population of around this size in 210011. 
 
                                                 
11 It is interesting to note the return (after their rejection in the early 1970s) of this neo-Malthusian argument in the Report’s 
justification of the need to limit population growth through a revised population programme. 
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For all of the concerns and awareness expressed in the President’s Council Report 
about the effects of apartheid on retarding the fertility decline among Africans, the 
effects of the PDP were muted, as can be seen from the continued slow pace of fertility 
decline after 1984. In their assessment of the PDP, the Department of Welfare’s White 
Paper of 1998 suggested that, while the PDP did consider the broader context of 
fertility decline in South Africa, the programme “did not address the fundamental 
question of the lack of citizenship of the black population, nor the institutionalised 
discrimination” prevalent in South Africa (Department of Welfare, 1998:3). 
Additionally, the failure of the PDP to meet its objectives were also attributed to its lack 
of integration into an overall development plan for all South Africans, the paucity of 
demographic data and demographic skills, and a failure of implementation at a 
provincial level. The validity of these criticisms notwithstanding, however, the continued 
uptake of modern forms of contraception after 1984, particularly in rural areas, is 
indicative that the PDP did, in some respects at least, succeed in broadening access to 
contraception and contraceptive advice. 
5.6 Conclusion: Rhetoric and reproduction in apartheid South 
Africa  
This chapter set out to provide a history of the evolution of rhetoric and policy on 
population in South Africa, paying special attention to the apartheid era. The changing 
political construction of demographic threats and realities in South Africa over the 
course of apartheid outlined in this chapter offers many insights into the process 
whereby South African population policy was formulated. In this regard, as in America 
and Europe, the dominant focus in South Africa during the inter-war years was on 
eugenics, and on improving the quality of the White population. By the end of the 
Second World War, however, discourse on population in South Africa reflected the 
(original) formulation of demographic transition theory. According to this version of the 
theory, modernisation and socio-economic development would lead to fertility decline, 
as the forces of Westernisation and economic growth began to undermine “traditional” 
patterns of social organisation.  
As has been shown, following on from the espousal of modernisation theory, the 
first half of the 1970s saw the adoption of the rhetoric of the population explosion and 
the growing belief in the possibility of a contraceptive-led fertility transition. The 
changes in international development and demographic thinking that permitted this 
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change were indeed timely in the context of South African population policy. The 
rightward shift in South Africa’s internal politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s had 
led to the abandonment of a development-led approach to instigating a decline in 
African fertility as recommended by the Tomlinson Commission. Both locally and 
internationally, greater emphasis was placed increasingly on the retardant effects of rapid 
population growth and high fertility on modernisation and socio-economic 
development.  
While rhetoric and policy on population in South Africa reflected international 
trends, these were not simply imported and applied unthinkingly to the South African 
context. Indeed, those international trends and theories were, in some senses, 
instrumental in providing apartheid policies with much-desired scientific legitimacy, 
even if the interpretation lent to those international trends and theories was not that 
intended originally. Thus, for example, even though the Tomlinson Commission had 
recommended a strategy of industrialisation to help limit African population growth, the 
Commission’s recommendations were expressed in the language of apartheid policies: 
that that development should occur in a political and administrative sphere distinct from 
that of White South Africa. 
Posel’s descriptions of the internal conflict and compromise within the apartheid 
state are also borne out in population policy. The centrality of population – the 
“numbers must count” – to apartheid policies meant that population policy, particularly, 
was affected by internal conflict between various government ministries with competing 
aims and agendas, as well as being affected by changes in international demographic 
thinking. The internal conflicts waged within the ruling party created a host of legislative 
and administrative frameworks that were far from entirely consistent with each other. 
Accordingly, after 1960 it is hard to divine a clear set of policies on population that was 
implemented with any determination or coherence. In keeping with the need for quasi-
scientific justifications of apartheid, the external face of many population policies 
reflected trends in the international development and demographic theories of the day. 
While these trends can be identified within the rhetoric and population policies adopted, 
the attempts to accommodate these within the broader structure of apartheid policies 
were generally heedless of any contradictions between them and government policy in 
other areas. 
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The adoption of the rhetoric of the “population bomb” and the arguments in 
favour of instituting family planning programmes in the late 1960s and early 1970s again 
indicate that – at least in the early and middle parts of the apartheid era – population 
policy in the country was broadly in alignment with that emerging in the United States. 
The fact that a particular path of evolution of official discourse on population questions 
so closely mirrored that in the United States is hardly surprising.  
As Szreter (1993) has argued, the inversion of the development-fertility nexus in 
the United States in the early 1950s was driven as much by the need for demographic 
research to be relevant to policy formulation, as by the feared consequences of 
communist or socialist uprisings across the developing world. These fears had particular 
resonance in a South Africa that, from the early 1960s increasingly constructed the 
external threat to the country in terms of the rooi gevaar – the “red peril”. Commencing 
with the Suppression of Communism Act (an almost McCarthy-ite piece of paranoid 
legislation) in 1950, and subsequent banning and imprisonment of people with 
communist leanings, the South African government sought – particularly in the wake of 
the granting of independence to many African countries in the 1960s and their 
subsequent alliance with the Eastern Bloc – to emphasise South Africa’s strategic 
importance to Western interests. Thus, it is hardly surprising that this general fear of 
communism also found its way into population policy, as it had in the United States. 
After its expulsion from the Commonwealth, and becoming a republic in 1961, South 
Africa looked increasingly to America as its ideological lodestone. Thus, the South 
African government made much of being among the last West-aligned countries in 
Africa, and emphasised its strategic importance both in terms of its mineral wealth and 
its geographical location at the foot of Africa12. On some levels, the strategy worked, as 
can be seen from the policy of “constructive engagement” adopted towards South 
Africa by the Reagan and Thatcher governments after 1980.  
From the mid-1970s onwards, as the dominant orthodoxy of demographic theory 
was broken down, and replaced not with one but many competing theories, the 
formulation of population policy in South Africa became increasingly detached from the 
international mainstream. No doubt this was in part due to South Africa’s growing 
international isolation. However, from then on, the internal conflict over population 
                                                 
12 The Suez Crisis in 1956, which the South African government used in its propaganda, is one such example. While the canal was 
blocked, the Cape Sea Route briefly became the main route of transport of oil from the Middle East to Europe and the Americas. 
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policy in the country became increasingly apparent through the rest of the apartheid era. 
Van Rensburg’s rebuke of calls for higher White fertility, and the President’s Council 
Report, which (despite its internal inconsistencies) appeared to suggest that in order to 
meet demographic ends, the structure of apartheid South Africa would have to be 
altered fundamentally, are just two examples. 
Thus, the rhetoric on population in South Africa can be seen to have occurred in 
two distinct phases. The first, lasting from the Second World War through to the mid-
1970s saw the application of the international orthodoxy to the South African context, 
albeit with a spin placed on it to render it superficially compatible with apartheid 
policies. The second phase, from the mid-1970s through to the demise of apartheid, was 
characterised by a shift towards formulation of population policy informed by internal 
political and economic considerations, and – occasionally – a return to neo-Malthusian 
theory. 
 
The arguments advanced in this chapter concur generally with those made by Youssef 
Courbage (2001). He also identifies the secrecy and confidentiality attached to 
demographic research in apartheid South Africa, and posits that apartheid 
demographers were aware of the political sensitivity of their analyses. Thus, according to 
him,  
Those Afrikaner demographers who shared the vision of 
government preferred not to unpack the demographic realities 
for the general public … the officially sponsored demographic 
analyses never exposed the real reasons for the population 
policy. Rather than give the political reasons, containment of 
the black population and maintenance of White supremacy, 
Malthusian arguments were advanced: the demographic 
explosion was far exceeding [South Africa’s] economic 
potential, and was environmentally devastating. (Courbage, 
2001:12, translated) 
The lengths to which South African demographers went to avoid highlighting the 
impact of apartheid policies on demographic outcomes suggests that they became 
increasingly aware that the structure of South African society from the 1950s onwards 
was not particularly conducive to fertility decline. It thus becomes imperative to 
examine that structure, and its associated institutions in order to comprehend fully the 
nature of the South African fertility decline. Understanding South African population 
policy and the contradictions that it embodied, combined with an analysis of institutions 
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that affect fertility, provides the essential insight into why the South African fertility 
decline followed its distinctive course.  
More importantly though, the lengthening of birth intervals together with the fact 
that an increase in African women’s use of contraception did not result in the fertility 
decline so desired by the government suggests that over the years from 1965, African 
women unintentionally undermined government family planning polices. Rather than 
using contraception for fertility limitation, as the government wanted them to, the 
provision of modern contraception offered women a very real means of asserting 
greater control over their lives in a situation where such control was rarely available to 
them. The nature of institutional effects on the lives and fertility of African women are 
explored in the next chapter.  
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6 THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FERTILITY 
DECLINE 
This chapter applies the framework on the effect of institutions on fertility described in 
Chapter 2 to the specific case of the decline in fertility in South Africa over the last fifty 
years. In keeping with the need for an historically-situated analysis, the chapter builds on 
the material presented in the preceding chapter, which traced the rise and evolution of 
population policies in South Africa over the course of the 20th century, paying particular 
attention to the years between 1948 and 1990.  
The analysis in the previous chapter of South African population policy from the 
1950s shows, as McNicoll (1994) and Greenhalgh (1995b) have argued, the importance 
of understanding local demographic dynamics in the wider context of international and 
national planning priorities and institutional change. While such investigations have 
seldom been undertaken in sub-Saharan Africa, Lesthaeghe and Eelens (1985) have 
pointed to the need for institutional analysis to expand our understanding of fertility 
transitions in Africa:  
The restructuring of social organisation and the functional 
adaptation of institutions are at present unfolding in sub-
Saharan Africa, be it of course along different tracks than in 
Western Europe. In our opinion, those responsible for social 
analyses and for formulating policies would be well advised to 
look into these matters more closely and to correct the bias of 
putting too much trust in the power of national governments 
and their new bureaucratic agencies for organising the new 
preventive checks in Africa. (Lesthaeghe and Eelens, 1985:49) 
Chapter 5 demonstrated how apartheid population policies represented a shifting 
syncretism of international thought and (internally-contested) national ideology. This 
chapter examines the effect on the fertility decline of institutions specific to South 
Africa under apartheid, and proposes that an institutional analysis of the South African 
fertility decline provides answers to three important, and related, questions: 
• Why has the South African fertility transition taken as long as it has? 
• Why did African women demand and adopt modern contraception methods 
when they did? 
• Why have birth intervals increased massively since the 1960s? 
This chapter therefore addresses directly the effect of institutions on the pace and 
nature of the South African fertility decline, and presents an analysis of the effect that 
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key apartheid institutions exerted on African South Africans, and hence on their fertility 
and childbearing strategies. The first five sections present analyses of the effect of these 
institutions on fertility in South Africa. The final section (6.6) synthesises this material, 
contextualised by the discussions in the previous chapter into a coherent explanation of 
the particularities and peculiarities of the South African fertility decline. In doing so, it is 
argued that the current trends in South African fertility and childbearing are the path-
dependent consequences of the policies, programmes and actions of the apartheid state 
since 1948. 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, fertility and fertility change are not determined solely at the level 
of the individual, but are also affected by social formations and institutions. The 
imperative to investigate the institutional characteristics, and to situate individuals’ 
reproductive behaviour in its institutional context, is possibly even greater in South 
Africa where, in Bozzoli’s phrase, “the forces of structure and agency are so unevenly 
balanced” (Bozzoli, 1991:2). 
No previous attempt has been made to understand the specific effects of 
apartheid institutions on South African fertility. While rigorous analysis of the South 
African fertility decline of necessity has to be contextualised with reference to the nature 
of the apartheid state over the last half century, little attention has been paid to the role 
played by the state and social institutions in determining the course of the South African 
fertility decline. 
Other researchers have investigated aspects of the relationship between the 
apartheid polity and population processes in South Africa, although they have tended to 
force macro-level considerations into the background. For example, Chimere-Dan 
(1993a) discusses in general terms the fact that apartheid education and the migrant 
labour system may have contributed to the slow pace of fertility decline. However, his 
analysis does not identify, specify or investigate the mechanisms whereby this may have 
occurred. One exception is the work of Carol Kaufman (1996, 1998, 2000), which sets 
out the social and political context in which African women adopted modern forms of 
contraception, as well as investigating the community-level effects associated with 
women’s use of contraception through applying multilevel models to the 1987-9 DHS 
data. 
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In addition to the list of institutions set out by McNicoll and listed in Chapter 2, 
others need to be considered to reflect the specificities of the South African situation. 
The most important of these are the institutional aspects of gender relations precipitated 
by apartheid. With the history of population policies presented earlier, and taking 
McNicoll’s framework for the analysis of the institutional determinants of fertility as a 
starting point, it is possible to construct a more detailed picture of the dynamics of the 
South African fertility transition. 
6.1 Institutional endowments 
The history of South African economic, social and political development fits none of 
McNicoll’s hypothesised institutional archetypes neatly. While ostensibly claiming to be 
adhering to a “traditional capitalist” development strategy, the South African state’s 
active intervention in all areas of personal and public life does not square well with the 
laissez-faire attitude assumed to be typical of such strategies. On the contrary, the 
apartheid state systematically set out to expand state power at the expense of other 
social institutions. In addition, while the state frequently claimed that it was following a 
path of capitalist development, several aspects of that strategy had more in common 
with statist developmental projects. First, the state’s policies of racialised development 
systematically denied access to capital to most South Africans. Second, as O’Meara 
(1996) has argued, in the years after 1948 the form of capitalism espoused was not 
directed at corporations, but rather was a variant of state capitalism, aimed particularly 
at establishing and entrenching Afrikaner business interests to further bolster support 
for the state. Simultaneously, the size of the civil service was expanded rapidly and a 
great many parastatal and quasi-statal organisations (such as the state-owned Iron and 
Steel Corporation) were established or recapitalised by the state.  
6.2 State power: regularity and duress 
Building on the exposition in Chapter 2, this section examines the role of the state in 
promoting fertility decline in South Africa in the years after 1948, as an instance of 
McNicoll’s analysis of state-driven fertility decline through regularity or duress. 
Application of this framework to the dynamics of the South African fertility 
decline suggests that one of the most important reasons for the slow decline in the level 
of South African fertility is that, from the 1950s, the apartheid state lacked both the 
inclination and the will to regularise its relations with Africans. Indeed, on many 
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dimensions, the state’s relationship with Africans during the apartheid era can be 
described in fairness as being the exact antithesis of regularity. The state engaged in 
arbitrary and unpredictable denials of basic human rights and freedoms, encouraged the 
breakdown of alternative social institutions (out of fear of them being used to 
undermine the state) and compounded insecurity about property and residential rights 
through its use of forced removals and the Pass Laws. Likewise, policies on education, 
employment and urban residence were, in terms of their impact on Africans, both 
unpredictable and arbitrary. Furthermore, the state’s internal security apparatus 
compromised interpersonal relations (and hence the creation and maintenance of social 
capital) within the African community by fostering distrust, division and suspicion. The 
maintenance of the migrant labour system, too, did much to undermine the role of the 
family as a repository of social capital, both within and beyond the household. These 
facets of state activity, combined with the migrant labour system, thus effectively made 
long-term planning on the part of individual women and families in relation to 
reproduction impossible.  
The apartheid state was equally ineffective at using duress as a means to achieving 
its desired fertility outcomes. For all of its repressive tendencies and coercive capacity, 
its lack of political legitimacy among the African population and a heightened sensitivity 
to charges of racial genocide reduced the state’s capacity to force or coerce individuals 
into particular forms and patterns of reproductive behaviour. This impotence, it must be 
noted, stands in stark contrast with the state’s ability to reach into almost every other 
sphere of Africans’ lives during the height of the apartheid era. There was no ‘one-child’ 
policy as in China, nor the incentivisation of sterilisation (as in India), nor could the 
state realistically appeal to Africans’ patriotism or to the national interest in order to 
effect a rapid change in fertility.  
 
In terms of its inability to promote regularity or exercise duress, the apartheid state was 
no different from other states in sub-Saharan Africa. What does set the apartheid state 
apart from those others is its institutional structure. Whereas other sub-Saharan African 
states demonstrated tendencies towards “lineage dominance” and prebendalist politics – 
what Bayart (1992) calls the “politics of the belly” – the South African state exhibited 
neither of these features to the extent seen elsewhere in the sub-continent, although by 
some measures, occasionally the apartheid state certainly did exhibit prebendalist and 
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kleptocratic tendencies. Furthermore, the South African state was, and remains, more 
industrialised, and its state structures more entrenched and less prone to instability than 
those in other African countries. As a result, although other African states also lacked 
the ability to enforce or coerce desired patterns of childbearing and fertility, these states 
never had the potential to reach into the household as the state in apartheid South 
Africa did. A further difference is that, unlike other African states, the apartheid state 
actively sought to exclude Africans from White civil society, while simultaneously 
undermining the building of a strong institutional power base within local African 
communities. 
McNicoll’s discussion of regularity and duress in sub-Saharan Africa holds South 
Africa up as the exception testing the rule by quoting Caldwell’s observation that South 
Africa’s family planning programme is the “only sub-Saharan national family planning 
programme comparable in intensity to those in Asia” (Caldwell (1994:13) in McNicoll 
(1996:22)). However, both McNicoll and Caldwell miss the fact that while the South 
African family planning programmes were indeed intense (insofar as they made modern 
contraception widely and cheaply available to a broad section of the population) and 
driven by a strong desire to promote African fertility decline, the programmes did not 
challenge the structural constraints that African women faced as a result of the 
impositions of apartheid.  
From this perspective, it is not surprising that despite their intensity, the 
population programmes implemented in 1974 and 1984 were incapable of delivering the 
results desired by the state, and that these programmes were subverted by the local 
populace. 
 
The review of the literature set out in Chapter 2 set out five paths identified by 
McNicoll (1996) whereby the state could affect, or gain purchase on, the pace of fertility 
decline. While aspects of each of these paths can be identified in the assessment of state 
action in South Africa under apartheid, the direction of their effects was contradictory. 
Only through the first path identified by McNicoll, the development, funding and 
management of population programmes, can the apartheid state be seen to have 
consciously sought to influence the level of fertility. As Chapter 5 has shown, the state 
had sought to implement family planning policies from the mid-1960s, but had been 
held back by its fear of being accused of promoting “racial genocide”. The programmes 
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that were implemented have been described, both internally and externally, as “intense” 
and “vigorous”. Both the 1974 National Family Planning and 1984 Population and 
Development Programmes sought to reduce African fertility through encouraging the 
use of contraception, and promoting the ideal of smaller family sizes. The second route 
– the socio-legal and administrative regime maintained by the state – corresponds 
broadly with his earlier discussion of regularity and duress, described above. As that 
discussion has shown, state actions in this regard were not conducive to extending its 
purchase on the pace of fertility decline. 
Apartheid policies in other areas were neutral to, or incompatible with, their desire 
for lower African fertility. Certainly, apartheid policies sought to maintain and entrench 
inequity and inequality along racial lines, thereby (according to McNicoll’s third 
pathway) obstructing the potential for faster fertility decline. Likewise in terms of the 
fourth mechanism whereby the state can affect fertility, apartheid policies were 
incompatible with a conscious attempt to reduce African fertility. The maintenance of a 
system of migrant labour and controls on urbanisation (inter alia), strongly affected the 
economic wellbeing of Africans. Public expenditure and transfer payments that 
encouraged lower African fertility were too all intents and purposes non-existent. 
Regarding White fertility, however, the state’s policies were – for a while in the late 
1960s – explicitly pro-natalist. The “Baby for Botha” campaign, and Robbertse’s call for 
fiscal incentives for higher White fertility is one side of the state’s attempts to gain 
purchase on the fertility transition through changing the economics of childbearing. 
These, and the purported threats to symbols of (White) national identity, what Benedict 
Anderson (1991) famously labelled the “imagined community”, were especially potent in 
government appeals for higher White fertility in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
Hence, according to this rubric, the opinion set out in the preceding chapter that 
population policy in South Africa was neither aided nor informed by a systematic, 
consistent or coherent set of government policies is reinforced. However, these were 
not the only impediments to lower African fertility that arose as a consequence of 
apartheid policies, as is discussed in the following sections. 
6.3 Systems of power and authority 
A distinctive characteristic of South Africa is the manner in which many traditional 
institutions of local organisation and authority were replaced by state bureaucracies. As 
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argued in the previous chapter, apartheid policies after 1960 had sought to undo the 
‘negative’ effects of the detribalisation of Africans, which were seen to occur as a result 
of exposure to Western ideals and lifestyles. Thus, part of the justification for the 
settlement of Africans in bantustans was to preserve and maintain ‘traditional’ African 
culture. Accordingly, the apartheid state did not wish to entirely “capture” (in Goran 
Hyden’s (1983) phrase) the African population and African social institutions or to 
establish hegemonic social control over Africans, since the imposition of total 
bureaucratic control from above would negate the policy of “retribalisation”. Thus, the 
extension of state power and control was far from complete. While the state desired 
control over the African population (and particularly desired control over African 
fertility), it was not in its interest to capture African civil society entirely. In any event, 
any such attempt would most likely have foundered because of the state’s illegitimacy in 
the eyes of the African population.  
The result was an uneasy co-existence between different forms of authority at a 
local level. On the one hand, apartheid bureaucrats and township administrators 
imposed control on Africans by taking on many of the functions of traditional authority, 
for example the resolution of land claims, the maintenance of a criminal justice system 
and the enforcement of policies on urbanisation and employment. On the other, 
however, the apartheid state kept and maintained a parallel justice system based on 
African “Customary Law” to deal with ‘tribal’ matters which sought to ensure the 
preservation of “traditional” culture. 
The split of authority between bureaucrats and ‘tribal leaders’, coupled with the 
detribalising influences of urban life, undermined both the family and traditional forms 
of authority based on patriarchy and gerontocracy, as well as the formation of social 
capital. From the early 1950s onwards, concern was expressed at the high rate of 
teenage pregnancy among urban African women and the breakdown in parental 
authority. Eloff, for example, described the problem thus: 
One of the distinguishing features of the community life of the 
urban Bantu is the high rate of extramarital births. The available 
features among the big cities of the Union show that nearly as 
many children are born outside of marriage as are born within 
marriage. By far the biggest percentage of these children is born 
to unmarried mothers. 
There are different factors that are responsible for this 
situation. The most important is probably the lack of control by 
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both elders and the community. To what extent the control 
over young people has weakened can be seen when it is 
compared with the position in tribal life. In tribal life, with its 
solid local group and the peer group within which young people 
played and worked together, it was difficult to initiate a 
personal relationship, or to do anything without the knowledge 
of the rest of the group. The group controlled the relationship 
between young man and girl and it was difficult to go further 
than the permissible form of sexual intercourse. The offender 
would be punished by a powerful social condemnation. In the 
cities, parental discipline has weakened, the peer groups have 
disappeared and there is no integrated community that can pass 
strong social censure. (Eloff, 1953a:27-28*) 
Detribalisation, and excessive individualism were held responsible for much of 
this breakdown: 
The native has also not succeeded in disporting himself in such 
a way that individualism, which is typical of the white culture, 
does not cause damage to the functioning of the family. 
Members of the family have a strong tendency towards 
individualistic actions, but now there is no balance to ensure 
that their individual behaviour can be co-ordinated for the 
benefit of the family as a whole. (Eloff, 1953a:37*)  
and 
The majority of parents in the cities did not enjoy any 
education, and they did not grow up in the city. The school, the 
cinema, the storybook or the cartoon strip and many other 
factors open up new worlds to the child, and these form ideas 
and interests which are alien to the parent. There are thus no 
communal thoughts, insights or universal interest between 
parent and child. (Eloff, 1953b:17*) 
These concerns no doubt helped to encourage and promote the shift in policy 
towards “retribalisation” and “Bantu education”, as well as further bolstering the 
argument in favour of further restrictions on African urbanisation, and presaged the 
recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission by a few years. 
Thus, the failure of the state to fully capture African social institutions limited its 
ability to influence demographic behaviour within the family, either through promoting 
regularity or through the utilisation of coercive measures. The enforced complexity of 
relationships that Africans held to the land further attenuated this power. 
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6.4 Migrant labour, the family, and family structure 
Many histories of South Africa focus on the alienation of Africans from the land after 
the1913 Land Act had restricted Africans to 13 percent of the area of South Africa. In 
fact, as both Beinart (1994) and Keegan (1988) have pointed out, the issues around land 
were more complex because while ownership may have been restricted, settlement and 
share-cropping rights often remained unchanged. The implications of this retained 
articulation1 certainly limited the ability of the state to affect the family economy, and 
hence the economics of supply and demand for children.  
The family, or the household, is the single most important link between 
individuals and the state in the analysis of fertility. Along with localised forms of 
authority, the family acts as a filter between the actions of the state and the behaviour of 
individuals. As McNicoll argues, “fertility decisions are made within a family setting, 
subject to intergenerational and intergender power relations, to the exigencies of the 
family economy, and to local interpretations of often-elastic cultural prescriptions. If 
you would understand what happens, cherchez la famille” (McNicoll, 1996:1). 
In South Africa, the concepts of family and household were (and frequently still 
are) elastic. To define what constitutes a household is probably even more difficult in 
South Africa than in other sub-Saharan African countries. The migrant labour system, 
combined with the strict controls on urbanisation, resulted in what have been termed 
“stretched households”, domestic units that are connected across space by kinship and 
remittances of income (Spiegel, Watson and Wilkinson, 1996). In this formulation, the 
household is no longer a spatially discrete entity, but one that exists simultaneously in 
multiple spaces, economies, provinces and urban/rural morphologies. 
The rise of “stretched households”, O’Meara suggests, was not an unintended 
consequence of apartheid policies: 
At the core of this central aspect of apartheid – the concern to 
regulate the flow of black labour – were attempts to control the 
urbanisation of African women. Women were excluded from 
the system of influx control until the 1960s. However, as early 
as the 1930s, the National Party and other bodies used the 
massive inflow of African women to the cities, and the growing 
proportion of females among the urban African population, as 
the principal index of the permanency of urbanisation. The 
apartheid effort to control and direct the labour supply rested 
                                                 
1 Indeed, it was important to apartheid planners that urban migrants’ links to the homelands remained unbroken to inhibit 
permanent settlement in White urban areas, and to justify the resettlement and “retribalisation” of African South Africans in the 
homelands.  
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heavily on reducing the numbers of African women in the 
cities… The development of the ‘Native Reserves’ was seen as 
crucial to stemming the flows of black labour to the cities – and 
particularly of confining African women outside of the urban 
areas. (O’Meara, 1996:70) 
As a result of this stretching of households, spousal separation was common, with 
men tending to be absent from their homes for long periods of time, leaving women 
behind to tend the land and raise the children more or less unsupported except for 
remittances. The extent to which apartheid society disrupted Africans’ partnerships bore 
severe implications for gender relations, as will be discussed in Section 6.5. 
The restrictions on the urbanisation of African women, the Pass Laws and forced 
removals also had a profound effect on sex ratios2 in both urban and rural areas. 
Simkins (1983) has calculated estimates of these ratios using the 1950, 1960 and 1970 
South Africa census data (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Sex ratios for the African South African population, by year and 
place of residence 
Census year Metropolitan Areas Towns Rural Areas Homelands 
1950 166 (16.8) 116 (8.7) 117 (34.9) 72 (39.7) 
1960 140 (20.2) 104 (9.1) 112 (32.1) 76 (38.6) 
1970 130 (18.2) 131 (8.9) 110 (24.5) 79 (48.4) 
Source:  Simkins (1983:53-7). Figures in parentheses indicate the proportion of African South Africans 
(of both sexes) living in each area. 
 
However, if children under the age of 15 are excluded from these ratios (since 
approximately equal numbers of children of each sex are likely to be found, and hence 
tend to bias the ratio towards 100), the sex ratio among adults suggests an even more 
extreme pattern: 
Table 6.2 Sex ratios for the African South African population over the age of 
15, by year and place of residence 
Census year Metropolitan Areas Towns Rural Areas Homelands 
1950 201 (21.5) 129 (9.4) 131 (33.7) 51 (35.3) 
1960 149 (23.7) 110 (9.8) 121 (31.3) 56 (35.2) 
1970 148 (22.3) 155 (10.3) 116 (23.4) 62 (44.0) 
Source:  Based on data presented in Simkins (1983:53-7). Figures in parentheses indicate the proportion 
of African South Africans (of both sexes) aged over 15 living in each area. 
 
The data in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 show clearly the effects of influx control and 
other government policies on the spatial distribution of the African South African 
population between 1950 and 1970. The proportion of the African population living in 
                                                 
2 The number of men per 100 women. 
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White rural areas decreased, while that living in the homelands increased. Substantial 
numbers of women urbanised between 1950 and 1960, since the proportion of Africans 
in metropoles and towns increased, and the sex ratio declined. Despite the hardening of 
influx control and the extension of Pass Laws to women after 1960, the proportion of 
women in metropolitan areas remained approximately constant, suggesting that some 
women were able to find employment or that sufficient circular migration was taking 
place to keep the sex ratio approximately constant.  
The situation in towns was somewhat different. Urbanisation occurred gradually 
over the twenty years, but significant numbers of African women were forcibly removed 
from towns to the homelands after 1960.  
 
One of the enigmas arising from the 1974 fertility study (Lötter and van Tonder, 1976) 
was the relatively small differential between urban and rural fertility. The study found 
that the (age-standardised) mean numbers of live births was 3.1 in urban areas, and 3.4 
in rural areas. Lötter and van Tonder suggest that the smallness of the differential is 
attributable to a breakdown in social norms leading to higher adolescent fertility in 
urban areas (although this is unclear from their data); higher coital frequency in urban 
areas; and the restricted effects of modernisation on urban African fertility, no doubt a 
consequence of state maintenance of aspects of traditional authority and policies on 
urbanisation: 
In short: Where urban dwellers remain oriented towards 
traditional values and norms which are internalised under tribal 
conditions, a decline in fertility does not follow automatically or 
mechanically. (Lötter and van Tonder, 1976:44) 
Contrary to this position, Kaufman (1996) is unconvinced that the narrow 
differential can be attributed to these factors, suggesting rather that the comparatively 
high levels of urban fertility reflect a breakdown in traditional breastfeeding and 
postpartum abstinence norms, resulting in higher fecundability.  
The evidence presented above suggests a further explanation: that the sheer 
imbalance of the sex ratios had a depressive effect on rural fertility, while increasing 
urban fertility. This is in accordance with findings from the Lesotho WFS in 1977, 
where it was suggested that spousal separation reduced the level of marital fertility by at 
around 9 percent (Timæus and Graham, 1989). 
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6.5 Gender relations 
The breakdown of traditional authority, its replacement by bureaucratised control, and 
the effects of apartheid land policies in conjunction with the migrant labour system and 
the government’s anti-urbanisation stance had a particularly profound effect on gender 
relations. Ethnographic accounts provide a rich seam of data on marital disruption and 
changing gender relations during the apartheid era. These changes can be charted 
through oral histories of older women collected in the 1970s, in which a recurrent 
theme is their frustration with what has been termed their “triple oppression” – along 
lines of class, race and gender. Central to these frustrations was their anger at being left 
literally holding the baby, and the fecklessness of men in their demands for higher 
fertility.  
One of the key manifestations of this change is the rise in households headed by 
women: according to the 1998 DHS, 42 percent of all households surveyed were headed 
by women, while 51 percent of African women interviewed in that survey lived in a 
household headed by a woman. Much of the literature on female-headed households 
adopts an overly simplistic mode of analysis. Many such households arise when women 
are widowed, abandoned, or divorced and many of them are very poor. It is wrong, 
however, to view all of them as such, since women may become heads of households as 
a result of conscious decisions made and initiated by them to achieve their economic 
and social ends. Van der Vliet (1991), for example, describes how perceptions of, and 
attitudes towards, modernity and traditionality (and any conflict inherent in this binary) 
are deeply gendered in a South African context, and how women, especially in urban 
areas, have tried systematically to claim greater autonomy and freedom for themselves 
and, in so doing, break out of historical patriarchal and social constraints.  
In her doctoral thesis, Muthwa (1995) also commented on this desire by women 
for greater autonomy at the expense of marital cohabitation. She observed that for many 
women heading households in Soweto, the perceived advantages of marriage were 
outweighed by its perceived disadvantages. For her informants, heading a household as 
a woman, while socially fraught and ambiguous on many levels, afforded women 
improved qualities of life through increased freedom, independence and potential for 
financial planning and budgeting, even if their material well-being did not improve. At 
the same time, while Muthwa found that women became heads of household largely as a 
result of marital breakdown, in the majority of cases it was the woman who initiated the 
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split. This suggests that becoming a female head is often the consequence of choices, 
informed by their institutional context, made by the women themselves. 
Other sources corroborate Muthwa’s and van der Vliet’s findings. African 
women’s descriptions of their daily lives in the 1980s describe very clearly their 
alienation from men: 
‘In fact I am no longer interested in men. I am still tired from 
my husband. When I look at a man now, I feel dizzy … it is 
happier without him’ – D.D 
‘[The father of my child] doesn’t help me to support the child. 
Now I don’t want him to help me because I have a somebody, 
a boyfriend who helps me. But I won’t marry him.’ – S.P 
‘I am not prepared to marry again. It creates more problems for 
me. What if I get another irresponsible husband?’ – R.R 
(Vukani Makhosikazi Collective, 1985:137-8) 
 
The tenuous nature of women’s rights to live in urban areas (unemployment was 
sufficient to be “endorsed out”) and the limited employment opportunities available to 
them (the single biggest form of employment of African women was as domestic 
servants, who had neither job security nor legal protection from summary dismissal), 
affected their desire for modern contraceptive methods. Since pregnancy almost 
certainly meant dismissal, and dismissal raised the possibility of being removed from the 
city, adoption of contraception to delay childbearing became an economic survival 
strategy for urban African women, as both Caldwell and Caldwell (1993) and Kaufman 
(1996) have argued. Rural African women faced similar pressures to delay their 
childbearing. The substantial gender imbalance in rural areas meant that the homelands 
were populated largely by the very young, the very old, the infirm and women. The 
absence of male labour to help with ploughing and other agricultural tasks rendered 
even subsistence farming difficult. Husbands and partners frequently abandoned their 
women, with remittances to rural areas often petering out as men established alternative 
households in urban areas. Childbearing thus became a liability for rural women too, if 
they were to avoid poverty. 
6.6 Conclusion: The institutional effects of apartheid on the South 
African fertility decline 
The institutional characteristics of the South African polity between 1950 and 1990 
explain why the South African fertility decline has progressed so slowly. The slow pace 
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of decline in fertility is not simply the product of Bantu education and influx control (as 
Chimere-Dan has argued), nor is it as anomalous as suggested by the Caldwells 
(Caldwell and Caldwell, 1993). The Caldwells had contrasted the high level of African 
fertility with the extent and scope of the 1974 National Family Planning Programme and 
the 1984 Population and Development Programme (what they deemed to be an “Asian-
type” programme, with a “higher density of services than is available anywhere in Asia 
or indeed anywhere else in the world”) and the relatively high level of socio-economic 
development in the country. They proposed three explanations as to why South African 
fertility had not fallen further.  
Their first explanation is that widespread community and political resistance from 
Africans undermined the government’s family planning programme. This explanation is 
flawed on several grounds. First, the rapid rates of uptake of modern contraceptive 
methods by African women in the early 1970s, and the high rates of current use 
subsequently reported, are incongruent with widespread resistance to the use of family 
planning. Second, the absence of strong internal resistance to apartheid (no doubt in 
part a consequence of the extent to which apartheid disrupted African communities and 
actively hindered the formation of strong community culture and local institutions) 
makes the possibility of resistance to the family planning programmes implausible. 
Third, historical evidence suggests that African opposition to family planning from the 
1960s onwards was sporadic and muted and that White fears of a generalised resistance 
to family planning among Africans were, to say the least, overstated. Most frequently, 
African opposition to family planning was articulated in terms of the racialised discourse 
on population, rather than on the merits of contraception per se. (One of the more 
trenchant articulations of this was a polemic written for the “African Communist”, 
which referred to family planning in South Africa as being “genocidal” (‘Letsema’, 
1982). It is interesting, too, to note that the language of “racial genocide” adopted by 
this author has a direct antecedent in the fears first expressed by White politicians in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s). Significantly, opposition to family planning was found 
predominantly among men and was not representative of a more general African 
opposition. This suggests that, along lines similar to those argued by van der Vliet, use 
of contraception was perceived by men to constitute a further threat against their 
traditional control over women and women’s reproduction. Women favoured the use of 
the injectable contraceptive (Depo-Provera) – not least because compliance was easy, 
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protection against pregnancy was afforded for long periods at a time and, since it was 
‘invisible’, the method was less likely to arouse male opposition (Kaufman, 1996:46ff). 
The second explanation offered by the Caldwells was that fertility control among 
African South Africans was “pointless”, since the social stratification of South African 
society made social mobility impossible. This explanation does not square with 
economic histories of South Africa. Both Lipton (1985) and Beinart (1994) discuss the 
changes that occurred in South African society, and the South African labour market 
particularly, between 1970 and 1990. They present convincing arguments that social 
mobility (while difficult and obstructed) was not impossible. Importantly, this period 
was characterised simultaneously by both political repression and the gradual freeing up 
of the South African social order, as economic growth systematically undid racist job-
reservation policies and the government lost the political will to enforce restrictions on 
African urbanisation. Hence, it is unlikely that barriers to social mobility can be held 
responsible for the slow pace of the African fertility decline in South Africa. In any 
event, the rapid continued increase in birth intervals demonstrated in Chapter 4 gives 
the lie to this argument. It is clear that African women were using modern forms of 
contraception to modify the pattern of their childbearing. 
Likewise, the Caldwells’ third explanation, that there were “profound cultural and 
social differences” in South Africa, resulting in a “refusal” by Africans to limit their 
fertility has been falsified by more recent data. The lack of women’s opposition to 
contraceptive use for either birth spacing or fertility limitation is indicated in the results 
from demographic surveys conducted after 1970.  
 
Rather than being explanations, the Caldwells’ observations are indicative of the 
institutional dynamics that were at work in South Africa over the apartheid era. The 
limited ability of women to change their own position in society, the precarious nature 
of urban and rural women’s existence, together with fundamental and far-reaching 
changes in gender relations are thus responsible for the rise in demand for modern 
forms of contraception identified by the government in the mid-1960s.  
However, while African women certainly availed themselves of the contraception 
provided by the government, the reasons underlying that uptake warrant further 
analysis. Two distinct motives for contraceptive use have been identified in the 
demographic literature. The first is parity-specific limitation, that is using contraception 
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to prevent a subsequent birth once a desired parity has been achieved. However, the 
material presented in Chapters 3 and 4 provides no evidence that African South 
Africans practised parity-specific fertility limitation. Thus, although government surveys 
reported that African women were in favour of using contraception for this purpose, 
practice did not necessarily follow.  
The second motive is the use of contraception to increase the interval between 
births. The possibility that African women were using contraception for this purpose 
was missed by many commentators of the time (and certainly by the planners behind the 
population programmes), who failed to draw a distinction between contraceptive use for 
birth spacing and use for fertility limitation. An article in the South African Medical 
Journal by van Dongen (1975) is a case in point: he argued that Africans needed to 
make use of family planning clinics in order to reduce population growth and failed to 
appreciate that women may have been using contraception for entirely different 
motives. While there was some evidence that women in Southern Africa may have had 
different motives for using contraception, government planners and demographers did 
not pick up on the implications of these findings. Thus, for example, Geraty cited 
evidence from a survey conducted by the Family Planning Association of (then) 
Rhodesia that  
birth control was seen as a measure introduced by the 
Government in order to reduce the Black population… On the 
other hand, family planning, used in the context of spacing 
births, was acceptable and meaningful, since the target 
population was able to associate it with practices that had been 
prevalent in traditional society… (Geraty, 1975:425) 
As has been shown earlier, by the start of the 1970s support for contraceptive use 
to space births was almost universal among African women in metropolitan areas. Thus, 
contraception, while widely desired, was viewed – primarily – as a mechanism for 
spacing children, rather than limiting family size.  
However, in the South African context, this simple dichotomy is inadequate. Both 
currently and historically, during the South African fertility transition, parity-specific 
fertility limitation was not practised. Equally, the pattern of contraceptive use and 
fertility among African South Africans is not entirely consistent with the use of 
contraception for birth spacing. In particular, the increase in birth intervals since the 
1970s suggests that women’s desire to use contraception was not predicated on the age 
of her youngest child. Thus, African women’s decision to use contraception was 
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contingent neither on her parity (i.e. limitation) nor on the age of her youngest child (i.e. 
spacing in the conventional sense). This suggests a third pattern of contraceptive use, 
probably most associated with societies where marital relationships are as severely 
disrupted by institutional dynamics as in South Africa, hinging on women’s desire to 
delay pregnancy and its associated costs sine die, and without consideration for parity or 
age of other children3.  
The conclusion thus drawn here is at variance with that drawn by Bongaarts 
(1997) who argued that, over the course of a fertility transition, birth intervals remain 
“relatively invariant”, with contraceptive use substituting for ‘traditional’ means of 
spacing births – postpartum abstinence and lactational amenorrhoea. Manifestly, birth 
intervals in South Africa have not been invariant over the course of the decline, which 
in turn lends further weight to the argument advanced in earlier chapters that the 
pattern of childbearing in South Africa is qualitatively different from that elsewhere in 
the developing world. 
 
This observation forces us to radically reassess the efficacy and success of the 
population programmes implemented in South Africa. The family planning programmes 
introduced in 1974 and 1984 helped to make modern contraception methods easily and 
widely available to African women. They were effective at least insofar as they assisted 
the rapid uptake of contraception by African women. However, urban African women’s 
demand for contraception predated these programmes. Hence that demand must be 
seen, in some sense, to have arisen from outside the realm of White discourse on 
population. Moreover, there is no evidence that these programmes altered the pace of 
the South African fertility decline. Given that the fundamental reason for the launch of 
those programmes was to provide a vehicle for the rapid decline of African fertility, the 
programmes must be said to have failed.  
Thus, although adoption of contraception from the 1960s onwards was fairly 
rapid by African standards, the effect on the overall level of fertility was less than 
expected because it was used for neither spacing nor limitation, but to avoid becoming 
pregnant for the present. As increasing numbers of women adopted contraception for 
this purpose, the effect was to set in motion a chain of increasingly delayed births. It is 
this process that has led to the slow decline in South African fertility: Bongaarts (1999) 
                                                 
3 I am grateful to Dr Ian Timæus for pointing out this distinction. 
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shows mathematically that a decline in fertility will occur if, in every succeeding year, a 
greater proportion of women delay their birth by a longer time.  
 
The South African fertility decline represents an interesting counterpoint to that seen 
elsewhere in Africa and the developing world, both for the slow pace of decline and for 
the length of birth intervals typically found among women. From an institutional 
perspective, aspects of the decline exhibit similarities with that seen elsewhere in the 
sub-continent. While the state was relatively strong and did not show the same 
prebendal tendencies so often associated with states in sub-Saharan Africa, the inability 
of the South African apartheid state to direct the course of the fertility transition is 
indicative of its failure to fully capture the African population. This failure, combined 
with the contradictory and incompatible ambitions of government policy provides a 
better explanation for the slow pace of the South African fertility decline than simply 
instrumentalist assessments based on the provision of services, and apartheid 
restrictions on spatial mobility. 
Finally, application of the institutional approach to fertility developed in Chapter 2 
further suggests that the pattern of change in African women’s birth intervals since 1970 
has shown path-dependent characteristics. With the collapse of many apartheid 
institutions by the mid-1980s (all attempts at influx control were abandoned in 1986), 
many of the forces impelling women to increase their birth intervals had fallen away by 
1990. If the rise in birth intervals had been simply a response to the conditions faced by 
Africans under apartheid, the changes that have occurred over the last 15 years in the 
South African polity would have alleviated most of those conditions, thereby causing 
median birth intervals to reach a new equilibrium. As shown in Chapter 4, this has not 
happened.  
One possible explanation for this continued increase is that the pattern of 
childbearing precipitated by apartheid has itself become institutionalised, proving to be 
durable and – in some respects – path-dependent. This is tested against other possible 
explanations in the next chapter. 
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7 TRENDS AND DIFFERENTIALS IN BIRTH INTERVALS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA, 1980 - 1998 
The analysis presented in Chapter 4 using a variant of the projected parity progression 
ratio approach has provided compelling and clear evidence as to the lengthening of birth 
intervals in South Africa over the last forty years. That approach, however, does not 
permit the statistical modelling of the trends and differentials in birth interval length 
among African South Africans. The review of the literature on institutional analyses of 
fertility change presented in Chapter 2 suggests that the use of statistical techniques 
should, in McNicoll’s (1992) words, “have a properly subordinated part” in expanding 
our understanding of the process of fertility decline. However, this does not imply that 
such investigations should not be attempted.  
An additional reason exists as to why these investigations should be pursued in 
the South African context. Investigations into birth intervals elsewhere in the 
developing world have demonstrated repeatedly the potential for such analyses to shed 
“major new insights into patterns of reproductive behaviour” (Hobcraft and McDonald, 
1984). A consequence of the poor quality and restricted availability of demographic data 
collected in South Africa (as well as the paucity of demographic skills to analyse those 
data that were collected) is that no investigations of this kind have been attempted with 
South African data before. Hence, any statistical analysis of the trends and differentials 
in birth intervals in South Africa increases our understanding of demographic dynamics 
in South Africa over the last few decades.  
Arising from the material presented in the three preceding chapters, one anomaly 
stands out that can be investigated using the birth history data in the South African 
Demographic and Health Surveys. Chapter 4 showed that the lengthening of birth 
intervals since 1970 continued after the end of apartheid in 1990. However, the analysis 
presented in the last two chapters argued that the increase in birth intervals in South 
Africa was a consequence of apartheid structures and institutions, as women sought to 
delay their childbearing as a survival strategy. These conclusions raise a further question: 
“Why have birth intervals among African South African women continued to increase 
after 1990, and what differentials can be identified in women’s childbearing 
behaviours?”. This chapter seeks to provide an answer to that question through the 
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investigation of the trends and differentials in African women’s birth intervals in South 
Africa between 1980 and 1998.  
The different methodological approaches that have been adopted by other 
researchers in similar investigations (as well as that adopted here) are evaluated in 
Section 7.1, while conceptual issues arising from attempts to model birth intervals are 
discussed in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 describes the process whereby the data from two 
South African Demographic and Health Surveys were manipulated into a form 
appropriate to the methodological approach adopted. Section 7.4 discusses in some 
detail the limitations and pitfalls of the approach adopted. Hypotheses that distinguish 
between different possible accounts are presented in Section 7.5. The remainder of the 
chapter is devoted to the parameterisation and fitting of statistical models to the length 
of women’s birth intervals in South Africa, using the data from the 1987-9 and 1998 
South African Demographic and Health Surveys.  
7.1 Approaches to modelling birth intervals 
The measurement of birth intervals offers up substantial challenges to demographers. In 
the first instance, such analysis requires complex and detailed data sets that only became 
available for developing countries with the collection of data for the World Fertility 
Surveys conducted in the 1970s, and subsequent Demographic and Health Surveys. 
These data (and the increase in computing power available) provided an impetus for 
demographers and statisticians to develop new methods for analysing and interpreting 
the determinants of women’s birth intervals. At the same time, however, even these 
more detailed data are of limited usefulness. Women may have given birth many years 
before the survey, but – while detailed maternity histories are collected – other 
information (including that on factors likely to affect women’s childbearing: 
contraceptive use, marital status and residence among others) is usually only collected 
about women’s current status. 
After attracting substantial interest in the late 1970s and 1980s, the development 
of analytical techniques for the measurement and analysis of birth intervals reached 
something of an impasse by the early 1990s. This is unsurprising. First, the decline in 
fertility worldwide reduced the urgency of developing robust statistical techniques to 
measure and analyse birth intervals. Second, the methodological difficulties encountered 
in the modelling of birth intervals led to a growing belief that attempts to do so were 
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unlikely to be successful. Third, data sufficient for the purpose were not usually 
collected or available. Thus, for example, Rindfuss, Palmore and Bumpass (1989:208) 
came to the conclusion in their review of published papers analysing birth intervals that 
“…until such advances [major investment in prospective data collection] are made, 
attempts to understand differential fertility in terms of the proximate determinants at 
the individual level may be at a dead end”.  
Despite this gloomy assessment, a variety of statistical approaches have been used, 
with greater or lesser success, to test hypotheses relating to differentials in birth 
intervals. Three broad approaches can be identified in the literature, and are discussed 
below. 
7.1.1 Logistic regression 
The first approach that can be used to investigate differentials in birth intervals is 
logistic regression. The record for each birth is expanded to create a record for each of a 
number of time segments. A binary variable is then added to each new record marking 
whether or not a subsequent birth took place in that time segment. This variable is then 
used as the dependent variable in a logistic regression to model the odds of having a 
birth in a given time segment. These odds can readily be converted into standard 
demographic measures, for example probabilities of not having another child in a given 
time interval. Hence, this approach can be viewed as the fitting of multivariate life tables 
to survival data. Palloni (1984) and Guilkey and Rindfuss (1987) have both conducted 
investigations using variants of this approach.  
The resulting predicted probabilities of having a birth in a given time segment of 
length n are analogous to the values of nqx in a life table, where x represents the time 
already elapsed since the preceding birth. The significance of independent variables can 
be determined from the logistic regression, and multivariate life tables can be derived 
based on any combination of the covariates specified in the models. Further, a single 
summary measure, a conditional “expectation of survival” (analogous to the 
conventional life table measure ex) can be derived for each life table, with the closing-out 
of the life table being determined using the approach set out in Guilkey and Rindfuss 
(1987). 
Computationally, models of this form pose few difficulties. However, the method 
does not cope adequately with cases censored by the interview date. These cases are 
assumed to contribute to the exposed-to-risk for the entire interval under examination, 
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but are not in fact exposed for the whole duration. The two other methods that have 
been used in investigations into birth intervals and their determinants deal more 
effectively with this problem. 
7.1.2 Proportional hazards models 
The measurement of survival in a given state, and the accommodation of censored data, 
is one of the foundations of demographic work. Cox’s work on proportional hazards 
models (Cox, 1972) established the statistical framework for the analysis of the 
covariates and determinants of survival times, and thus allowed the modelling and 
testing of hypotheses relating to the covariates of survival phenomena. Proportional 
hazards models offer, at least theoretically, an approach to modelling multivariate 
correlates of survival data, while better accommodating the need to allow for censoring 
than the logistic regression approach outlined above. However, the approach has some 
very specific limitations of its own, which limit its applicability and usefulness. 
Cox’s regression model is defined in terms of a time-dependent hazard, λ(t), and a 
set of covariates, z such that  
λ(t; z) = exp(zβ) · λ0(t), (1) 
where the β are the coefficients of z to be estimated, and λ0(t) is an unknown, 
and unspecified, function giving the hazard when z = 0, the “baseline hazard function”.  
Implicit in the specification of the proportional hazards model is the assumption 
that the hazards for the covariates are proportional to the (unknown) baseline hazard 
function. In other words, the effect of the covariates is assumed to shift the baseline 
hazard function up or down by a constant proportion. In all applications of Cox’s 
model, however, it is essential to test whether or not the proportionality assumption 
holds. Failure to ascertain the validity of the proportionality assumption, or to modify 
the model accordingly (through the use of time-varying covariates), constitutes a severe 
and serious misuse of the method. As Singer and Willett observe,  
researchers should be especially circumspect about the 
tenability of the proportional hazards assumption: estimated 
effects of predictors may be wrong if the adopted model 
incorrectly constrains the log-hazard profiles to be parallel with 
identical shapes. Ignoring such underlying failures can lead to 
incorrect substantive conclusions. (Singer and Willett, 1991:279)  
An examination of recent research on birth intervals that use proportional hazards 
models suggests that many researchers have been less than careful in setting out (or 
even testing) the proportionality assumptions underlying their models. Few papers that 
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examine the determinants of birth intervals set out the models used. An investigation 
into the determinants of birth intervals in two Indian states (Singh, Suchindran, Singh et 
al., 1993), for example, contains no discussion on the validity of the proportionality 
assumption. Ahn and Shariff (1993), on the other hand, present formulae that suggest 
that non-proportionality has been accommodated, but this is nowhere discussed.  
These failings notwithstanding, proportional hazards approaches to the statistical 
analysis of birth intervals became increasingly common in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. In addition to the papers already mentioned, a sizeable body of literature on birth 
intervals exists that has used proportional hazards models with greater or lesser success 
(see, for example, Ofosu (1989) and Trussell, van de Walle and van de Walle (1989)).  
Part of the elegance of the proportional hazards model approach stems from the 
fact that it does not seek to parameterise the underlying failure distribution, since fitting 
a parameterised functional form to the underlying hazard function is not only difficult, 
but potentially computationally messy (Trussell, 1984). However, the baseline hazard 
function in a proportional hazards model can only be estimated indirectly, thereby 
making interpretation of results from such models somewhat more difficult. Finally, 
allowing for time-varying covariates is not analytically simple with the proportional 
hazards framework. This, together with the difficulty of interpreting the results from the 
models and of validating the proportionality assumption suggests that the disadvantages 
of using the proportional hazards approach outweigh the benefits. 
An alternative is an approach that shares many features of Cox proportional 
hazards models, but (despite its own limitations) suffers from none of the serious 
drawbacks outlined above. 
7.1.3 Piecewise log-rate models 
Piecewise log-rate models, as applied to the analysis of birth intervals by Trussell and 
Hammerslough (1983) and set out in more general fashion in Yamaguchi (1991), offer a 
different approach to the models presented above.  
The underlying assumption of the approach is that the hazard (or risk of failure) 
varies between heterogeneous groups, and that the hazard is constant within groups. 
These models form a subclass of Poisson regression techniques, which are suited to 
investigation of the rate at which events occur, where the duration of the exposure to 
risk of an event occurring is of importance.  
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Such an approach has much to recommend it. First, the approach does not 
require the rigorous assumptions involved in the use of proportional hazards models. 
Assumptions of proportionality can be made, but are not essential. Second, the 
approach allows the presentation and calculation of results in terms familiar to 
demographers, since the estimated incidence rates arising from the model can, with 
minor algebraic manipulation, be transformed into probabilities, and thence into familiar 
life table measures. 
A third advantage of using Poisson regression in preference to proportional 
hazards models is that the method is particularly amenable to adaptation to 
accommodate data from more than one survey. By aggregating the number of events 
and the total exposed-to-risk for similar groups of women in different data sets, it is 
possible to combine these data, and thereby permit the direct statistical comparison of 
event histories from more than one data source. This modification to the Poisson 
regression approach can also be applied to methods based on logistic regression, but 
doing so does not remove the overriding objections to the use of the latter approach. 
This flexibility is of particular importance for the investigation being undertaken here, 
where the focus is on secular trends in birth intervals as indicated by the data on 
women’s childbearing collected in two different surveys. The decision to work with 
aggregated data, of course, involves a number of trade-offs, which are set out explicitly 
in Section 7.4.  
 
One fundamental difference between Poisson regression and proportional hazards 
models is the manner in which the incidence or hazard rate is constructed. In the 
former, the log-incidence rate is assumed to be piece-wise constant (hence the 
alternative name for this approach, piece-wise log-rate models) across defined segments 
of the birth interval, whereas the proportional hazard model assumes the hazard to be a 
continuous function.  
The functional form of the piece-wise log-rate model is given by 
ln λ/D (t; z) = α + βt .T + βi .z + βit .T.z (1) 
or, taking the exponential of each side, 
λ/D (t; z) = exp (α + βt .T + βi .z + βit .T.z) (2) 
The left-hand side of the equation represents the estimated incidence rate, being 
the number of events observed (i.e. the number of birth intervals closed in the period of 
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investigation) divided by the aggregated number of person-months exposure in the 
period of investigation. The subscript t refers to the segment of the birth interval being 
considered. 
On the right-hand side of the equation, α is a constant, while the vector z 
represents the covariates (including dummy variables in the case of categorical variables) 
and β(t) a vector of the estimated coefficients, a function of the segment of the birth 
interval under investigation, and T is the time variable. 
The choice of breakpoints to define the time segments is somewhat arbitrary. As 
with logistic regression approaches, very narrow time segments (e.g. a few months) 
permit more accurate modelling of the incidence rate over time since last birth, but also 
increase the possibility of only a few events being observed in each segment, thereby 
resulting in possibly inferior estimates of the hazard. By contrast, wider intervals reduce 
the number of estimated parameters in the model and avoid over-fragmentation of the 
data, but suffer from the effect of the assumption that the hazard remains constant 
within each time segment. The implications of this for the models fitted are discussed in 
Section 7.3.3. 
 
The most important assumption underlying the use of Poisson regression techniques is 
that the distribution of events (i.e. the number of women closing their birth intervals) 
follows a Poisson distribution (Frome, 1983; Holford, 1980). This requires that three 
conditions are met: First, that the number of events in any two non-overlapping 
intervals of time must be independent; second, that the probability that an event occurs 
in any very short interval of time must be approximately proportional to the length of 
that interval; and third, that the probability that two events occur in a very short period 
of time must be much less than that of just a single event occurring (de Groot, 
1986:254-5). In the case of the count data at hand, these conditions are fulfilled. The 
fact that a birth interval is closed in one time segment has no effect on the probability 
that another birth interval (obviously not to the same woman) is closed in the next. For 
the second and third conditions, it stands to reason that the probability that an interval 
is closed in some time segment t is roughly proportional to the length of the segment 
and that in any short time segment, the probability of many events occurring is very 
much less than that of just a few occurrences. 
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Thus, on substantive grounds, there is a strong case to be made that the number 
of events follows a Poisson process. Further evidence in this regard is provided by 
investigations into the distribution of the number of events. According to Dobson 
(1990:43), the number of events can be assumed to be Poisson-distributed if “the 
variability [of the count variable] increases as the number of events increases”. Greene 
(1998) uses this simple rule-of-thumb to investigate the validity of the Poisson 
assumption in her cross-national investigation of the relationship between contraceptive 
use and children ever borne in sub-Saharan Africa. She notes that log-linear Poisson 
regression is preferable to linear regression, as the latter requires the assumption that the 
variance in each cell is constant. In her study she observes that the variance of the 
number of events in each cell is approximately proportional to the mean number of 
events in each cell.  
Initial investigation of the data used in the investigation of birth intervals in South 
Africa confirms that the mean and variance, while proportional, are not equal. As a 
result, the negative-binomial variant of the Poisson regression approach is preferable for 
use in testing the hypotheses set out in Section 7.5. The use of negative-binomial models 
accommodates this over-dispersion of the variance, and is hence the method used here, 
although the change in the estimated parameters arising from the preference of a 
negative binomial functional form over a Poisson functional form is fairly small. 
7.2 Issues in modelling birth intervals 
As mentioned, the analysis of secular trends in birth intervals to assess differentials in 
and determinants of birth intervals poses substantial and significant challenges. In 
particular, appropriate methods of analysing birth interval data need to take biases 
introduced through censoring and selection of data into account to produce robust 
estimates.  
7.2.1 Censoring 
The first issue requiring attention is the treatment of censored cases – that is, birth 
intervals that, at the interview date, have not been closed by a subsequent birth. By its 
very design, the last maternity for all women interviewed in a demographic and health 
survey is censored at the interview date. If these censored cases were to be excluded, 
two biases would be introduced. First, estimates of birth intervals would be biased 
downwards, since the intervals of women who were intending to have additional 
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children but had not yet done so by the interview date would be omitted, thus tending 
to bias against women with longer intervals. Second, the secular trend in birth intervals 
would be distorted, since the open intervals thus excluded relate (by definition) to a 
more recent time-frame than those intervals already closed by a subsequent birth. 
Thus, approaches that allow for the duration of women’s exposure to risk of 
closing an interval are preferable to those that do not. Hence, in the selection of an 
appropriate modelling strategy, a strong consideration must be the ease and ability with 
which that strategy can accommodate the duration for which a woman has been 
exposed to risk. From this perspective, then, proportional hazards and piecewise logistic 
regression models are preferable to logistic regression approaches. 
However, even where statistical techniques are used that permit the inclusion of 
censored cases, the distribution of birth intervals has a very long right tail. In DHS data 
which record the maternity histories of women aged between 15 and 50, these intervals 
could take values of up to 420 months (in the case where a woman has a child aged 
exactly 15, and is surveyed just before her fiftieth birthday having borne no more 
children). Values close to this maximum are found in both the 1998 and 1987-9 South 
Africa DHS. In order to avoid errors introduced by the inclusion of extreme values in 
statistical models, birth history data (censored or otherwise) for women who had not 
had a subsequent birth within 120 months of their previous birth were excluded from 
the analysis. Thus, the resultant estimated hazard functions covers only the risk of a 
subsequent birth between 0 and 119 months since the previous birth. Further, this 
means that the survival function does not ever approach zero, but rather indicates the 
proportion of mothers who still have not progressed to a subsequent birth 120 months 
after their last. 
7.2.2 Selection biases 
While censoring biases can be avoided through the use of life table methods and 
statistical models that build on them, selection bias is more difficult to control. Selection 
bias arises because, in a retrospective survey, not all women will have been equally 
subject to censoring. For example, a birth interval commencing at age 15 could have 
occurred anything up to 35 years before the survey, depending on the age of the mother 
at birth, while an interval commencing at age 49 could, given the survey design, only 
have been recorded if that birth had occurred in the year before the interview. Clearly, 
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the further back in time that one seeks to investigate, the more acute the problem of 
selection bias becomes.  
The principal effect of selection bias in the analysis of birth intervals is that, unless 
it is controlled for, the data analysed will be biased towards women with shorter birth 
intervals or, as Hobcraft and McDonald (1984) put it, 
selectivity refers to the fact that the transition from birth order i 
to i+1 can only be studied for women who have achieved at 
least birth order i at the time of the survey and are thus not 
representative of the whole population since they have been 
selected for more rapid childbearing. (Hobcraft and McDonald, 
1984:9) 
In other words, selection biases are introduced because women with more 
children will contribute more information on birth intervals than those with fewer 
children. However, parity is not the only source of selection bias: older women tend to 
have borne more children (and, on average, more distantly) than younger women, and 
hence, will contribute disproportionately to data on birth intervals if this is not allowed 
for. 
While there is no single method that compensates entirely for selection bias, the 
rigorous analysis of birth intervals must ensure that selection biases are minimised. 
Rindfuss, Palmore and Bumpass (1982) suggest a clear and implementable method of 
minimising selection bias by investigating only a subset of all intervals available, as 
indicated by the Lexis diagram in Figure 7.1. The solid-shaded area represents data on 
women who, on account of their age, were not sampled in the survey, and hence for 
whom no data exists. Any rectangular slice of data chosen for analysis on a time and age 
basis that crosses into that dark-shaded area introduces selection bias, since complete 
data is only available for some women in the time slice.  
By contrast, the diagonally-shaded rectangle between ages u and v, and covering a 
period of s months before the survey date, is a representative sample of birth intervals 
for women in the survey for whom full maternity histories are available for this subset 
of ages and period of time. The aim, then, is to define a period of investigation, s, and 
age-limits u and v such that sufficient data will be present in an event-exposure file, 
while not giving rise to unacceptable selection biases in respect of fast breeders, 
although doing so introduces selection bias associated with mother’s age at birth. 
Clearly, however, what is deemed ‘acceptable’ is a matter of subjective judgement rather 
than capable of being exactly specified. 
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One further type of unavoidable selection bias needs to be mentioned here. 
According to Yamaguchi (1991:136), “defined covariates” (in the terminology of 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), those that are fixed in advance for all subjects under 
investigation) introduce selection bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity because as 
time passes, the population remaining at risk of the event becomes increasingly select. 
There is no possible control for this bias, since this bias is not mechanical but a function 
of the observation of subjects over an extended period of time. Accordingly, results 
from the models with respect to such covariates need to be interpreted with this in 
mind. 
Figure 7.1 Lexis diagram showing selection for modelling of birth intervals 
 
The approach adopted here in the analysis of birth intervals in South Africa is to 
examine the maternities of two identically truncated and selected groups of women 
from two different data sources. The first set of maternity histories is derived from the 
1987-9 DHS data, while the second comes from the 1998 South Africa DHS. By 
combining these data into a single file, the pattern of birth intervals for two identically 
selected groups of women can be compared directly with each other, and secular 
changes in birth intervals over the period covered by the two surveys can be identified, 
thus permitting the testing of the hypotheses set out in Section 7.5. The algorithms used 
to manipulate the data into the required format, and issues associated with the adoption 
of this approach are set out in the next section. 
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7.3 Manipulation of data to investigate trends and differentials in 
birth intervals in South Africa 
This section sets out the procedures adopted and assumptions made in modelling the 
trends and differentials in birth intervals in South Africa using data from the 1987-9 and 
1998 demographic and health surveys conducted in South Africa. At the outset, it is 
important to reiterate that the investigations that follow are restricted to the analysis of 
childbearing and birth intervals among parous women. This constraint arises from the 
design of the 1987-9 South Africa DHS. Only those women who were married or who 
had ever borne a child were eligible for inclusion in the survey, thus excluding many 
childless women. Hence, entry into motherhood cannot be investigated with the two-
survey comparative approach adopted here. 
7.3.1 Algorithm for calculation of exposure-to-risk 
While Rindfuss, Palmore and Bumpass’ (1989) approach to minimising selection bias is 
employed here, a further modification to the criteria for selecting the women (and their 
births) to be included in the models is necessary. Rindfuss, Palmore and Bumpass 
suggest analysing only intervals commenced within the time period s, the approach 
adopted here takes into account the exposure in the interval s arising from a preceding 
birth that took place before the commencement of the period of investigation. If left-
censoring was not taken into account, the analysis of birth intervals using a Poisson 
event-exposure approach would be restricted to only those birth intervals begun in the 
period of observation, and usable information on the time between entry into the period 
of investigation (s months before the interview date) and the subsequent closure of the 
interval with a subsequent birth, or censoring at the interview date, would be lost. 
Accommodating left-censored data therefore has two advantages. First, it increases the 
number of events in the time period under observation, and second, it allows a better 
estimation of changes in birth intervals over that period. This modification is of 
particular importance in the analysis of South African birth interval data. The material 
presented in Chapter 4 has shown that birth intervals in South Africa are extremely 
long, and hence the restriction of the analysis to only those intervals commenced within 
the period s months before the interview would exclude a great deal of data. The 
resultant calculation of exposure-to-risk is described below. 
Nineteen mutually exclusive possibilities cover the full set of each birth’s possible 
contributions to the event-exposure file. Multiple births at the same confinement are 
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treated as a single maternity, and all subsequent manipulations of the data are restricted 
to separate maternities. Figure 7.2 shows these nineteen categories graphically, where 
the index maternity (that under consideration) is represented by a diamond, and a 
subsequent maternity by a circle.  
Figure 7.2 Schematic diagram showing possible contributions to the event-
exposure file 
 
Thus, maternity data fitting categories 1, 2, 3, 7, 13, 15 and 19 are excluded from 
the analysis entirely, as they fail to meet either or both of the age and period 
requirements. Maternity histories fitting categories 4, 6, 12 and 14 give rise to an “event” 
in the event-exposure file, and contribute to the exposed-to-risk. The remaining 
categories contribute to exposure, but not to the total number of events. 
Using the definitions in Table 7.1, the contribution of each maternity to exposure 
within the period of investigation, and the left-censored exposure at entry into the 
period of investigation shown in Table 7.2 can be calculated. 
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Table 7.1 Variables required to calculate exposed-to-risk 
Variable Definition 
x(t) Age of mother at time t 
x(t+s) Age of mother at time t+s, i.e. at interview 
x(i) Age of mother at birth of child i 
x(i+1) Age of mother at birth of child i+1 
u Minimum age for inclusion 
v Maximum age for inclusion 
 
Table 7.2 Contribution to event-exposure file, by category 
Category Exposure in period of investigation Exposure at entry into investigation Event 
4 x(i+1) - u u - x(i) 1 
5 v - x(t) x(t) - x(i) 0 
6 x(i+1) - x(t) x(t) - x(i) 1 
8 x(t+s) - u u - x(i) 0 
9 x(t+s) - x(t) [=s] x(t) - x(i) 0 
10 v - x(t) x(t) - x(i) 0 
11 v - x(i) 0 0 
12 x(i+1) - x(i) 0 1 
14 x(i+1) - u u - x(i) 1 
16 x(t+s) - u u - x(i) 0 
17 v - x(i) 0 0 
18 x(t+s) - x(i) 0 0 
 
One particular issue arises with this categorisation of women’s contributions to 
the event-exposure file. While each individual maternity can be represented by one (and 
only one) of the nineteen categories, different maternities to the same woman may be 
categorised differently. Thus for example, a woman’s first maternity may be of the sixth 
type listed, while the following two maternities might be of the type described by 
category 12, followed by a fourth in category 18. Thus, even though the maximum 
amount of exposure taken into account for any individual woman is s months, this 
exposure will usually be apportioned across several maternities. Thus, ideally, models of 
women’s birth intervals should take this “clustering” effect (of multiple maternities to 
the same woman) into account. This matter is discussed in greater detail in Section 7.4. 
7.3.2 Creation of historical variables from limited data 
The discussion in Section 4.4.1 identified the centrality of contraception and marital 
status in determining women’s birth intervals. Neither contraceptive use nor marital 
status histories were collected in either of the surveys. However, both questionnaires 
asked respondents (albeit in slightly different ways) about the dates of their first union 
or cohabitation, and the date (or parity) of their first use of contraception. From these 
limited data, it is possible to derive rudimentary binary variables reflecting whether, at 
the time of birth of a particular child, the woman had ever been married or had ever 
used modern forms of contraception. In the absence of full historical data, these 
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variables, of necessity, have to be simple: in neither case is the duration of marriage or 
contraceptive use clear, but they do represent a significant improvement over the use of 
current-status data to interpret historical dynamics.  
Similar considerations arise with the data on women’s employment, and their 
current place of residence. In both of these cases, current-status data are deemed to 
have been applicable over the entire period for which the woman was exposed to risk. 
This assumption is clearly problematic, but in the absence of alternative data by which 
to incorporate women’s employment and place of residence, it has to suffice. However, 
with careful identification of the data to include in the models (and the specification of 
the length of the period of investigation, s, in particular), the extent of the errors 
introduced into the models as a result of treating current-status data as historically 
constant can be attenuated. 
Nevertheless, all variables created or used in this way are “defined covariates” in 
the terminology set out in Section 7.2.2. As such, the use of such variables results in the 
incorporation of otherwise unobserved heterogeneity in the specified models. 
7.3.3 Choice of parameters defining the periods of investigation used 
In order to complete the calculation of the exposed-to-risk, values of s, u and v (as 
defined earlier) have to be fixed. To increase the number of events under observation, 
while not introducing sizeable selectivity biases, a value of s of 84 months was chosen. 
This choice is, to all intents and purposes, arbitrary but reflects a trade-off between the 
value of s (the length of time under observation), and that of v (the “depth” of the 
investigation, since the choice of s strongly influences the choice of v, the maximum 
age for inclusion. The most obvious choice is (50-(s/12)) years. In theory, a lower value 
of v could be chosen, but there is little justification for the data loss that would 
accompany such a choice. Hence v was set to 43 years.  
The choice of the lower age limit for inclusion, u, is also arbitrary. In order to 
maximise the amount of data under investigation, and to avoid selection effects through 
the exclusion of younger women. Since high levels of teenage pregnancy have been 
documented repeatedly since the 1950s (Fuller and Liang, 1999; Preston-Whyte, 1988), 
it was decided to set this value to the lowest age for which data are available for all 
women – i.e. 15 years.  
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Finally, as discussed briefly in Section 7.1.3, the delimitation of the time segments 
to be used in the models has to be established. Events should be distributed 
approximately uniformly over the time segment, and not heaped excessively at either the 
beginning or the end of each segment. Accordingly, the mean duration spent in a 
particular segment by those mothers closing their birth intervals in that segment should 
be close to half the length of the time segment. 
Taking all these factors into account leads to a choice of time segments of six 
months length between 18 and 72 months after the last birth. Before 18 months, time 
segments of length nine months were used, and for intervals still open 72 to 120 months 
after the birth of the last child, segments of length 12 months were used.  
Table 7.3 Mean survival in each time segment of mothers closing their birth 
intervals in that time segment 
Starting point of time segment  
(months after birth) 
1987-9 DHS 1998 DHS Smoothed value ai factor 
0 7.0 -- 7.00 0.78 
9 4.9 4.8 4.85 0.54 
18 3.2 3.3 3.25 0.54 
24 2.9 2.7 2.80 0.47 
30 2.8 2.8 2.80 0.47 
36 2.8 2.7 2.80 0.47 
42 2.8 2.9 2.85 0.48 
48 2.8 2.7 2.80 0.47 
54 2.9 2.9 2.90 0.48 
60 2.7 2.6 2.65 0.44 
66 2.7 3.0 2.85 0.48 
72 5.5 5.8 5.65 0.47 
84 5.1 4.9 5.00 0.42 
96 5.3 5.1 5.20 0.43 
108 5.2 5.0 5.10 0.43 
 
Table 7.3 shows the mean exposure in each time segment contributed by mothers 
closing their birth interval in that time segment. As can be seen, these values are 
generally close to half the length of the segment, and do not differ substantially between 
the two data sets. The values shown in the table also have a further purpose once the 
models have been specified. Since Poisson regression models produce results in the 
form of incidence rates (analogous to central death rates in demographic terminology), 
the (averaged and smoothed) values shown in Table 7.3 can be thought of as being 
equivalent to the set of adjustment factors, ai, required to convert central rates into life 
table measures of probability (Newell, 1988; Preston, Heuveline and Guillot, 2001). 
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7.3.4 Creation of a single event-exposure file containing data from two 
different data sets 
The final stage of data manipulation required before the specified models can be fitted is 
to create a single data file containing aggregated events and exposure-to-risk from the 
two separate data sources. To do this, equivalent variables (for example, race, urban 
residence and education) were first created in each of the two data sets, taking care to 
ensure that the original questions asked in the surveys, and the consequent coding of 
responses, were compatible. 
The algorithms set out in Table 7.2 were then applied to each data set separately, 
thereby deriving the left-censored starting exposure and exposed-to-risk in the period of 
investigation for each maternity, as well as an indicator variable showing whether the 
maternity in question gave rise to an event within the period of investigation.  
Data relating to women’s seventh or higher order confinements were omitted, 
partly on account of the sparseness of this data, and because such high orders are 
sufficiently rare in a South African context for them to be treated as outliers. This 
results in the exclusion of 4.6 percent of births to African women in the 1998 DHS and 
6.4 percent of births to African women interviewed in the 1987-9 survey. 
The data files were then collapsed, giving the weighted aggregate exposure and 
number of events for each combination of the independent variables decided upon, and 
required to test the hypotheses set out in Section 7.5.  
7.4 Conclusion: Review of the methodology adopted, and its 
limitations 
The approach adopted here embodies several trade-offs and consequently has some 
methodological flaws and limitations that require comment and explanation. The focus 
of the statistical investigations, and hence the overriding determinant of the 
methodological approach adopted, is the resolution of the apparent paradox outlined at 
the start of this chapter. Principally, the investigations undertaken seek to test alternative 
explanations for the continued increase in the birth intervals of African South Africans 
after the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. Data from two different surveys, one 
conducted in the final years of apartheid, the other shortly after the political transition, 
are available and can be applied to resolve the paradox. The statistical comparison of 
birth interval data from two different surveys, however, necessitates the combination of 
these two data sets into a single data file that can then be subjected to statistical 
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investigation. The process of combining the two data sets introduces three distinct 
sources of error that, while not affecting the estimates of coefficients, exercise an effect 
on the standard deviations of those estimates. 
First, the need to combine data from two different surveys means that important 
variables relating to the design of each of the surveys cannot be included. In both cases, 
a stratified, clustered random sample of women was drawn, based on census 
enumerations. However, due to changes in the demarcation of census enumeration areas 
between the two surveys, and different sampling strategies in each survey, the 
aggregated event-exposure file cannot take the spatial stratification and clustering in 
each survey into account. The survey sample weights, however, were used to ensure that 
the numbers of events and the amount of exposure in each survey were appropriately 
weighted to reflect the underlying sampling frames in each survey, which were designed 
(after weighting) to be nationally representative. Therefore, the estimated confidence 
intervals calculated for the coefficients will be unquantifiably narrower than they should 
be, even though the coefficients remain unchanged. 
Second, the adoption of an aggregated piece-wise log-rate model precludes 
allowance for other clustering effects. As suggested in Section 7.3.1, the data on birth 
intervals in the period of investigation usually reflects several separate maternities, and 
hence the analysis of the birth interval data should take this clustering into account. 
Furthermore, with the decomposition of the total birth interval into several discrete 
time segments, multiple records (up to 15) are created for each maternity contributed by 
each woman in the two surveys. Thus, ideally, the analysis should take into account the 
fact that multiple records relate to the same maternity, but also that multiple maternities 
relate to the same woman. This cannot be done with an aggregated event-exposure file. 
However, if the data were not aggregated, the clustering effects might be 
accommodated, but doing so would preclude the correct incorporation of the sample 
weights for women sampled in each survey. 
The third issue is even more intractable than the two outlined above. The design 
of both surveys (and some of the hypotheses proposed) indicates that multi-level 
models should be fitted to the data under investigation, since the design effects, and 
many of the hypothesised variables of significance are not, in truth, attributes of 
individuals, but rather of communities, or other aggregations of individuals. However, 
given the difficulties associated with adequately accommodating the clustering and 
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weighting of individual level data from two surveys, attempts to fit more complex multi-
level models are not justified. 
Furthermore, the answer to the question of whether these methodological failings 
are significant depends on the perspective that is brought to bear on it. From a purist 
statistical perspective, the limitations outlined above are indeed severe. However, from a 
more pragmatic standpoint, several arguments can be advanced as to why, despite these 
limitations, the methodological approach outlined above may still have value. In the first 
instance, the imperative to investigate secular trends in birth intervals has necessitated 
the approach adopted. No other methodological approach could hope to cast light on 
the trends and differentials in birth intervals among African South Africans without 
introducing significant and unacceptable selection biases of the forms described in 
Section 7.2.2. Second, and more importantly, the first two limitations described above 
exercise an effect on the standard deviation of the coefficient estimates, not on the 
estimates themselves. Hence the life tables derived as a result of using the methodology 
outlined in this chapter will not contain biased estimates. Life tables, despite being 
subject to random error, are not typically published with their standard deviations. In 
this respect, the output from the models is not much different from that of any other 
life table technique. Moreover, since the overriding purpose of this investigation is to 
establish a parsimonious model that describes the data adequately and that permits the 
derivation of life tables showing the effect of various hypothesised covariates on 
women’s birth intervals, these limitations might be regarded as of minor importance. 
From this more pragmatic standpoint, then, any marginally significant results arising 
from the regression models should probably be viewed as being statistically insignificant.  
7.5 Hypotheses and operationalisation of independent variables 
The combination of institutional analysis with a statistical approach limits the problems 
associated with attempting to draw inferences and conclusions about national 
demographic trends in a single country. However, similar to the debates on the efficacy 
of state-sponsored family planning programmes mentioned in Chapter 2, it is impossible 
to address the counterfactual of what would have happened to birth intervals in South 
Africa without apartheid. Nor is it appropriate in this thesis to evaluate the trends and 
differentials in other African countries for the purpose of comparison. Nevertheless, by 
further limiting the scope of the investigation to South Africa immediately before and 
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after the transition, it is possible to gain additional insights into the effect of that 
transition on African women’s birth intervals.  
McNicoll’s point about the limitations of statistical models of demographic 
outcomes in analyses of fertility from an institutional perspective must be borne in 
mind. Many, if not most, hypotheses relating to the effect of social institutions on the 
length of birth intervals that might be of interest cannot be tested using data of the form 
collected in demographic and health surveys. Thus, for example, while the combination 
of quantitative and qualitative arguments presented in the preceding chapters makes a 
strong case for the assertion that African South African women adopted modern forms 
of contraception in order to postpone their childbearing sine die, this cannot be tested 
using demographic survey data. Only detailed ethnographic and microanalytic research 
might determine whether the conclusions drawn are correct.  
However, other hypotheses about the nature and determinants of women’s birth 
intervals can be tested using demographic survey data. As Greenhalgh (1990) has 
pointed out, the effects of institutions on individual behaviour vary between individuals 
(and groups of individuals) in a given society. She argues that the degree to which 
institutions affect individuals varies by social class and status, since individuals’ ability to 
subvert or modify social institutions is closely associated with their proximity to power 
within that society. Some indication of the magnitude and direction of these effects can 
be gained from an examination of the trends and differentials in women’s childbearing 
according to differences in factors already known to affect fertility: marital status, level 
of education, wealth and urbanisation.  
 
In investigating the continued increase in birth intervals in South Africa after the demise 
of apartheid, it is necessary to formulate a set of hypotheses capable of distinguishing 
between different possible accounts as to why this has occurred. Any explanation of this 
continued increase must have a clearly identifiable causal pathway operating through the 
proximate determinants of birth intervals discussed in Chapter 4.  
The univariate analyses presented in Section 4.4.1 showed that birth intervals of 
women who had never used contraception before the birth of a child had remained 
almost constant, while those of women who had, had increased. A priori, the increase in 
birth intervals in South Africa is associated with the uptake of contraception, and its use 
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for delaying childbearing. As an identified causal pathway, contraceptive use is not 
included in any of the models specified. 
Second, birth intervals of married women have increased in line with those of 
women who had not been married at the time of the birth, and the differential that 
exists between the birth intervals of married and unmarried women has not widened. 
Hence it is unlikely that higher rates of marital disruption in recent years (or the path-
dependent outcome of changed gender relations precipitated by apartheid, and made 
manifest by a greater proportion of births to unmarried mothers) are a causal pathway 
for the continued increase in birth intervals. As a result, a hypothesis is specified to 
investigate whether trends and differentials in African South Africans’ birth intervals 
according to marital status are significant. 
Third, infecundability may have increased, resulting in unintentionally postponed 
pregnancies. A hypothesis is formulated to examine whether this explanation may 
indeed hold. Finally, more women may be choosing to terminate unwanted pregnancies. 
For reasons discussed in Chapter 4, however, this explanation unfortunately cannot be 
investigated. No data on termination of pregnancy exist in the 1987-9 Demographic and 
Health Survey, and hence it is impossible to investigate changes in the proportion of 
women terminating a pregnancy between the two surveys.  
Before presenting the hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider the nature 
of the main effects in models of the form specified in the preceding sections. 
7.5.1 Main and interaction effects of independent variables 
In addition to the determination of whether the main effects associated with the 
hypothesised variables are statistically significant in explaining trends and differentials in 
birth intervals, several interaction effects are also of interest.  
First, the method adopted for modelling women’s birth intervals estimates the 
relative risk of women having a birth, but over a number of time segments. Models that 
do not include an interaction effect between the hypothesised variable and the time 
elapsed since the last birth (broken down into discrete segments) make the assumption 
that the failure rates associated with different values or categories of that independent 
variable have a constant proportional relationship to each other over all time segments. 
The hypotheses presented reject this assumption of proportionality explicitly, and hence 
interaction terms between the variable of interest and the time elapsed since last birth 
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are included. For simplicity of reference in later discussion, interactions of this form are 
termed “variable-interval interactions”. 
Similar to this first interaction effect, the second interaction that needs to be 
accommodated is that between the time elapsed since last birth and the survey data set 
from which the data come. Again, failure to include interactions of this second kind 
makes the assumption that the distribution of failure rates over time since last birth are 
constantly proportional in both data sets. This, then, is equivalent to making the 
assumption that the shape of the distribution of women’s births over the two surveys is 
identical, one merely being a constant multiple of the other. Given the evidence 
presented in Chapter 4 of a continued increase in birth intervals over time, this 
assumption may not hold (i.e. the hazard function may exhibit an entirely different 
shape). Hence, all models fitted test this assumption by including an interaction between 
the survey date and the time elapsed since last birth. Interactions of this form are 
termed “survey-interval interactions”.  
In testing these interval interaction effects, a continuous form of the duration 
variable was fitted, rebased to zero at 27 months. By doing so, the additional number of 
parameters fitted to the models arising from the inclusion of interaction effects is 
limited1. 
The third interaction effect of interest is that between the hypothesised variable of 
interest and the survey date. The inclusion of this interaction reflects that the 
assumption of proportionality of the effects of different values or categories of the 
hypothesised variable of interest between different surveys may not hold. Interactions of 
this form are termed “variable-survey interactions”, and are assumed, a priori, to be 
significant in the models.  
Finally, if all three second-order interactions are found to be significant in the 
fitted models, the possibility that they all affect each other is tested through the 
inclusion of a three-way interaction term. Such an interaction reflects the combined 
interactions of the variable of interest, the intervals under investigation, and secular 
changes in the pattern of birth spacing over time. 
                                                 
1 Use of a continuous variable to model the survey-interval interaction has the effect of “tilting” the hazard function with an 
increased hazard at one duration being compensated for by a decreased hazard at other durations. Investigations using a series of 
dummy variables to model these interval effects revealed no evidence that the simpler model distorts the pattern of change in birth 
intervals in South Africa. Therefore, the more parsimonious specification of the interaction effect was adopted for the final models. 
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7.5.2 Hypotheses 
Four investigations into the continued increase in birth intervals can be expressed as 
testable hypotheses using the data from the two demographic and health surveys 
conducted in South Africa in 1987-9 and 1998. For the reasons set out in Chapter 4 and 
Section 7.5, all four hypothesised explanations are assumed to operate through the 
proximate determinant of contraceptive use.  
 
Hypothesis One: Marital stability and social change 
The first hypothesis relates to the effect of marital status on women’s childbearing. The 
evidence presented in Section 4.4.1.2 suggests that marital status is not a strong 
proximate determinant of birth intervals in South Africa. Hence, marital status can be 
included in statistical models without undue concern for whether the effect of other 
variables of interest are in fact operating through women’s marital status as a proximate 
determinant.  
Women who had been married at the birth of a child are hypothesised to have 
shorter birth intervals than women who had never married. Variable-interval 
interactions are hypothesised to be significant, reflecting the hypothesis that the 
distribution of women’s birth intervals by time elapsed since last birth differs 
significantly for women of different marital status. Likewise, the variable-survey 
interaction is hypothesised to be significant, reflecting the hypothesis that changes in 
South African society, in particular the easing of restrictions on women’s cohabitation 
with their husbands, have changed the pattern of childbearing between the two surveys. 
A second investigation related to this hypothesis is that birth interval length is 
determined by women’s propensity to experience marital disruption. The supplementary 
hypothesis, then, is that single women, and those prone to greater marital instability 
would have longer birth intervals than women whose lives have been characterised by 
greater marital stability.  
 
Hypothesis Two: The effect of social status – education, assets and urbanisation 
The second hypothesis relates to differentials in the trajectories and patterns of African 
women’s birth intervals in South Africa by their socio-economic status. Urban, educated 
and (relatively) well-off women are presumed to be among those who survived the 
ravages of apartheid best, and are hypothesised to have a different pattern of child 
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spacing from rural, less educated and poorer women. In order to maintain their right to 
urban residence, these women had a strong incentive under apartheid to delay their 
childbearing as much as possible. They were, no doubt, assisted in this by their greater 
autonomy and ability to reconstitute marital relations in forms that suited them, 
resulting in the use of modern contraception to delay childbearing. Further, these 
women may have acted, and continue to act, as role models for other, less privileged, 
women.  
This hypothesis, then, suggests that the ‘typical’ factors associated with fertility 
decline according to modernisation theory will be apparent in South Africa too. Thus, 
according to this hypothesis, more educated, wealthier, and urban women will have 
longer birth intervals than less educated, rural and poorer women. In addition, the very 
factors allowing the former group of women’s birth intervals to increase suggests that 
the differential between the two groups will have widened over the period covered by 
the two surveys.  
Both variable-interval and variable-survey interactions are hypothesised to be 
significant. The former because it is hypothesised that the more privileged women under 
apartheid would evince a very different pattern of childbearing from less privileged 
women, and the latter because of the observed structural changes in South African 
society over time. 
 
Hypothesis Three: Violence and social instability – spatial differentials in child spacing 
The third hypothesis investigates whether the social and political instability in the years 
surrounding the political transition might have induced women to delay their 
childbearing. The province of KwaZulu-Natal was particularly affected by violence and 
social instability, as a low-intensity civil war was waged across the province between 
supporters of ANC-aligned groups and the apartheid-state-supported Inkatha Freedom 
Party, which claimed the political and ideological leadership of the Zulus who constitute 
the vast majority of that province’s population. In addition, the civil war in 
Mozambique, which borders KwaZulu-Natal, might have contributed to the breakdown 
of social stability in the region. If this violence and the uncertainty that it engendered 
had an effect on childbearing, it is hypothesised that women living in KwaZulu-Natal 
would have chosen to delay their childbearing during the years of violence, while 
women living in less affected provinces would not have done so to the same extent.  
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Thus, according to this hypothesis, if the increase in birth intervals after the end 
of apartheid is explained by political conflict, birth intervals in KwaZulu-Natal would 
have lengthened relative to other provinces, which were (with the exception of parts of 
Gauteng) relatively unaffected by these conflicts. 
Again, a variable-survey interaction term is required to reflect that these forces 
were in operation largely between the periods covered by the two surveys. The inclusion 
of a variable-interval interaction term is used to test whether the effect of the conflict 
changed women’s pattern of childbearing in KwaZulu-Natal relative to other provinces. 
 
Hypothesis Four: Disease and sub-fecundability – spatial differentials in child spacing 
The fourth hypothesis tests whether the spread of HIV/AIDS in South Africa is 
responsible for the increase in women’s birth intervals throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
It is known that women infected with HIV experience greater difficulty in conceiving 
than women uninfected with the disease (Zaba and Gregson, 1998). A reduction in 
fecundability might find its expression in increasing birth intervals.  
The incidence (and, hence, prevalence) of HIV is not uniform across South 
African provinces. In 1994 (the earliest year for which antenatal data are available 
according to the new provincial delimitations), estimates of HIV prevalence ranged 
from 14.4 percent in KwaZulu-Natal to 1.2 percent in the Western Cape (Table 7.4).  
Since 1994, the disease has spread rapidly. Hence, if the spread of HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa is related to the continued increase in birth intervals in South Africa in the 
1980s and 1990s, it is hypothesised that birth intervals would have lengthened most 
dramatically in those provinces with the highest levels of HIV prevalence in the early 
1990s. 
Table 7.4 HIV prevalence among attenders of government antenatal clinics in 
various years, by province 
 HIV prevalence (percent) by year 
Province 1994 1996 1998 2000 
KwaZulu-Natal 14.4 19.9 32.5 36.2 
Mpumalanga 12.2 15.8 30.0 29.7 
Free State 9.2 17.5 22.8 27.9 
Gauteng 6.4 15.5 22.5 29.3 
North-West Province 6.7 25.1 21.3 22.9 
Northern Province 3.0 7.9 11.5 13.2 
Eastern Cape 4.5 8.1 15.9 20.2 
Northern Cape 1.8 6.5 9.9 11.1 
Western Cape 1.2 3.1 5.2 8.7 
National 7.6 14.2 22.8 24.5 
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Variable-survey interactions are hypothesised to be significant, reflecting the low 
prevalence of HIV infection in the country in the late 1980s and high prevalence in 
many provinces by the late 1990s. Equally, variable-interval interactions are 
hypothesised to be significant, reflecting the (possibly unintentional) increase in birth 
spacing among women living in provinces with higher prevalences of HIV. 
 
7.5.3 Operationalisation of independent variables 
This section describes the operationalisation of the independent variables required to 
test these hypotheses. 
7.5.3.1 Marital status 
As described in Chapter 4, full marital or relationship histories typically are not collected 
in Demographic and Health Surveys. Only the date of a woman’s first marriage is asked. 
Hence, it is possible only to know whether a woman had ever been married at the time 
of a given maternity. This simple binary was used to assess the relative effects of marital 
status on women’s childbearing. (In future, a relatively simple modification to the DHS 
maternity history questionnaire could provide much more detailed information by 
asking of each maternity whether the father of that child was known to be the father of 
the previous child. Doing so would give some information on paternity, and changes in 
marital relationships over a woman’s reproductive lifetime). 
In relation to the secondary hypothesis, data on the number of unions are sparse 
in the 1987-9 DHS, being restricted to a simple categorisation of 0, 1 or more than one 
unions. However, by combining this information with that on current marital status, a 
five-fold typology can be derived that gives an indication of women’s propensity to 
experience marital disruption (Table 7.5). 
Table 7.5 Typology of marital disruption based on information collected in 
the 1987-9 and 1998 Demographic and Health Surveys 
 Number of unions 
Current marital status 0 1 1+ 
Single Category One -- -- 
Married -- Category Two Category Four 
Divorced / Separated / Widowed -- Category Three Category Five 
 
The material presented in earlier chapters suggested that women’s ability to recast 
and reconstitute their lives played an important role in shaping the pattern of fertility 
and childbearing under apartheid. One indicator of that ability would be whether or not 
the woman was the head of her household, or living in a household headed by another 
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woman. Unfortunately, the data in the 1987-9 DHS are inadequate to establishing an 
accurate picture of household living arrangements, and hence the sex of the household 
head cannot be used in these investigations. 
7.5.3.2 Social status 
Like marital status, information on a woman’s social status has to be gleaned from 
limited data. The second hypothesis in the previous section argues that educated, urban 
and wealthier women would have significantly different patterns of childbearing in 
comparison to less-educated, rural and poorer women. Initially, a nine-fold typology of 
educational status was used, based on the highest grade of education completed and 
women’s level of literacy. This latter factor proved (unsurprisingly) to be highly 
correlated with highest completed year of schooling. Accordingly, a five-fold typology 
was used: No education, education up to Grades 5, 7, and 11 (the penultimate year of 
schooling), and those women who had completed their schooling or attended a tertiary 
education institution. Urban residence was operationalised according to whether the 
woman lived in an urban or rural area at the time of the survey. A woman’s material 
status was determined by examining how many of the following items were present in 
her household: a radio, a television and a refrigerator. In general, ownership of either of 
the last two items implies that the household has access to electricity. Examination of 
early models showed little distinction in the childbearing of women with none or one of 
the items, and little difference between those with two or three. Accordingly, wealth was 
operationalised as a dichotomous variable, reflecting presence of either one or two items 
on the one hand, or two or more on the other. It was not possible to use data on 
income or other assets due to incompatibilities between the two data sources.  
7.5.3.3 Effects of social and political instability 
The effect of political and social instability was investigated through a simple 
comparison of women resident in KwaZulu-Natal at the time of the surveys with those 
who were resident in other provinces. The 1987-9 DHS, however had a different set of 
provincial delimitations compared to the 1998 DHS, reflecting the fact that the earlier 
survey was conducted in the four provinces of “White” South Africa, and the ten 
independent and semi-autonomous “homelands”. The delimitation of magisterial 
districts across South Africa, however, did not change with the political transition, and a 
variable was captured in the 1987-9 DHS indicating in which of the more than 300 
magisterial districts in the country (including the homelands) the respondent was 
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surveyed. Then, using a list of magisterial districts according to the new provincial 
delimitations distributed with the 1996 South Africa Census, the magisterial districts 
coded in the 1987-9 DHS were mapped onto the new provincial delimitations.  
As a result of this procedure, identical provincial definitions to those in the 1998 
DHS were created in the 1987-9 DHS. From this, it is a simple matter to create a binary 
variable denoting whether the respondent was a resident of KwaZulu-Natal (according 
to post-1994 provincial delimitations). 
7.5.3.4 Effects of the spread of HIV/AIDS on fertility 
The same algorithm as that described in the preceding section was used to create a 
binary variable indicating whether the respondent was resident in provinces with high 
levels of HIV or not. The choice of which provinces to include in the “high HIV 
provinces” is, of course, somewhat more arbitrary. An examination of the results from 
the antenatal surveys conducted between 1994 and 1998 (some of which are presented 
in Table 7.4) suggests that, despite some variability in estimates in the same province 
from year to year, five of the nine provinces can be viewed as having noticeably higher 
prevalences of HIV than the others in the early to mid-1990s: KwaZulu-Natal, 
Mpumalanga, Free State, Gauteng and North-West province. Accordingly, women 
resident in these five provinces were regarded as living in provinces with high levels of 
HIV. 
7.5.4 Other variables used as controls 
In addition to the independent variables above, several other variables were included in 
the models as control variables. The choice of these controls was determined from prior 
information, and findings from other demographic research into fertility and 
childbearing in South Africa. These variables, and their operationalisation, are described 
in the following sections. 
7.5.4.1 Age of mother 
A woman’s age has an important effect on fertility outcomes. Older women tend to 
have borne more children than younger women. Furthermore, the mode of the fertility 
distribution, as shown in Chapter 3, lies between the ages of 25 and 30, and as women 
age they are less likely to close an open birth interval with another birth. To 
accommodate these differences, the grouped age of the mother at the mid-point of the 
period of investigation (i.e. 3.5 years before the interview date, and grouped into five-
year bands) was included in each model. 
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7.5.4.2 Mother’s childhood place of residence 
Kaufman (1996) has shown that place of residence until the age of 12 is an important 
determinant of African South African women’s fertility and contraceptive use in the late 
1980s. Data were collected in both DHS surveys indicating whether the woman had 
spent most of her childhood in a rural area, a town, or a major city. 
7.5.4.3 Linguistic group of mother’s home language 
Research done on differentials in fertility in South Africa using the 1993 LSDS 
(described in Chapter 2), showed that women in Nguni-speaking households tended to 
bear more children than women in Sotho-speaking households (Moultrie and Timæus, 
2001). This difference leads to the a priori assumption that there might be important and 
significant differences in patterns of child spacing by the mother’s linguistic group. 
7.5.4.4 Birth order 
The earlier discussion on selectivity indicates that the number of children borne by a 
woman has an important effect on her birth intervals. Women with many children, 
particularly, are more likely to have shorter birth intervals than those with fewer 
children, even after controlling for other variables. 
7.6 Fitted models and results 
Together with the key variables required for negative binomial regression models (the 
number of events, and the amount of exposure), the variables described in the previous 
section were used to fit models to African women’s birth intervals in South Africa over 
the period of investigation described in Section 7.3, using the methodology described 
earlier. 
The modelling process went through a number of stages. First, a “base” model, 
which excluded those independent variables (or derivations of them) required to test the 
hypotheses, was fitted to the data. Having found the best (i.e. most parsimonious) 
model using only the control variables and having identified necessary variable-interval 
and variable-survey interactions, this model was then held constant and variables 
required to test the four hypotheses were added to it. 
After the most parsimonious model was identified in each instance, predicted 
incidence rates (per person-month of exposure) for each element in the data were 
calculated. These were derived by dividing the predicted number of events estimated 
from the model by the amount of exposure for each time segment and each 
combination of the covariates of interest (the survey date and the independent variable 
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operationalised to test the hypothesis). Multiplying these point estimates by the width of 
the time segment (e.g. nine months for the first two segments), produces point-
estimates of the central failure rates in each time segment. Transformation of these rates 
into probabilities was performed by using the averaged and smoothed values of the data 
in the last column of Table 7.3 as approximations to a set of ai factors by means of the 
formula 
qx = mx / [1 + (1 – ax)mx]. 
Cumulative survival functions, with a radix of one, were then calculated from 
these failure probabilities using standard demographic techniques. 
In addition to plots of the incidence rates and cumulative survival functions, a 
summary survival statistic suggested by Guilkey and Rindfuss (1987) is also presented. 
Even with a cut-off of 120 months, not all women will close their birth intervals. Hence, 
an exact equivalent to the life table measure e0 cannot be calculated. Furthermore, at the 
extreme ends of the life table, modelled estimates of the incidence rate tend to become 
unstable as a result of small numbers of events, and lower amounts of exposure. 
Instead, Guilkey and Rindfuss (1987:282) suggest that a “conditional expectation of 
survival” offers an appropriate manner of “closing” the derived life tables. This 
approach avoids the need for the imposition of “arbitrary assumptions on those who 
survive beyond the age where the multivariate life table ends”. Thus, using conventional 
life table algebra, they derive a summary measure, gs0 , which indicates the expected 
time to the event for those who experience the event prior to the end of the last 
segment (s+1), where s is the last time segment for which incidence rates are calculated, 
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With the data used in this investigation, the last defined time segment is that from 
108 to 120 months. Accordingly, probabilities of survival from 108 to 120 months can 
be derived (i.e. 12q108), and the final value of the life table calculated will be that of l120. 
Consequently, in this investigation, Guilkey and Rindfuss’ formula takes the form 
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The large number of parameters in each of the fitted models makes presentation of the 
model results difficult. In addition, given the large number of control variables and the 
number of time segments in the models, it is also difficult to assimilate the overall effect 
of a particular variable through an examination of the estimated coefficients. Hence, the 
results presented here will focus on the predicted incidence rates, cumulative survival 
functions, and conditional expected birth interval lengths for the key variables in each 
model. Full results from the models fitted are provided in the Appendix to the thesis. 
7.6.1 The “base” model 
The “base” model of the determinants of women’s birth intervals was derived by 
ascertaining the effect of adding each variable sequentially into the model, and including 
it if a likelihood ratio test comparing that model to the nested model excluding that 
variable was statistically significant. Variables whose estimated coefficients were not 
significant were omitted and the model was then refitted. 
Interactions between these main effect variables and duration since last birth were 
tested, and included where appropriate. The base model allowed for survey-interval 
interaction as well as variable-interval interactions between the mother’s age and her 
linguistic family. A three-way interaction was required between mothers’ childhood 
place of residence, the secular time in which the survey took place and duration since 
last birth. After including all these variables and interaction effects, birth order was 
found to be not significant. Nevertheless, birth order was found to be significant in later 
models, and was thus retained in the base model. Interactions between birth order and 
interval were not significant. 
 
The fitted incidence rates and cumulative survival function by duration since last birth 
and year in which the data were collected are shown in Figure 7.3. 
Two important features of the continued change in birth intervals can be 
identified in these graphs. Looking at the first graph, it is apparent that there has been a 
remarkable shift in the pattern of women’s childbearing between the 1987-9 and 1998 
demographic and health surveys. Women in the 1987-9 survey indicated a fairly 
predictable pattern of childbearing, with a mode around 30 months, and a very long tail 
giving rise to long median birth intervals. By contrast, the pattern of childbearing by 
duration since last birth among women in the 1998 survey shows a far more uniform 
distribution, with incidence rates remaining almost constant between 36 and 72 months, 
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and even then only falling gradually. The effect of this shift is clearly visible in the 
calculated cumulative survival functions, with women in the later survey progressing 
more slowly to a subsequent birth, particularly between 36 and 84 months. 
Figure 7.3 Fitted incidence rates and cumulative survival functions by year of 
survey, base model 
 
Most interestingly of all, however, is the indication that the overall proportion of 
women progressing to another birth within 120 months of the previous birth changed 
only very slightly between the two surveys, while the distribution of childbearing within 
that time period has changed dramatically. According to this synthetic measure, 
approximately a quarter of women will not have another child within 10 years of their 
last. Hence, parity progression has remained largely unchanged.  
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A further measure of this change can be gained from the conditional expected 
birth interval length of women having a subsequent birth within ten years of their last 
(Table 7.6). 
Table 7.6 Conditional expected birth interval length (months) of women 
having a subsequent birth within 120 months, by survey date: base 
model 
Survey Conditional Expectation 
1987-9 46.2 
1998 53.3 
 
This table shows that among those women who did close their birth interval 
within 120 months, women interviewed in the 1987-9 survey did so, on average, just 
under four years after their previous birth. Between the two surveys, this conditional 
expectation has increased by more than 15 percent, or 7.1 months. 
7.6.2 Results: Hypothesis One – Marital status 
This hypothesis tests whether differentials in child spacing by marital status have 
changed over the course of the two DHS surveys.  
After fitting the base model, and variables included in the other hypotheses 
(province of residence, urban or rural residence, education, and the measure of material 
well being), clear differences in women’s childbearing according to their marital status 
remain apparent. The main effect of marital status is highly significant, as are both 
variable-survey and variable-interval interactions. The possible three way interaction of 
survey, variable and interval was not significant. 
Two particularly striking features are apparent from the estimated incidence rates 
and survival functions (Figure 7.4). First, women interviewed in the 1998 survey who 
were not married at the time of their birth have a very different pattern of childbearing 
from married women in either survey, as well as a pattern of childbearing very different 
from that of unmarried women in the earlier survey. For these unmarried women in the 
later survey, the incidence of childbearing is more or less constant between 30 and 96 
months, while amongst the other three groups, the mode is close to 36 months. 
Second, while there are differences by marital status in the proportion of women 
still to progress to a subsequent birth 120 months after the previous birth in the 1987-9 
data, these differences are much smaller in the 1998 data. However, the shape of the 
hazard function differs markedly by marital status in both surveys. This is further 
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confirmed by the changes in the conditional expected birth interval length between the 
two surveys (Table 7.7). 
Figure 7.4 Fitted incidence rates and cumulative survival functions by survey 
date and marital status  
Table 7.7 Conditional expected birth interval length (months) of women 
having a subsequent birth within 120 months, by survey date and 
marital status 
 Survey 
Marital status 1987-9 1998 
Never married 51.8 58.2 
Married 42.6 49.8 
 
There is almost no difference in the change in expected birth interval length 
between the two groups of women, or over the two time periods covered by the 
surveys. The conditional interval length for married women increased by 7.2 months, 
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while that for unmarried women increased by 6.4 months. Thus, the hypothesised 
effects of marital status on women’s birth intervals are supported to a degree, although 
there is some evidence that the differential has narrowed recently. The main effect 
operates in the direction assumed initially, while the significance of the variable-interval 
interaction confirms the different pattern of childbearing since last birth for the two 
groups of women, while the significant variable-survey interaction indicates that the 
pattern of childbearing has changed over the periods covered by the two surveys. 
The second investigation suggested by the hypotheses is that women who are 
more prone to marital disruption have longer birth intervals than women whose lives 
are characterised by a greater degree of marital stability. Relative to women who are 
currently in their first marriage, the estimated hazard is lower for all the other groups of 
women set out in Table 7.5. In addition, although the data are too complex to permit 
graphical exposition, there is a wide variation in the proportion of women who have yet 
to have another child within 120 months of their last (Table 7.8). 
Table 7.8 Estimated cumulative survival functions, by propensity for marital 
disruption and survey 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Duration 1987 1998 1987 1998 1987 1998 1987 1998 1987 1998 
0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
9 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.9 99.8 99.9 99.8 99.9 99.8 99.9
18 96.6 97.6 92.5 95.3 94.2 96.4 94.2 96.1 93.0 95.7
24 92.1 94.3 83.3 89.0 87.2 91.5 86.7 90.7 84.9 90.2
30 85.4 89.0 71.0 79.9 77.7 84.6 76.3 82.8 74.3 82.3
36 78.9 83.5 60.4 71.3 69.1 78.0 66.8 75.0 64.8 75.0
42 72.8 78.1 51.4 63.4 61.8 71.8 58.5 67.5 56.9 68.7
48 67.7 73.4 44.7 57.0 56.1 66.8 52.1 61.2 51.0 63.6
54 63.2 69.1 39.2 51.4 51.3 62.3 46.7 55.7 46.2 59.1
60 59.1 64.9 34.6 46.3 47.3 58.3 42.0 50.6 42.2 55.2
66 55.4 60.8 30.7 41.7 43.8 54.6 37.9 45.8 38.8 51.8
72 52.4 57.3 27.7 38.0 41.1 51.6 34.7 42.0 36.3 49.0
84 47.3 51.2 23.1 31.8 36.8 46.4 29.7 35.3 32.4 44.2
96 43.6 46.1 19.9 27.0 33.9 42.4 26.0 30.1 29.7 40.6
108 40.4 41.3 17.5 22.9 31.6 38.6 22.9 25.6 27.6 37.3
120 38.2 37.5 15.8 19.8 30.2 35.6 20.8 22.4 26.3 35.0
Note:  (1): Single; (2) Married, 1 union; (3) Divorced, separated or widowed, 1 union;  
(4) Married, 1+ unions; (5) Divorced, separated or widowed, 1+ unions. 
 
Thus, as expected, more single women tend to not have another child within 10 
years than other groups of women, while women in their first marriage show the 
greatest likelihood of having another child. Women currently in a second or higher 
order marriage have the next highest risk, while the risk among divorcees and widowers 
tends to be closer to that among single women, especially in the 1998 survey. In general, 
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then, the hypothesis is supported. The resulting conditional expected birth interval 
lengths are given in Table 7.9. 
Table 7.9 Conditional expected birth interval length (months) of women 
having a subsequent birth within 120 months, by survey date and 
propensity for marital disruption 
Propensity for disruption 1987 1998 Change 
Single - 0 Unions 51.8 58.3 6.6 
Married - 1 Union 43.8 51.2 7.4 
Divorced, separated, widowed - 1 Union 45.3 52.7 7.4 
Married - 1+ Unions 47.1 53.4 6.3 
Divorced, separated, widowed - 1+ Unions 43.4 49.9 6.5 
 
Thus, even though the proportions of women who are likely to have a subsequent 
child within 120 months may vary by their propensity for marital disruption, the 
expected timing of births among those women who do have another child is remarkably 
similar for all women other than those who have never been married. 
7.6.3 Results: Hypothesis Two – Education, urbanisation and material well-
being 
The second hypothesis investigates trends and differentials in women’s birth intervals 
according to their social and economic status. Three variables were included in the 
model to assess the effect of social and economic status: highest completed level of 
education, urban or rural residence, and a proxy measure of household wealth based on 
a scale of consumer durables present in the household as discussed in Section 7.5.3.2.  
7.6.3.1 Effect of education 
As expected, women’s childbearing is greatly affected by her highest completed standard 
of education. Likelihood ratio tests indicated that the variable-survey interaction did not 
add significantly to the fit of the model. 
Having some education (up Standard 3 – five years of schooling) has no 
significant effect on the hazard of having another birth relative to having had no 
schooling at all. The proportion of women closing their birth intervals by 120 months 
falls with increasing levels of education after this point, with around one in three women 
who have completed their schooling not having closed their birth intervals within 120 
months, compared with one in five women with less than a Standard 3 education (Table 
7.10). 
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Table 7.10 Estimated cumulative survival functions, by highest completed level 
of education and survey 
 None St 3 St 5 St 9 Matric + 
Duration 1987 1998 1987 1998 1987 1998 1987 1998 1987 1998 
0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
9 99.7 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 100.0
18 91.9 93.8 92.7 94.8 93.6 95.7 95.0 96.9 96.6 98.2
24 82.4 85.9 83.8 87.8 85.7 89.8 88.6 92.4 92.0 95.4
30 70.3 75.1 72.1 78.0 74.9 81.4 79.5 85.5 85.2 91.0
36 59.9 65.5 61.9 68.8 65.3 73.3 71.0 78.6 78.5 86.2
42 51.4 57.3 53.4 60.7 57.0 65.9 63.4 72.0 72.2 81.3
48 45.1 51.0 47.0 54.2 50.7 59.6 57.3 66.3 66.9 76.8
54 40.1 45.8 41.7 48.7 45.4 54.1 52.0 61.2 62.0 72.4
60 36.0 41.2 37.4 44.0 40.9 49.3 47.5 56.4 57.5 68.1
66 32.5 37.1 33.7 39.7 37.0 44.9 43.4 51.8 53.2 63.7
72 29.9 34.1 30.9 36.5 34.0 41.4 40.2 48.0 49.7 59.9
84 25.9 29.1 26.5 31.2 29.2 35.7 35.0 41.2 44.0 53.1
96 23.3 25.6 23.5 27.2 25.7 31.3 31.2 35.8 39.4 47.3
108 21.3 22.9 21.1 23.9 23.0 27.3 27.9 30.8 35.5 41.6
120 20.0 21.0 19.5 21.6 21.2 24.4 25.7 27.1 32.8 37.0
 
Importantly, too, the differentials in women’s childbearing by their educational 
attainment are widening, as shown by Table 7.11. More educated women in the 1987 
survey not only had longer intervals in comparison with less educated women, but 
conditional expected birth intervals for women who had completed their schooling 
increased by more than double the amount of the increase among women with no 
education. 
Table 7.11 Conditional expected birth interval length (months) of women 
having a subsequent birth within 120 months, by survey date and 
highest completed level of education 
Highest completed school standard  1987 1998 Change 
None 42.1 46.0 3.9 
St 3 43.7 48.4 4.6 
St 5 45.7 51.3 5.6 
St 9 48.8 55.9 7.1 
Matric + 53.5 61.9 8.4 
 
7.6.3.2 Urbanisation 
Section 4.4.3 indicated that the differential in women’s birth intervals – while increasing 
for women in both rural and urban areas – is widening. The modelling of these 
differentials confirms that result (Figure 7.5). The hazard function for urban women in 
the 1998 survey is almost constant after 36 months, while the other three hazard 
functions exhibit more typical shapes. There has been little change between the two 
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surveys in the proportion of rural women not progressing to a subsequent birth within 
120 months. Urban women are slightly less likely to have another child within 120 
months than their rural counterparts.  
Figure 7.5 Fitted incidence rates and cumulative survival functions by survey 
date and place of residence 
 
The effect of the changes in trends and differentials in women’s childbearing 
according to their place of residence can be seen clearly in Table 7.12. While the 
conditional expected birth interval length for the synthetic cohort of women resident in 
rural areas increased by 5.2 months over the period covered by the surveys, that for high 
status women increased by 9.5 months. Thus, while the differential between urban and 
rural women in the 1987-9 survey was 4.1 months in 1987-9, this had widened to 8.4 
months by the time of the 1998 survey.  
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Table 7.12 Conditional expected birth interval length (months) of women 
having a subsequent birth within 120 months, by survey date and 
place of residence 
 Survey 
Residence 1987-9 1998 
Urban 48.8 58.3 
Rural 44.7 49.9 
 
7.6.3.3 Consumer durables in the household 
The third aspect of socio-economic status investigated is the extent to which there are 
significant differentials, and trends in those differentials, among women’s childbearing 
by a proxy for their wealth. As with the investigation in respect of education, the 
variable-interval interaction was significant. 
Figure 7.6 Fitted incidence rates and cumulative survival functions by survey 
date and number of consumer durables in the household 
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Women living in households with more consumer durables are less likely to close 
their birth intervals within 120 months than women living in poorer households. At the 
same time, the proportion of women in poorer households not progressing to a 
subsequent birth within 120 months has remained almost unchanged over the period 
covered by the two surveys, while that of women in richer households has increased in 
the 1998 survey relative to the 1987 survey. Furthermore, the differential in birth 
intervals between women in wealthier households is widening relative to women in 
poorer households. The conditional expected birth interval length for women in poorer 
households increased by 4.6 months to 49.2 months between the two surveys, while that 
for women in richer households increased by 6.8 months, to 58.2 months (Table 7.13). 
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Table 7.13 Conditional expected birth interval length (months) of women 
having a subsequent birth within 120 months, by survey date and 
number of consumer durables in the household 
 Survey 
Number of durables 1987-9 1998 
0 – 1 44.6 49.2 
2 – 3  51.4 58.2 
 
7.6.4 Results: Hypothesis Three – Violence and social instability 
The third hypothesis posits that endemic violence and social disruption and instability 
might account for the continued increase in birth intervals after the end of apartheid. 
The hypothesis suggests that, since this violence was concentrated most intensely in the 
province of KwaZulu-Natal, and that that instability and violence may have led women 
to delay their childbearing, the differential between birth intervals in KwaZulu-Natal 
and those in other provinces would have widened.  
The hypothesised variable-interval interaction effect does not produce a better 
fitting model. Thus, there is no statistically significant non-proportional difference 
between the distribution of childbearing between women in KwaZulu-Natal and those 
in other provinces. The variable-survey interaction, however, is significant. This shows 
that the differentials in patterns of childbearing between the two groups of women have 
changed in non-proportional ways. 
A somewhat strange distribution of incidence rates and cumulative survival 
function can be seen in the data for KwaZulu-Natal in the 1987-9 survey (Figure 7.7), 
resulting in higher rates of non-progression by 120 months for these women than for 
any other group. Data errors for women in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1987-9 DHS cannot 
be excluded. 
Nevertheless, the results shown here lead to the rejection of the hypothesis. 
Rather than indicating longer birth intervals in KwaZulu-Natal than other provinces, the 
model shows that women in KwaZulu-Natal surveyed in the 1998 DHS tend to 
progress faster to another birth than other women, while this pattern is reversed in the 
earlier survey.  
Figure 7.7 Fitted incidence rates and cumulative survival functions by survey 
date and residence in KwaZulu-Natal 
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The distribution of incidence rates shows patterns of childbearing in both the 
1987-9 and 1998 surveys similar to those identified in the testing of earlier hypotheses 
and in the base model. The distribution of childbearing in the later survey is much 
flatter than in the earlier survey. The conditional expected birth interval lengths are 
shown in Table 7.14. 
From these data, it is apparent that despite the (possibly) greater proportion of 
women in KwaZulu-Natal not having a subsequent birth within 10 years of the last, the 
conditional expected interval length for those women who did have a birth within 10 
years shows no difference between women in KwaZulu-Natal and those in other 
provinces in the 1987-9 survey. By contrast, in the 1998 survey, women in KwaZulu-
Natal tended to have their births faster than women in other provinces. 
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Table 7.14 Conditional expected birth interval length (months) of women 
having a subsequent birth within 120 months, by survey date and 
province of residence 
 Survey 
Province of residence 1987-9 1998 
Not KwaZulu-Natal 46.2 54.5 
KwaZulu-Natal  47.1 49.8 
 
7.6.5 Results: Hypothesis Four – Disease and subfecundability 
The final hypothesis is an inquiry into whether the spread of HIV in South Africa in the 
1980s and 1990s has precipitated a shift in women’s patterns of childbearing. It is 
proposed that, since infection with HIV inhibits conception, women living in provinces 
that show higher levels of HIV prevalence have longer birth intervals than women living 
in other provinces. 
All three second-order interaction terms are significant in the model, as is the 
three-way interaction between variable, interval and survey. 
The results from this model, and the implications for the validation of the 
hypothesis are striking. With the exception of women surveyed in 1998 living in 
provinces with high HIV prevalence, the pattern of child spacing is fundamentally 
similar. Only women living in high HIV provinces at the time of the later survey show a 
different pattern of child spacing (Figure 7.8), but in any event, this pattern suggests that 
women in these provinces have a greater hazard of having another birth later than other 
women. However, it is important to note, again, that the proportion of women not 
having a subsequent birth within 10 years of the last has hardly changed in any of the 
groups. Hence, women living in high HIV provinces delay their births more than other 
women, either by accident or by design, but show similar levels of parity progression ten 
years after the birth of the last child. 
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Figure 7.8 Fitted incidence rates and cumulative survival functions by survey 
date and residence in provinces with high levels of HIV prevalence 
 
An examination of the conditional expected interval length shows that, among 
those women having a subsequent birth within 10 years, women living in high HIV 
prevalence provinces in both surveys tended to have longer birth intervals than those 
not living in these provinces. More significantly, however, the differential in conditional 
expectation between women in the two groups of provinces has widened slightly. 
Among women surveyed in the 1987-9 DHS, the provincial differential is 2.5 months. 
However, in the 1998 DHS, that differential is 3.2 months. Similarly, while these 
conditional expectations indicate that birth intervals in the low HIV prevalence 
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provinces has increased by 6.3 months between the two surveys, those in high HIV 
provinces has increased by 7 months. 
Table 7.15 Conditional expected birth interval length (months) of women 
having a subsequent birth within 120 months, by survey date and 
residence in provinces with high levels of HIV 
 Survey 
Province of residence 1987-9 1998 
Not high HIV 44.8 51.1 
High HIV 47.3 54.3 
 
Thus, there some evidence in support of this hypothesis on the grounds of 
ecological association. Other factors, of course, may account for the observed widening 
of the differential between this grouping of provinces. However, these groupings of 
provinces are not very homogeneous in other respects: both urbanised and rural 
provinces are included in the group of high HIV provinces. Moreover, there is no 
obvious linguistic compositional distinction between the two groups of provinces. 
Thus, while the point can be made that higher levels of HIV prevalence are 
generally associated with bigger increases in conditional expected birth interval length, 
the results shown for areas with the highest levels of HIV prevalence indicate that 
higher HIV prevalence does not offer a complete explanation of the increase in birth 
intervals. This result, however, may not be as anomalous as it appears. Indeed, the very 
behaviours underlying high rates of HIV infection may be the very same as those 
resulting in a slower increase in birth intervals. 
However, since data on individual women’s sero-status were not collected in the 
1998 DHS. Without these individual level data it is dangerous to draw firm conclusions 
about the association between HIV infection and women’s birth intervals, and on the 
basis of the evidence presented above, the hypothesis should be rejected. 
7.7 Discussion 
This chapter sought to identify possible explanations for the continued increase in birth 
intervals in South Africa. Existing methods for investigating birth intervals were 
discussed, and an approach (using Poisson regression techniques) proposed that permits 
the comparison of data from more than one survey. Despite suffering from certain 
statistical limitations, described in Section 7.4, the method has proved extremely useful 
in highlighting trends and differentials in birth intervals among African South African 
women over the last few years. 
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Four hypotheses were proposed to explain the continued increase in birth 
intervals among African South Africans. The testing of the first hypothesis confirmed 
the existence of differentials in child spacing between ever-married and never-married 
women. However, the differential between these two groups of women has not widened 
between the two surveys. Birth intervals for both groups of women have increased by 
approximately the same amount, and hence changes in gender relations cannot account 
for the continued increase in birth intervals after the end of apartheid.  
No evidence was found to contradict the second hypothesis. Women likely to 
have suffered least under apartheid (urban, educated and relatively wealthier women) 
have shown a large increase in their birth intervals, while intervals for other women 
have also lengthened, but by a lesser amount.  
Third, it was hypothesised that that the continued increase in birth intervals might 
have been precipitated by violence and social instability. This hypothesis was also 
rejected. The conditional expected birth interval length among women living in the 
province most affected by violence and social stability (KwaZulu-Natal) increased by 
less than it did among women living in other provinces.  
The evidence in support of the fourth hypothesis is unconvincing. Women living 
in provinces afflicted with high levels of HIV infection show longer birth intervals than 
women living in provinces with lower levels. However, the differential between the two 
groups of women has not widened substantially over the period of investigation covered 
by the two surveys. Further detailed research is necessary to investigate this hypothesis 
further, requiring a survey that captures detailed maternity histories and maternal sero-
status. 
However, in none of the four investigations conducted was an instance found 
where the survival function for women interviewed in the 1987-9 survey and that for 
women interviewed in 1998 overlapped. In other words, no group of women has been 
identified for whom patterns of childbearing have remained invariant over the period of 
investigation. This suggests that patterns of childbearing in South Africa after the end of 
apartheid have, in some sense, become institutionalised. African South African women’s 
birth intervals have lengthened, irrespective of their marital status, their social status or 
their experience of conflict, although there does appear to be some association between 
the spread of HIV and the increase in birth intervals.  
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Chapter 2 argued that the forces of history exert long-term consequences. Robert 
Putnam (1993) was quoted as saying “individuals responding rationally to the social 
context bequeathed to them by history reinforce social pathologies”. The continued 
increase in birth intervals in South Africa after the end of apartheid provides one telling 
demographic example of this. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this thesis was to detail the causes and institutional context of the South 
African fertility decline, and thereby to answer the question, “Why has fertility in South 
Africa fallen so slowly?”. Three investigations were pursued, each of which has helped 
to cast light on the answer to that question. Substantive findings and conclusions have 
already been presented at the end of each chapter of this thesis. Consequently, the 
conclusions set out here will not simply repeat those findings, but concentrate instead 
on integrating them into a coherent story that answers the research question.  
The first investigation was that into the level and past trend in South African 
fertility and birth intervals over the course of the fertility decline. Chapter 3 provided 
concrete evidence of the pace of the fertility decline in South Africa since the 1960s. 
The level of fertility has fallen gradually over an extended period of time. Over a quarter 
of a century, the level of fertility among African South Africans has fallen by less than 
half, from approximately 6 children per woman in 1970 to 3.5 children per woman in 
1996. There are no obvious discontinuities in this trend associated with the 
implementation of the government’s family planning programmes in 1974 and 1984. By 
this measure – the correct one, given the intensity of the government’s desire to 
precipitate a rapid decline in African fertility – those programmes failed to meet their 
objectives despite their reputed strength and vigour.  
Chapter 4 investigated the length of women’s birth intervals using life table and 
other techniques. These results are certainly the most surprising presented in this thesis. 
African women’s birth intervals have increased dramatically since the early 1970s. 
Furthermore, this increase has followed a secular trend discernible among all women, 
irrespective of their age or parity. The conclusion arrived at is not that women did not 
avail themselves of modern forms of contraception (they did), but that they did so to 
exercise greater control over the pace, not the quantity, of childbearing. 
The results presented in these two chapters were compared and contrasted with 
demographic evidence from other African countries synthesised by Barney Cohen. 
While the age distribution of fertility among African South Africans is shown to be 
essentially similar to that in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the pattern of birth 
spacing, as evinced by the calculation of B60s suggests that, at present, that pattern is 
dissimilar to that observed elsewhere in the region. However, the B60s for those other 
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African countries that have entered the fertility transition show a similar shape across 
cohorts to those observed in South Africa, even if they indicate faster progression to a 
subsequent parity. Thus, although this was not a focal point of the thesis, the conclusion 
drawn is that the demography of South Africa cannot be regarded as being either sui 
generis, or typically African. Rather, South African fertility data both do and do not show 
similarities with those data from other African countries, depending on the measure 
adopted. 
 
The second investigation examined the rhetoric, discourse and institutional context of 
reproduction that prevailed in South Africa under apartheid. The observed length of 
birth intervals impels the analysis of the South African fertility decline to accommodate 
institutional theory, and to investigate whether the underlying forces behind the 
apparent slowness of the fertility decline and the rise in birth intervals may have their 
explanation in the social structure of South African society. As argued in Chapters 5 and 
6, the apparent anomalies of the South African fertility decline have an intuitive 
explanation when they are analysed using the theoretical framework first used by 
McNicoll. 
According to this analysis, the slow pace of the South African fertility decline can 
be attributed to a range of institutional and structural factors. As a result of internal 
contradiction and policy changes over time, the state was never able to establish a firm 
grip on the African population and thereby manipulate the economics of the supply and 
demand for children. Government social and economic policies, whilst employing the 
rhetoric of modernisation and demographic transition theory, were generally inimical to 
rapid fertility decline. These policies (particularly those relating to influx control, 
education and urbanisation) had the effect of attenuating the potential benefits of 
modernisation.  
As Chapters 2 and 5 have argued, no obvious reason exists as to why, with the 
range of theoretical positions on the causes and consequences of fertility decline 
available, the South African government should have adopted the particular 
demographic theorisations that it did. However, when these policies and practices are 
situated in their historical context, it becomes clear that the theoretical positions 
adopted by successive apartheid governments were those that were best suited to the 
quasi-scientific justifications that the government sought for its policies, while also 
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reflecting its own identification with particular ideological positions in the international 
political environment. 
Beyond the structural constraints on women’s lives imposed by apartheid, the 
apartheid state’s policies embodied neither of McNicoll’s two paths of state-led fertility 
decline. State-individual relationships with Africans were not regularised. Equally, the 
state could not (and would not) use duress to dictate the pace of the South African 
fertility transition. Second, apartheid institutions had the (unintended) effect of 
precipitating an irrevocable transformation of gender relations between African men 
and women. Migrant labour, restrictions on urbanisation and forced removals distorted 
and disrupted the formation of stable households and relationships. By the early 1980s, 
large numbers of African women were living in households headed by themselves or by 
other women, and – in many respects – viewed men as superfluous. This change in 
gender relations is made clear, too, by women’s adoption of modern contraceptive 
methods in the face of male opposition based on political and patriarchal views.  
The family planning programmes implemented by apartheid governments offered 
African women a mechanism whereby they could assert a greater degree of control of 
their lives and their reproduction in a setting where the state and its institutional 
structures exercised huge power over individuals. Women’s tenuous urban livelihoods, 
and poverty in rural areas, coupled with the state’s intervention into, and obstruction of, 
family life meant that women sought modern contraceptive methods not to limit their 
fertility, but as an economic survival strategy. 
Hence, this thesis has argued that the African populace used the government’s 
family planning programmes for purposes other than those intended by apartheid 
planners. Despite the imbalance between structure and agency in the South African 
context, the dynamics of the South African fertility decline and women’s responses to 
the institutional forces ranged against them suggest a Giddensian analysis of the 
dynamics of the South African fertility transition. The evolution and articulation of 
White fears that they were being swamped by African population growth precipitated 
state responses to those fears in the form of a system of generalised racism and 
implemented through apartheid policies and the government’s family planning 
programmes. African women, however, were not simply the passive targets of these 
policies, responding mechanically to the state’s bidding. Rather, as Giddens (1984, 1990) 
has theorised, individuals and the state recursively interacted with each other. With the 
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failure of modernisation-led fertility decline, the state sought to alter African women’s 
fertility preferences through the provision of contraception in the hope that they would 
avail themselves of these technologies to practice parity-specific fertility limitation. 
African women, however, saw this intervention as an opportunity to assert greater 
control over their lives in a way that made sense to them, and in ways that reconstituted 
their views of the world. African women’s childbearing, as a result, was modified 
iteratively by their changing perceptions and experiences of the effects of apartheid 
social engineering. As we have seen, women also rationalised their responses to the 
provision of contraception, and the institutional forces set against them. In their 
discussion of gender relations, their own recasting of their position – with men 
occupying an increasingly peripheral space in the constitution of their quotidian realities 
– are indicative of this reflexivity in action. Hence, what has happened in the course of 
the South African fertility transition relates strongly to Giddens’ assertion that  
the reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that 
social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the 
light of incoming information about those very practices, thus 
constitutively altering their character. (Giddens, 1990:38)  
 
The third investigation was that into the continued increase in birth intervals in South 
Africa after the end of apartheid in 1990. The penultimate chapter applied statistical 
techniques to discern and elucidate the trends and differentials in the length of birth 
intervals over the last few decades. Differentials in women’s birth intervals according to 
their marital and social status were identified. Birth intervals among women never 
married at the time of their giving birth were longer than those among married women. 
However, expected birth intervals do not seem to depend on women’s propensity to 
engage in disrupted relationships. Internal instability in the country around the end of 
apartheid does not explain the increase. The spread of HIV in the country in the 1990s 
may have contributed to the lengthening of birth intervals. The further disentangling of 
this association could be a profitable line for further research. 
No thesis on the recent or current demography of South Africa (or any other sub-
Saharan African country, for that matter) can possibly be viewed as complete without 
some discussion of the impact of HIV/AIDS. Indeed, the critical reader of this thesis 
might feel that leaving such a crucial demographic cataclysm to the final paragraphs 
constitutes a serious error of omission on the part of the author. In the final analysis, 
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however, this thesis has been largely reconstructive: understanding the process and 
dynamics underlying the South African fertility transition to date. Given that much of it 
has been focused on events in the (sometimes very) distant past, the neglect of the 
impact of HIV/AIDS is defensible. The first case of HIV/AIDS was diagnosed in 
South Africa in the mid-1980s, and the epidemic only started spreading dramatically in 
the mid- to late 1990s. As a result, the 1996 South Africa Census and the 1998 DHS 
data provide a demographic picture that is never to be regained: the demography of 
South Africa more or less untouched by the ravages of the disease. While the impact of 
HIV/AIDS-related mortality is still to work its way through onto the structure of the 
South African population, some evidence of its impact on the future demography of 
South Africa can be found in the differentials in women’s patterns of child spacing 
described in Chapter 7. 
What are the likely implications of the epidemic for future population growth, 
fertility levels and birth intervals? At this point the discussion has to enter the realm of 
informed speculation, although a couple of pointers are available. There is growing 
evidence from elsewhere in Africa that HIV has an inhibiting effect on fecundability. 
Already, birth intervals among South African women living in provinces with higher 
levels of HIV prevalence appear to be increasing. Given that in October 2000, around a 
quarter of women attending antenatal clinics in South Africa and around one in nine 
South Africans of all ages were infected with HIV, the spread of the epidemic must be 
assumed to limit at least some women’s fertility. In the absence of an increase in fertility 
among uninfected women, this in itself would be adequate to precipitate a further fall in 
national fertility. However, when viewed against the backdrop of already exceptionally 
long birth intervals before the advent of HIV/AIDS, the impact of the epidemic on 
fertility in South Africa is likely to be even more dramatic. Were women to bear children 
in relatively quick succession, it would be possible for many women to bear a number of 
children before succumbing to infection, reduced fecundability and eventual death. 
Where women space their children by between five and eight years, however, the ability 
of women to bear large numbers of children is curtailed drastically. 
A further methodological point in the measurement of fertility in countries with 
high levels of HIV infection will also come to the fore in the coming years. The most 
commonly used measure of fertility, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), is not robust against 
increasing levels of mortality. Implicit in the formulation of the TFR is the assumption 
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that maternal mortality is relatively low: it gives the number of children a woman may be 
expected to have by the end of her childbearing years, if she follows the experience of 
women older than she, and if she survives to menopause. With increasingly fewer 
numbers of women surviving to age 50, and increasing rates of HIV-associated 
subfecundability, demographers will need to ask themselves what the TFR really 
measures in these environments, and – if necessary – will need to develop new and 
more robust indicators of period-based fertility levels, cognisant of the fact that the TFR 
is not a measure of reproductivity. 
 
The fundamental premise of this thesis was set out in the Introduction: that the pattern 
and process of fertility decline in South Africa could not be understood outside of the 
social and institutional context in which that decline has occurred. 
The three investigations examined the historical dynamics of the South African 
fertility decline from a number of perspectives, all of which lead to the same conclusion. 
Apartheid population policies were ineffectual in hastening the pace of the South 
African fertility transition but have nonetheless continued to exercise a profound 
influence on African women’s childbearing. Despite being widely praised for their reach 
and their implementation, the failure to integrate population policies into broader social, 
economic and political programmes meant that the institutional conditions of African 
women’s lives under apartheid were not changed to be conducive to rapid fertility 
decline. Furthermore, the state lacked the legitimacy, and did not use the coercive 
capacity at its disposal, to encourage or force African women to limit their fertility. 
However, the rapid rate of uptake of modern contraception in South Africa from the 
mid-1960s onwards creates a paradox. African women did not use modern 
contraception for parity-specific fertility limitation, but neither did they use 
contraception for spacing their births according to the age of their youngest child. A 
new pattern of contraceptive use, ostensibly the product of women repeatedly deciding 
to go on delaying childbearing for now as an economic and social survival strategy, has 
been identified. The evolution of a pattern of very long (and increasing) median birth 
intervals among African South African women is held to be evidence of this. 
The combination of apartheid policies, the institutional structure of South African 
society, and the subversion of the government’s strong and vigorous family planning 
campaigns explains the dynamics of the South African fertility transition far better than 
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simply appealing to any one of these forces, since they were reflexively bound up with, 
and continually mediated, each other. Further, the thesis has argued that the slow 
decline in fertility and the rapid rise in birth intervals are not incompatible with each 
other. Rather, the structural and institutional context in which African women found 
themselves in between 1960 and 1990 has resulted in a distinctive pattern of fertility 
decline and birth spacing that shows strong evidence of path-dependence.  
Thus, the South African fertility decline provides further support for McNicoll’s 
argument that fertility transition is innately and inherently institutional. Where social 
institutions are ill-conducive to fertility change, even the strongest family planning 
programme is likely to have a limited impact. 
 
In a recent paper, John Casterline (1999:4) noted that “at present, there is little 
agreement about why some fertility declines are precipitous while others occur at a 
leisurely pace”. This thesis has taken some small steps towards resolving this apparent 
conundrum. Taking South Africa as a single example, this thesis has argued that the 
underlying reason why the fertility decline has occurred slowly, even in the face of 
strong and vigorous family planning campaigns, is that the underlying institutional 
structure of South African society was not amenable to rapid changes in fertility. 
Certainly, this thesis has demonstrated that it is indeed hard, if not impossible, to 
evaluate thoroughly the dynamics of fertility decline in South Africa without keeping the 
institutional structure of South African society in the foreground.  
The institutional approach to the analysis of fertility adopted here has allowed a 
nuanced picture of fertility changes in a given space over time to emerge. By avoiding a 
presumption of institutional stasis, analyses conducted using this approach are likely to 
be equally interested in both the absolute levels of fertility in a given population at a 
given time, as well as in the institutional and social forces that are in operation and 
which serve to affect the level of fertility over time. 
South Africa provides, in many respects, an extreme case against which the role of 
institutions in the process of fertility decline can be assessed. The nature of many South 
African institutions over the course of the apartheid era facilitates that analysis, since the 
effect of the polity and other institutions on demographic outcomes are easier to divine 
and determine than would frequently be the case. State policies and institutions exerted 
an influence on demographic outcomes more directly than is usual even in developing 
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countries. Other analyses that seek to demonstrate similar effects in other countries and 
other institutional settings will require somewhat subtler analyses.  
 
The thesis adds to our knowledge in several significant ways. The level and trend of the 
past decline in fertility in South Africa is now known with greater certainty. In so doing, 
the quality of the fertility data in the 1996 South Africa Census has been subjected to 
rigorous investigation. Important lessons about the quality of those data have been 
learned. The estimates derived are a first step to accurate reporting and recording of 
levels and trends in fertility in South Africa.  
Birth intervals in South Africa have been investigated for the first time. A 
(possibly unique) pattern of childbearing has been identified among African women, 
which is argued to be a response to the conditions under which they made reproductive 
decisions. Much information, which was previously solely at the disposal of Afrikaans-
speaking South Africans, allowing the assessment of the decline in fertility in the 
country, has been made more generally accessible. As a result of the work presented in 
this thesis, it is hoped that our understanding of the fertility transition in South Africa, 
and the debate on the process and pattern of fertility decline in South Africa is advanced 
considerably. 
The census conducted in South Africa in October 2001, together with subsequent 
Demographic and Health Surveys, will add considerably to the data available to 
researchers to assess the progress of the South African fertility decline, both nationally 
and in comparison with the declines evident in other African countries. It is hoped that 
other sources of data, which will permit thorough investigation into the consequences 
of HIV infection for fertility and childbearing, will also be collected in the coming years. 
The historical evidence and institutional analysis strongly suggest that the principal 
reason underlying the slow pace of the South African fertility decline is that the social, 
political, economic and institutional structure of South African society was ill-conducive 
to rapid fertility decline. That structure, too, has precipitated the creation of a path-
dependent pattern of child spacing in the country, characterised by increasing birth 
intervals and possibly now exacerbated by the spread of HIV. 
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APPENDIX 1 PARAMETERS OF MODELS FITTED IN CHAPTER 7 
The following tables set out the six models fitted to the data in Chapter 7. Note, that as 
described in that chapter, the model fitting process sought to find the most 
parsimonious model for each hypothesis, taking the “base” model as fixed. The 
specification of each model was determined through likelihood ratio tests. Hence, some 
variables included in these models might not appear to be significant, but likelihood 
ratio tests showed that their omission would result in significantly worse-fitting models. 
Table A1 presents the results from the base model fitted in Section 7.6.1. Table 
A2 present the results of the model specified to test the first two hypotheses in Sections 
7.6. Tables A3 and A4 show the results of the models specified to test the third and 
fourth hypotheses. 
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Table A1 Model results – Base model 
 
Negative binomial regression Number of observations 89891
LR chi2(46) 4653.750
Prob > chi2 0.000
Log likelihood = -33979.228 Pseudo R2 0.064
PARAMETER Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
Interval (Base: 30)
0 -5.120 0.192 -26.640 0.000 -5.497 -4.743
9 -1.491 0.061 -24.320 0.000 -1.612 -1.371
18 -0.649 0.053 -12.310 0.000 -0.753 -0.546
24 -0.126 0.047 -2.670 0.008 -0.218 -0.034
36 0.061 0.046 1.330 0.184 -0.029 0.151
42 0.017 0.048 0.360 0.721 -0.077 0.112
48 0.034 0.051 0.670 0.504 -0.066 0.135
54 0.066 0.055 1.190 0.234 -0.043 0.174
60 0.132 0.059 2.230 0.026 0.016 0.248
66 0.040 0.066 0.610 0.544 -0.090 0.170
72 0.040 0.064 0.630 0.530 -0.085 0.166
84 0.008 0.078 0.110 0.915 -0.145 0.162
96 0.099 0.091 1.090 0.277 -0.080 0.278
108
Survey (Base: 1987)
1998 -0.840 0.068 -12.370 0.000 -0.973 -0.707
Duration (continuous, = 0 at interval = 27) -0.017 0.002 -11.100 0.000 -0.020 -0.014
Interaction: Duration and Survey
1998 0.021 0.002 8.700 0.000 0.017 0.026
Birth order (Base: 1 & 2)
3 & 4 0.014 0.028 0.490 0.624 -0.042 0.070
5 & 6 -0.017 0.041 -0.420 0.673 -0.099 0.064
Age of mother (Base: 25-29)
-15 -1.949 0.424 -4.600 0.000 -2.780 -1.119
15-19 -0.302 0.048 -6.330 0.000 -0.395 -0.208
20-24 -0.108 0.035 -3.050 0.002 -0.178 -0.039
30-34 -0.131 0.040 -3.300 0.001 -0.209 -0.053
35-39 -0.317 0.051 -6.180 0.000 -0.417 -0.216
40-44 -0.403 0.083 -4.880 0.000 -0.565 -0.241
45-49 -0.464 0.336 -1.380 0.167 -1.122 0.194
Interaction: Duration and Age of mother
-15 -0.048 0.030 -1.600 0.110 -0.107 0.011
15-19 0.001 0.002 0.390 0.699 -0.004 0.006
20-24 0.001 0.001 0.860 0.387 -0.001 0.004
30-34 0.001 0.001 1.010 0.315 -0.001 0.004
35-39 -0.004 0.002 -2.690 0.007 -0.007 -0.001
40-44 -0.009 0.002 -3.600 0.000 -0.013 -0.004
45-49 -0.014 0.011 -1.280 0.200 -0.035 0.007
Linguistic group of mother (Base: Nguni)
English/Afrikaans -0.153 0.128 -1.190 0.234 -0.404 0.099
Sotho -0.106 0.029 -3.710 0.000 -0.162 -0.050
Other African 0.069 0.047 1.480 0.138 -0.022 0.160
Interaction: Duration and Linguistic group
English/Afrikaans 0.003 0.004 0.840 0.400 -0.004 0.011
Sotho 0.004 0.001 4.140 0.000 0.002 0.006
Other African 0.008 0.002 4.480 0.000 0.004 0.011
Childhood residence and survey (Base: Rural 1987)
City 1987 -0.305 0.072 -4.240 0.000 -0.446 -0.164
City 1998 -0.278 0.109 -2.560 0.010 -0.491 -0.065
Town 1987 -0.339 0.036 -9.300 0.000 -0.411 -0.268
Town 1998
Rural 1998 0.580 0.070 8.250 0.000 0.442 0.718
Interaction: Duration and Childhood residence and survey
City 1987 0.005 0.003 2.080 0.037 0.000 0.010
City 1998
Town 1987 0.004 0.001 3.040 0.002 0.001 0.007
Town 1998 -0.006 0.003 -1.920 0.055 -0.011 0.000
Rural 1998 -0.014 0.002 -5.590 0.000 -0.019 -0.009
Constant
-3.494 0.045 -77.370 0.000 -3.583 -3.406
/lnalpha 0.253 0.038 0.178 0.327
alpha 1.287 0.049 1.195 1.387
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0  chibar2(01) = 1640.070 Prob>=chibar2 0.000
Dropped due to collinearity
95% Confidence Interval
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
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Table A2 Model results – Hypotheses One and Two (Marital and socio-
economic status) 
Negative binomial regression Number of observations 87310
LR chi2(79) 5510.050
Prob > chi2 0.000
Log likelihood = -32602.315 Pseudo R2 0.078
PARAMETER Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
Interval (Base: 30)
0 -5.171 0.193 -26.790 0.000 -5.550 -4.793
9 -1.538 0.063 -24.580 0.000 -1.660 -1.415
18 -0.660 0.053 -12.390 0.000 -0.764 -0.556
24 -0.135 0.047 -2.840 0.004 -0.228 -0.042
36 0.084 0.046 1.820 0.069 -0.007 0.174
42 0.052 0.048 1.070 0.283 -0.043 0.147
48 0.076 0.052 1.470 0.140 -0.025 0.177
54 0.110 0.056 1.990 0.047 0.001 0.219
60 0.178 0.060 2.980 0.003 0.061 0.295
66 0.086 0.067 1.290 0.197 -0.045 0.218
72 0.075 0.065 1.150 0.248 -0.052 0.201
84 0.049 0.079 0.620 0.536 -0.105 0.202
96 0.128 0.092 1.390 0.164 -0.052 0.307
108
Survey (Base: 1987)
1998 -0.728 0.104 -6.970 0.000 -0.933 -0.523
Duration (continuous, = 0 at interval = 27) -0.025 0.002 -12.220 0.000 -0.029 -0.021
Interaction: Duration and Survey
1998 0.015 0.002 7.290 0.000 0.011 0.020
Birth order (Base: 1 & 2)
3 & 4 -0.135 0.029 -4.610 0.000 -0.193 -0.078
5 & 6 -0.257 0.043 -6.010 0.000 -0.341 -0.173
Age of mother (Base: 25-29)
-15 -1.743 0.418 -4.170 0.000 -2.562 -0.923
15-19 -0.166 0.049 -3.430 0.001 -0.262 -0.071
20-24 -0.061 0.036 -1.690 0.091 -0.131 0.010
30-34 -0.154 0.040 -3.820 0.000 -0.233 -0.075
35-39 -0.357 0.052 -6.820 0.000 -0.459 -0.254
40-44 -0.474 0.083 -5.680 0.000 -0.637 -0.310
45-49 -0.570 0.334 -1.710 0.088 -1.225 0.085
Interaction: Duration and Age of mother
-15 -0.052 0.029 -1.790 0.074 -0.110 0.005
15-19 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.998 -0.005 0.005
20-24 0.001 0.001 0.940 0.348 -0.001 0.004
30-34 0.002 0.001 1.720 0.085 0.000 0.005
35-39 -0.002 0.002 -1.060 0.291 -0.005 0.001
40-44 -0.005 0.002 -2.150 0.031 -0.010 0.000
45-49 -0.010 0.011 -0.940 0.348 -0.031 0.011
Linguistic group of mother (Base: Nguni)
English/Afrikaans -0.146 0.133 -1.100 0.270 -0.407 0.114
Sotho -0.111 0.041 -2.690 0.007 -0.192 -0.030
Other African -0.021 0.060 -0.350 0.725 -0.138 0.096
Interaction: Duration and Linguistic group
English/Afrikaans 0.004 0.004 1.040 0.298 -0.004 0.012
Sotho 0.004 0.001 4.300 0.000 0.002 0.006
Other African 0.009 0.002 5.090 0.000 0.006 0.012
Childhood residence and survey (Base: Rural 1987)
City 1987 -0.049 0.078 -0.620 0.534 -0.202 0.105
City 1998
Town 1987 -0.179 0.042 -4.260 0.000 -0.261 -0.097
Town 1998 0.248 0.110 2.250 0.024 0.032 0.463
Rural 1998 0.533 0.099 5.400 0.000 0.339 0.726
City 1987 0.001 0.003 0.480 0.634 -0.004 0.006
City 1998 0.006 0.003 2.040 0.041 0.000 0.012
Town 1987 0.002 0.001 1.070 0.284 -0.001 0.004
Town 1998
Rural 1998 -0.005 0.002 -2.530 0.011 -0.009 -0.001
Province (Base: Gauteng)
Western Cape -0.092 0.080 -1.150 0.251 -0.249 0.065
Eastern Cape 0.105 0.055 1.900 0.057 -0.003 0.213
Northern Cape 0.031 0.106 0.300 0.767 -0.176 0.239
Free State -0.164 0.054 -3.050 0.002 -0.269 -0.058
KwaZulu-Natal -0.058 0.055 -1.060 0.288 -0.166 0.049
North-West -0.037 0.050 -0.740 0.457 -0.135 0.061
Mpumalanga -0.002 0.057 -0.030 0.974 -0.113 0.110
Northern Province -0.016 0.049 -0.330 0.741 -0.112 0.079
/continued…
95% Confidence Interval
Interaction: Duration and Childhood residence and survey
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
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PARAMETER Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
Current residence (Base: Urban)
Rural 0.029 0.035 0.820 0.410 -0.040 0.098
Interaction: Survey and Current residence
Rural 1998 0.115 0.057 2.040 0.042 0.004 0.226
Education (Base: No education)
Education up to St. 3 (Grade 5) -0.054 0.045 -1.210 0.226 -0.142 0.034
Education up to St. 5 (Grade 7) -0.131 0.044 -2.950 0.003 -0.218 -0.044
Education up to St. 9 (Grade 11) -0.255 0.043 -5.910 0.000 -0.339 -0.170
Education up to St. 10 (Grade 12), or higher -0.581 0.059 -9.830 0.000 -0.697 -0.465
Interaction: Duration and Education
Education up to St. 3 (Grade 5) 0.003 0.002 1.870 0.062 0.000 0.006
Education up to St. 5 (Grade 7) 0.004 0.002 2.760 0.006 0.001 0.008
Education up to St. 9 (Grade 11) 0.006 0.002 3.950 0.000 0.003 0.009
Education up to St. 10 (Grade 12), or higher 0.008 0.002 3.980 0.000 0.004 0.012
Access to material resources  (Base: 0 or 1 durable, 1987)
0 or 1 durable, 1998
2 or 3 durables, 1987 -0.162 0.039 -4.150 0.000 -0.238 -0.085
2 or 3 durables, 1998 -0.359 0.052 -6.850 0.000 -0.462 -0.256
Interaction: Duration and Access to material resources
0 or 1 durable, 1998 -0.003 0.002 -1.850 0.064 -0.006 0.000
2 or 3 durables, 1987 0.005 0.001 3.260 0.001 0.002 0.007
2 or 3 durables, 1998
Marital status (Base: Married)
Never Married -0.268 0.039 -6.830 0.000 -0.345 -0.191
Interaction: Duration and Marital status 
Never Married 0.008 0.001 6.440 0.000 0.006 0.010
Interaction: Survey and Marital status 
Never Married 1998 0.139 0.049 2.840 0.005 0.043 0.235
Propensity for marital disruption (Base: Married, 1 Union)
Single, 0 unions -0.526 0.044 -11.850 0.000 -0.613 -0.439
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1 union -0.283 0.050 -5.630 0.000 -0.381 -0.184
Married, 1+ unions -0.186 0.054 -3.470 0.001 -0.291 -0.081
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1+ unions -0.162 0.111 -1.450 0.146 -0.380 0.056
Interaction: Duration and Propensity for marital disruption
Single, 0 unions -0.004 0.001 -3.000 0.003 -0.007 -0.001
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1 union -0.003 0.002 -1.490 0.135 -0.006 0.001
Married, 1+ unions 0.002 0.002 0.820 0.413 -0.002 0.005
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1+ unions -0.005 0.004 -1.350 0.177 -0.013 0.002
Constant
-3.026 0.077 -39.050 0.000 -3.177 -2.874
/lnalpha 0.097 0.042 0.016 0.179
alpha 1.102 0.046 1.016 1.196
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0  chibar2(01)= 1223.47 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
95% Confidence Interval
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Table A3 Model results – Hypothesis Three (Violence and social 
instability) 
Negative binomial regression Number of observations 87310
LR chi2(73) 5488.210
Prob > chi2 0.000
Log likelihood = -32613.235 Pseudo R2 0.078
PARAMETER Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
Interval (Base: 30)
0 -5.168 0.193 -26.780 0.000 -5.546 -4.790
9 -1.537 0.063 -24.560 0.000 -1.659 -1.414
18 -0.661 0.053 -12.400 0.000 -0.765 -0.556
24 -0.133 0.047 -2.820 0.005 -0.226 -0.041
36 0.083 0.046 1.800 0.072 -0.007 0.173
42 0.050 0.048 1.040 0.299 -0.045 0.145
48 0.075 0.052 1.460 0.146 -0.026 0.176
54 0.111 0.056 2.000 0.046 0.002 0.220
60 0.179 0.060 2.990 0.003 0.062 0.296
66 0.088 0.067 1.320 0.188 -0.043 0.219
72 0.077 0.065 1.180 0.236 -0.050 0.203
84 0.051 0.079 0.650 0.519 -0.103 0.205
96 0.128 0.092 1.390 0.164 -0.052 0.307
108
Survey (Base: 1987)
1998 -0.751 0.104 -7.240 0.000 -0.954 -0.548
Duration (continuous, = 0 at interval = 27) -0.025 0.002 -12.220 0.000 -0.029 -0.021
Interaction: Duration and Survey
1998 0.016 0.002 7.300 0.000 0.011 0.020
Birth order (Base: 1 & 2)
3 & 4 -0.132 0.029 -4.510 0.000 -0.190 -0.075
5 & 6 -0.256 0.043 -5.970 0.000 -0.339 -0.172
Age of mother (Base: 25-29)
-15 -1.734 0.418 -4.150 0.000 -2.553 -0.915
15-19 -0.169 0.048 -3.490 0.000 -0.264 -0.074
20-24 -0.066 0.036 -1.840 0.065 -0.137 0.004
30-34 -0.151 0.040 -3.750 0.000 -0.230 -0.072
35-39 -0.352 0.052 -6.740 0.000 -0.455 -0.250
40-44 -0.465 0.083 -5.580 0.000 -0.629 -0.302
45-49 -0.550 0.334 -1.650 0.100 -1.205 0.105
Interaction: Duration and Age of mother
-15 -0.052 0.029 -1.780 0.075 -0.110 0.005
15-19 0.000 0.002 0.100 0.921 -0.005 0.005
20-24 0.001 0.001 0.970 0.333 -0.001 0.004
30-34 0.002 0.001 1.730 0.084 0.000 0.005
35-39 -0.002 0.002 -1.030 0.304 -0.005 0.001
40-44 -0.005 0.002 -2.180 0.030 -0.010 -0.001
45-49 -0.010 0.011 -0.970 0.330 -0.031 0.011
Linguistic group of mother (Base: Nguni)
English/Afrikaans -0.186 0.132 -1.410 0.159 -0.444 0.073
Sotho -0.178 0.031 -5.820 0.000 -0.238 -0.118
Other African -0.074 0.049 -1.520 0.130 -0.169 0.022
Interaction: Duration and Linguistic group
English/Afrikaans 0.004 0.004 1.040 0.299 -0.004 0.012
Sotho 0.004 0.001 4.400 0.000 0.002 0.006
Other African 0.009 0.002 5.110 0.000 0.006 0.013
Childhood residence and survey (Base: Rural 1987)
City 1987 -0.077 0.076 -1.010 0.312 -0.226 0.072
City 1998
Town 1987 -0.193 0.042 -4.620 0.000 -0.275 -0.111
Town 1998 0.231 0.110 2.100 0.036 0.016 0.446
Rural 1998 0.523 0.098 5.310 0.000 0.330 0.716
City 1987 0.001 0.003 0.510 0.611 -0.004 0.007
City 1998 0.006 0.003 2.020 0.043 0.000 0.012
Town 1987 0.002 0.001 1.050 0.292 -0.001 0.004
Town 1998
Rural 1998 -0.005 0.002 -2.580 0.010 -0.009 -0.001
/continued…
95% Confidence Interval
Interaction: Duration and Childhood residence and survey
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
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PARAMETER Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
Current residence (Base: Urban)
Rural 0.053 0.033 1.580 0.115 -0.013 0.118
Interaction: Survey and Current residence
Rural 1998 0.118 0.056 2.090 0.036 0.007 0.228
Education (Base: No education)
Education up to St. 3 (Grade 5) -0.053 0.045 -1.190 0.235 -0.141 0.035
Education up to St. 5 (Grade 7) -0.120 0.044 -2.710 0.007 -0.206 -0.033
Education up to St. 9 (Grade 11) -0.239 0.043 -5.580 0.000 -0.323 -0.155
Education up to St. 10 (Grade 12), or higher -0.555 0.059 -9.430 0.000 -0.670 -0.440
Interaction: Duration and Education
Education up to St. 3 (Grade 5) 0.003 0.002 1.850 0.065 0.000 0.006
Education up to St. 5 (Grade 7) 0.004 0.002 2.650 0.008 0.001 0.007
Education up to St. 9 (Grade 11) 0.006 0.002 3.880 0.000 0.003 0.009
Education up to St. 10 (Grade 12), or higher 0.008 0.002 3.940 0.000 0.004 0.012
Access to material resources  (Base: 0 or 1 durable, 1987)
0 or 1 durable, 1998
2 or 3 durables, 1987 -0.170 0.039 -4.400 0.000 -0.246 -0.094
2 or 3 durables, 1998 -0.367 0.052 -7.000 0.000 -0.470 -0.264
Interaction: Duration and Access to material resources
0 or 1 durable, 1998 -0.003 0.002 -1.810 0.070 -0.006 0.000
2 or 3 durables, 1987 0.005 0.001 3.220 0.001 0.002 0.007
2 or 3 durables, 1998
Marital status (Base: Married)
Never Married -0.266 0.039 -6.780 0.000 -0.343 -0.189
Interaction: Duration and Marital status 
Never Married 0.008 0.001 6.460 0.000 0.006 0.010
Interaction: Survey and Marital status 
Never Married 1998 0.129 0.049 2.620 0.009 0.033 0.226
Propensity for marital disruption (Base: Married, 1 Union)
Single, 0 unions -0.517 0.044 -11.660 0.000 -0.603 -0.430
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1 union -0.283 0.050 -5.630 0.000 -0.381 -0.185
Married, 1+ unions -0.192 0.053 -3.610 0.000 -0.297 -0.088
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1+ unions -0.166 0.111 -1.500 0.135 -0.385 0.052
Interaction: Duration and Propensity for marital disruption
Single, 0 unions -0.004 0.001 -3.000 0.003 -0.007 -0.002
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1 union -0.003 0.002 -1.520 0.129 -0.006 0.001
Married, 1+ unions 0.002 0.002 0.820 0.412 -0.002 0.005
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1+ unions -0.006 0.004 -1.370 0.170 -0.013 0.002
Resident in KwaZulu Natal (Base: Not resident)
Resident -0.142 0.039 -3.600 0.000 -0.219 -0.065
Interaction: Resident in KwzZulu Natal and Survey
Resident, 1998 0.145 0.061 2.360 0.018 0.024 0.265
Constant
-3.004 0.064 -47.300 0.000 -3.129 -2.880
/lnalpha 0.105 0.042 0.023 0.186
alpha 1.110 0.046 1.024 1.204
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0  chibar2(01)= 1236.22 Prob>=chibar2 0.000
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
95% Confidence Interval
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Table A4 Model results – Hypothesis Four (Disease and sub-fecundability) 
Negative binomial regression Number of observations 87310
LR chi2(75) 5505.930
Prob > chi2 0.000
Log likelihood = -32604.372 Pseudo R2 0.078
PARAMETER Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
Interval (Base: 30)
0 -5.172 0.193 -26.790 0.000 -5.551 -4.794
9 -1.539 0.063 -24.580 0.000 -1.662 -1.417
18 -0.661 0.053 -12.400 0.000 -0.766 -0.557
24 -0.134 0.047 -2.830 0.005 -0.227 -0.041
36 0.083 0.046 1.800 0.072 -0.007 0.173
42 0.051 0.048 1.060 0.290 -0.044 0.146
48 0.076 0.052 1.470 0.143 -0.026 0.177
54 0.110 0.056 1.980 0.048 0.001 0.219
60 0.177 0.060 2.960 0.003 0.060 0.294
66 0.086 0.067 1.280 0.201 -0.046 0.217
72 0.076 0.065 1.170 0.241 -0.051 0.203
84 0.052 0.079 0.670 0.506 -0.102 0.207
96 0.130 0.092 1.420 0.157 -0.050 0.310
108
Survey (Base: 1987)
1998 -0.617 0.112 -5.520 0.000 -0.836 -0.398
Duration (continuous, = 0 at interval = 27) -0.025 0.002 -11.780 0.000 -0.029 -0.021
Interaction: Duration and Survey
1998 0.016 0.002 7.350 0.000 0.012 0.021
Birth order (Base: 1 & 2)
3 & 4 -0.132 0.029 -4.510 0.000 -0.190 -0.075
5 & 6 -0.256 0.043 -5.970 0.000 -0.340 -0.172
Age of mother (Base: 25-29)
-15 -1.730 0.418 -4.140 0.000 -2.549 -0.910
15-19 -0.161 0.048 -3.330 0.001 -0.256 -0.066
20-24 -0.061 0.036 -1.690 0.091 -0.131 0.010
30-34 -0.155 0.040 -3.850 0.000 -0.234 -0.076
35-39 -0.358 0.052 -6.840 0.000 -0.460 -0.255
40-44 -0.471 0.083 -5.650 0.000 -0.635 -0.308
45-49 -0.560 0.334 -1.680 0.093 -1.215 0.094
Interaction: Duration and Age of mother
-15 -0.052 0.029 -1.780 0.074 -0.110 0.005
15-19 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.994 -0.005 0.005
20-24 0.001 0.001 0.880 0.380 -0.001 0.004
30-34 0.002 0.001 1.720 0.085 0.000 0.005
35-39 -0.002 0.002 -0.990 0.320 -0.005 0.002
40-44 -0.005 0.002 -2.190 0.029 -0.010 -0.001
45-49 -0.010 0.011 -0.970 0.330 -0.031 0.011
Linguistic group of mother (Base: Nguni)
English/Afrikaans -0.176 0.132 -1.330 0.182 -0.434 0.082
Sotho -0.142 0.029 -4.850 0.000 -0.199 -0.084
Other African -0.002 0.049 -0.040 0.968 -0.098 0.094
Interaction: Duration and Linguistic group
English/Afrikaans 0.004 0.004 0.960 0.337 -0.004 0.011
Sotho 0.004 0.001 4.170 0.000 0.002 0.006
Other African 0.008 0.002 4.660 0.000 0.005 0.012
Childhood residence and survey (Base: Rural 1987)
City 1987 -0.022 0.076 -0.290 0.774 -0.171 0.127
City 1998
Town 1987 -0.176 0.042 -4.210 0.000 -0.257 -0.094
Town 1998 0.233 0.110 2.130 0.033 0.018 0.448
Rural 1998 0.525 0.098 5.350 0.000 0.333 0.718
City 1987 0.001 0.003 0.510 0.612 -0.004 0.007
City 1998 0.006 0.003 2.020 0.043 0.000 0.012
Town 1987 0.001 0.001 1.000 0.319 -0.001 0.004
Town 1998
Rural 1998 -0.005 0.002 -2.540 0.011 -0.009 -0.001
/continued…
95% Confidence Interval
Interaction: Duration and Childhood residence and survey
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
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PARAMETER Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
Current residence (Base: Urban)
Rural 0.057 0.033 1.710 0.087 -0.008 0.123
Interaction: Survey and Current residence
Rural 1998 0.105 0.056 1.860 0.063 -0.006 0.216
Education (Base: No education)
Education up to St. 3 (Grade 5) -0.062 0.045 -1.380 0.167 -0.150 0.026
Education up to St. 5 (Grade 7) -0.135 0.044 -3.040 0.002 -0.222 -0.048
Education up to St. 9 (Grade 11) -0.257 0.043 -5.980 0.000 -0.341 -0.172
Education up to St. 10 (Grade 12), or higher -0.572 0.059 -9.710 0.000 -0.687 -0.456
Interaction: Duration and Education
Education up to St. 3 (Grade 5) 0.003 0.002 1.870 0.061 0.000 0.006
Education up to St. 5 (Grade 7) 0.004 0.002 2.770 0.006 0.001 0.008
Education up to St. 9 (Grade 11) 0.006 0.002 3.960 0.000 0.003 0.009
Education up to St. 10 (Grade 12), or higher 0.008 0.002 3.960 0.000 0.004 0.012
Access to material resources  (Base: 0 or 1 durable, 1987)
0 or 1 durable, 1998
2 or 3 durables, 1987 -0.156 0.039 -4.020 0.000 -0.232 -0.080
2 or 3 durables, 1998 -0.365 0.052 -6.970 0.000 -0.468 -0.263
Interaction: Duration and Access to material resources
0 or 1 durable, 1998 -0.003 0.002 -1.710 0.087 -0.006 0.000
2 or 3 durables, 1987 0.005 0.001 3.180 0.001 0.002 0.007
2 or 3 durables, 1998
Marital status (Base: Married)
Never Married -0.272 0.039 -6.950 0.000 -0.349 -0.196
Interaction: Duration and Marital status 
Never Married 0.008 0.001 6.400 0.000 0.006 0.010
Interaction: Survey and Marital status 
Never Married 1998 0.148 0.049 3.030 0.002 0.052 0.244
Propensity for marital disruption (Base: Married, 1 Union)
Single, 0 unions -0.530 0.044 -11.940 0.000 -0.617 -0.443
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1 union -0.280 0.050 -5.570 0.000 -0.378 -0.181
Married, 1+ unions -0.175 0.054 -3.260 0.001 -0.279 -0.070
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1+ unions -0.150 0.111 -1.340 0.179 -0.368 0.069
Interaction: Duration and Propensity for marital disruption
Single, 0 unions -0.004 0.001 -2.990 0.003 -0.007 -0.001
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1 union -0.003 0.002 -1.540 0.124 -0.006 0.001
Married, 1+ unions 0.001 0.002 0.650 0.515 -0.002 0.005
Divorced, Separated, Widowed, 1+ unions -0.006 0.004 -1.440 0.149 -0.014 0.002
Resident in provinces with high HIV and Survey (Base: Resident, 1987)
Not resident, 1987 0.153 0.034 4.450 0.000 0.085 0.220
Not resident, 1998
Resident, 1998 -0.063 0.054 -1.160 0.247 -0.169 0.043
Interaction: Resident in provinces with high HIV and duration
Not resident, 1987 0.000 0.001 -0.110 0.915 -0.003 0.002
Not resident, 1998 -0.004 0.002 -2.320 0.020 -0.007 -0.001
Resident, 1998
Constant
-3.100 0.065 -47.730 0.000 -3.227 -2.972
/lnalpha 0.105 0.041 0.024 0.187
alpha 1.111 0.046 1.024 1.205
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0  chibar2(01)= 1238.46 Prob>=chibar2 0.000
95% Confidence Interval
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
Dropped due to collinearity
